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A B S T R A C T
Within the last decade, smartphone applications and online services
became universal resources and an integral part of nowadays life. Un-
fortunately, the ongoing digitization trend is also a huge risk for the
individual’s privacy because users of these interconnected devices
and services become more and more transparent and reveal sensi-
tive data to an untrusted and possibly unknown service provider. Yet,
since the 1980’s it is known that any computation between two or
more parties can be evaluated securely such that the parties do not
learn more about the inputs of the other parties than they can derive
from the output of the computation. For a long time considered to be
a purely theoretical concept, in the last fifteen years, this technique
known as Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC), transitioned into
a powerful cryptographic tool to build privacy-enhancing technol-
ogy. As such MPC could prevent mass surveillance of online services
while maintaining the majority of their business use cases. Further-
more, MPC could be an enabler for novel business-to-business use
cases, where mutually distrusting parties corporate by sharing data
without losing control over it. Albeit its potential, the practicality of
MPC is hindered by the difficulty to implement applications on top
of the underlying cryptographic protocols. This is because their man-
ual construction requires expertise in cryptography and hardware de-
sign. The latter is required as functionalities in MPC are commonly
expressed by Boolean and Arithmetic circuits, whose creation is a
complex, error-prone, and time-consuming task.
To make MPC accessible to non-domain experts, in this thesis we
design, implement, and evaluate multiple compilation techniques that
translate the high-level language ANSI C into circuit representations
optimized for different classes of MPC protocols. Split in two parts,
we focus on Boolean circuit based protocols in the first part of this
thesis. We begin with an introduction into compilation and optimiza-
tion of circuits with minimal size, which is required for constant
round MPC protocols over Boolean circuits, such as Yao’s Garbled
Circuits protocol. For this purpose, we identify and evaluate classic
logic minimization techniques for their application in compilation for
MPC. Then, we present compiler assisted parallelization approaches
for Yao’s protocol that distribute the computational workload onto
multiple processors, which can allow a faster or possibly more en-
ergy efficient protocol evaluation. By extending the protocol, we fur-
ther show that parallelization leads to speed-ups even in single-core
settings. As not only size minimization is of relevance for MPC, we
also propose a compilation chain for the creation of depth-minimized
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Boolean circuits, optimized for their use in multi-round protocols,
such as the GMW protocol. For this purpose, we propose and im-
plement new hand-optimized building blocks as well as code and
circuit minimization techniques. In most cases the presented compil-
ers create applications from high-level source code that outperform
previous (hand-optimized) work.
In the second part, we introduce compilers for two advanced hy-
brid MPC protocols. First, we study the creation of MPC applica-
tions using multiple (standalone) MPC protocols at once. By com-
bining protocols with different paradigms, e.g., Boolean and Arith-
metic circuits based protocols, faster applications can be created. For
the compilation of these hybrid applications we design and present
novel code decomposition and optimization techniques. Moreover,
we introduce solutions to the protocol selection problem to efficiently
combine multiple protocols. Thus, we are able to present the first
compiler that achieves full automatization from source code to hy-
brid MPC. Second, we investigate compilation for the combination of
Oblivious RAM with MPC, also known as RAM based secure compu-
tation (RAM-SC). RAM-SC is required in data intensive applications,
where circuit based protocols show limited scalability. A multitude of
ORAMs based on different design principles with different trade-offs
has been proposed. We explore all these design principles and corre-
sponding deployment costs in different scenarios, before introducing
a compiler that identifies an optimal selection of ORAM schemes for
a given input source code. As such, we present the first fully autom-
atized compile chain for RAM-SC programs.
In summary, we contribute in making MPC practical by improving
both, efficiency and automatized application generation.
Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Eine der größten technischen Entwicklungen in den letzten 15 Jah-
ren ist der Fortschritt des Smartphones, die ständige Verfügbarkeit
von Informationen und Konnektivität, sowie die damit verbundene
Nutzung von mächtigen Onlinediensten. Leider birgt dieser Digita-
lisierungstrend auch große Risiken für die Privatsphäre der Nutzer,
denn diese werden immer transparenter für den teilweise unbekann-
ten Dienstanbieter. Es ist jedoch bereits seit Mitte der 1980er-Jahre be-
kannt, dass jegliche Art von Berechnung oder Interaktion zwischen
zwei oder mehreren Parteien auch privatsphärefreundlich durchge-
führt werden kann, so dass die teilnehmenden Parteien nicht mehr
über die Eingaben der anderen Parteien lernen können, als das was
sie sich von der gemeinsame Ausgabe ableiten können. Lange war
diese Idee der sicheren Mehrparteienberechnung (MPC) nur ein theo-
retisches Konzept, jedoch hat es sich in den letzten 15 Jahren in ein
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sehr praktisches kryptographisches Werkzeug entwickelt, um privat-
sphäreschützende Anwendungen zu realisieren. Als solches könnte
MPC helfen die Massenüberwachung der Onlinedienste zu unterbin-
den, ohne deren Geschäftsmodelle komplett außer Kraft zu setzen.
MPC ermöglicht auch neuartige Geschäftsmodelle, so dass beispiels-
weise zwei sich nicht vertrauende Unternehmen kooperieren und
Daten teilen, ohne dabei die Kontrolle über diese Daten an den Ge-
schäftspartner zu verlieren. Trotz des immensen Potentials von MPC
findet es kaum Anwendung in der Praxis. Dies liegt vor allem an der
Komplexität und dem Aufwand, um Anwendungen für existierende
MPC Protokolle zu entwickeln. Die Erstellung dieser Anwendungen
benötigt nämlich umfangreiche Kenntnisse der Kryptographie und
des Logikdesigns (Schaltungsbau). Letzteres wird benötigt, da Funk-
tionen in MPC üblicherweise in Form von logischen oder arithmeti-
schen Schaltungen dargestellt werden, deren händische Erzeugung
sehr fehleranfällig und zeitaufwendig ist.
Um MPC auch Nicht-Experten zugängliche zu machen, haben wir
im Rahmen dieser Arbeit verschiedene Übersetzungstechniken (Com-
piler) entwickelt, implementiert und evaluiert, die es ermöglichen
standard ANSI C Programmcode automatisiert in Schaltungen für
verschiedene Klassen von MPC Protokollen zu übersetzen. Diese Ar-
beit besteht aus zwei Teilen, wobei sich der erste Teil mit der Erzeu-
gung von logischen Schaltkreisen beschäftigt. Wir beginnen mit einer
Betrachtung der Konstruktion von Schaltungen mit minimaler Grö-
ße. Diese werden üblicherweise in MPC Protokollen mit konstanter
Rundenanzahl eingesetzt, wie beispielsweise Yao’s Garbled Circuits
Protokoll. Zu diesem Zweck analysieren und adaptieren wir klas-
sische Logikminimierungstechniken für MPC. Anschließend zeigen
wir, wie Yao’s Protokoll mit Hilfe eines Compilers effektiv paralleli-
siert werden kann, um die Protokollausführung auf Mehrprozessor-
systemen zu beschleunigen. Weiterhin präsentieren wir eine Protokol-
lerweiterung, die selbst auf einem einzigen Rechenkern die Berech-
nungszeit durch Parallelisierung reduzieren kann. Neben der Mini-
mierung der Schaltungsgröße, ist die Minimierung der Schaltungstie-
fe von besondere Relevanz für MPC Protokolle mit variabler Runden-
anzahl, wie beispielsweise dem GMW Protokoll. Für diese Art von
Protokollen präsentieren wir einen Übersetzungsansatz, bestehend
aus neuen handminimierten Schaltungsbausteinen und Schaltungs-
minimierungstechniken. Die im Rahmen dieser Arbeit entstandenen
Compiler, die die vorgestellten Techniken implementieren, erzeugen
Schaltungen aus einer Hochsprache, die meist schneller evaluiert wer-
den können als die zuvor vorgestellten und oft händisch optimierten
Schaltungen.
Im zweiten Teil dieser Arbeit beschäftigen wir uns mit der Schal-
tungserzeugung für hybride MPC Protokolle. Hier zeigen wir zum
einen die automatisierte Konstruktion von Anwendungen, die ver-
v
schiedene MPC Protokolle in einer Anwendung kombinieren. Durch
die Kombination von Protokollen mit verschiedenen Designprinzipi-
en, beispielsweise logische und arithmetische Schaltungen, können
Anwendungen weiter beschleunigt werden. Zur Erzeugung dieser hy-
briden Anwendungen präsentieren wir neue Codezerlegungs- und
Optimierungstechniken. Weiterhin stellen wir Lösungen vor, welche
die effizienteste Kombination von Protokollen für eine gegebene An-
wendungszerlegung identifizieren kann. Mit diesem Beitrag können
wir den ersten Compiler präsentieren, der eine vollständige Auto-
matisierung von Programmcode zu hybriden Anwendungen erzielt.
Als zweite hybride Protokollklasse betrachten wir die Compilierung
von RAM basierten Protokollen. Diese so genannten RAM-SC Pro-
tokolle kombinieren klassische MPC Protokolle mit Oblivious RAM
(ORAM) Techniken und werden für datenintensive Anwendungen
benötigt. Da existierende ORAMs verschiedenste Designprinzipien
verwenden, präsentieren wir eine umfangreiche ORAM Kostenana-
lyse mit der die Laufzeit von RAM-SC in beliebigen Einsatzszenari-
en abgeschätzt werden kann. Diese Abschätzung ermöglicht es uns,
den ersten voll automatisierten Compiler für RAM-SC vorzustellen,
der sämtliche Speicherzugriffe in einem gegebenen Programmcode
erfasst und die effizientesten ORAMs ermitteln kann.
Zusammenfassend trägt diese Arbeit dazu bei, MPC praxistaug-
licher und zugänglicher für Nicht-Experten zu machen, indem die
Entwicklungsprozesse automatisiert und die Effizienz von MPC An-
wendungen gesteigert wird.
vi
E R K L Ä R U N G
Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit – abgesehen von
den in ihr ausdrücklich genannten Hilfen – selbständig verfasst habe.
Niklas Büscher
A K A D E M I S C H E R W E R D E G A N G
11/2013 - 10/2018 Technische Universität Darmstadt
Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter
Promotionsstudium
04/2011 - 10/2013 Technische Universität Darmstadt
Studium der Informatik
Abschluss: Master of Science
08/2011 - 05/2012 University of Boulder, Colorado, USA
Studium der Informatik
04/2008 - 03/2011 Technische Universität Darmstadt
Studium der Informatik
Abschluss: Bachelor of Science
vii
P U B L I C AT I O N S
This thesis is based on the following publications:
1. Niklas Büscher and Stefan Katzenbeisser. “Faster Secure Compu-
tation through Automatic Parallelization”. In: Proceedings of the
24th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2015,
Washington, D.C., USA.
2. Niklas Büscher, Andreas Holzer, Alina Weber, and Stefan Kat-
zenbeisser. “Compiling Low Depth Circuits for Practical Secure Com-
putation”. In: Proceedings of the 21st European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2016, Heraklion,
Greece.
3. Niklas Büscher, David Kretzmer, Arnav Jindal, and Stefan Kat-
zenbeisser. “Scalable Secure Computation from ANSI-C”. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 8th IEEE International Workshop on Informa-
tion Forensics and Security, WIFS 2016, Abu Dhabi, United
Arab Emirates.
4. Niklas Büscher, Martin Franz, Andreas Holzer, Helmut Veith,
and Stefan Katzenbeisser. “On Compiling Boolean Circuits Opti-
mized for Secure Multi-Party Computation”. In: Formal Methods
in System Design 51(2).
5. Niklas Büscher and Stefan Katzenbeisser, “Compilation for Secure
Multi-Party Computation”, Springer Briefs in Computer Science
2017, ISBN 978-3-319-67521-3.
6. Niklas Büscher, Alina Weber, and Stefan Katzenbeisser, “Towards
Practical RAM-based Secure Computation”. In: Proceedings of the
23rd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security,
ESORICS 2018, Barcelona, Spain.
7. Niklas Büscher, Daniel Demmler, Stefan Katzenbeisser, David
Kretzmer, and Thomas Schneider. “HyCC: Compilation of Hybrid
Protocols for Practical Secure Computation.” In: Proceedings of the
25th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security, CCS 2018, Toronto, Canada.
Further peer-reviewed publications published during my doctoral
studies:
8. Johannes A. Buchmann, Niklas Büscher, Florian Göpfert, Ste-
fan Katzenbeisser, Juliane Krämer, Daniele Micciancio, Sander
viii
Siim, Christine van Vredendaal, Michael Walter. “Creating Cryp-
tographic Challenges Using Multi-Party Computation: The LWE Chal-
lenge”. In: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM International Workshop
on ASIA Public-Key Cryptography, AsiaPKC@AsiaCCS
2016, Xi’an, China.
9. Niklas Büscher, Stefan Schiffner, Mathias Fischer. “Consumer Pri-
vacy on Distributed Energy Markets”. In: Proceedings of the Pri-
vacy Technologies and Policy - 4th Annual Privacy Forum, APF
2016, Frankfurt, Germany.
10. Florian Kohnhäuser, Niklas Büscher, Sebastian Gabmeyer, Ste-
fan Katzenbeisser. “SCAPI: A Scalable Attestation Protocol to De-
tect Software and Physical Attacks”. In: Proceedings of the 10th
ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mo-
bile Networks, WiSec 2017, Boston, USA.
11. Niklas Büscher, Spyros Boukoros, Stefan Bauregger, Stefan Kat-
zenbeisser. “Two Is Not Enough: Privacy Assessment of Aggregation
Schemes in Smart Metering”. In: Proceedings of the 17th Privacy
Enhancing Technologies Symposium, PETS 2017, Minneapo-
lis, USA.
12. Florian Kohnhäuser, Niklas Büscher, Stefan Katzenbeisser.
“SALAD: Secure and Lightweight Attestation of Highly Dynamic and
Disruptive Networks”. In: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Asia Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security, AsiaCCS
2018, Incheon, Republic of Korea.
ix
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
Being at the final step of the doctorate allows me to thank every-
one who supported me along the way. Foremost, I am very grateful
to my advisor Stefan Katzenbeisser, for his invaluable guidance in
and beyond research, the enjoyable working environment, and espe-
cially for the many mountaineering trips to Kleinwalsertal. Further-
more, I thank Florian Kerschbaum, for agreeing to be the second re-
viewer and even more for going to any length in trying to keep me in
academia. My thank also goes to Christian Reuter, Thomas Schneider,
and Neeraj Suri for joining the defense committee.
I owe my first contacts to research to Marc Fischlin and Michael
Goesele, who both were independently willing to push undergradu-
ate projects, jointly tackled with Benjamin, into papers and sponsor-
ing our first conference visit. During my masters I was very warmly
welcomed into the TK security group led by Stefan and Mathias, who
gave me a first introduction into privacy research.
Then, during my doctoral studies, I had the honor to work with ex-
cellent colleagues in the SecEng team. Without revealing any details,
e.g., with whom I shared the most coffee breaks, I have to say that
it was my pleasure to work with André, Christian, Dominik, Erik,
Florian, Heike, Marius, Markus, Nikolaos I., Nikolaos II., Nikolay,
Philipp, Sebastian B., Sebastian G., Spyros, Tolga, and Ursula. Sim-
ilarly, I would like to thank the ENCRYPTO group, namely, Ágnes,
Amos, Christian, Daniel, Michael, Oleksandr, and Thomas for accept-
ing me as an alien MPC researcher, sharing many conference visits,
lunches, and coffees, which frequently led to fruitful discussions.
Likewise, I am very thankful for my co-authors and students, most
notably Alina for her passion and endurance in performing circuitry,
Andreas for introducing me to CBMC-GC, which provides a founda-
tion for the tools developed as part of this thesis, and David for his
commitment in compiler development as well as his exceptional ex-
pertise in C++ and information flow.
Many thanks go to my family for their continuous encouragement,
teaching me open-mindedness, and the importance of education. But
most of all, I am grateful for my wife Katharina, especially for her
never-ending support and patience throughout the past years.
x
C O N T E N T S
1 introduction 1
1.1 Research Goal and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
i preliminaries 7
2 basic techniques 8
2.1 Digital Logic and Boolean Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Oblivious RAM and RAM-SC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Compilers for MPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Benchmarking Applications for MPC Compilers . . . . 25
3 from ansi c code to boolean circuits 32
3.1 Motivation and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 CBMC-GC’s Compilation Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 Complexity of Operations in MPC . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
ii compilation and optimization for boolean cir-
cuit based mpc protocols 45
4 compiling size-optimized circuits for constant-
round mpc protocols 46
4.1 Motivation and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2 Circuit Minimization for MPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3 Building Blocks for Boolean Circuit Based MPC . . . . 50
4.4 Gate-Level Circuit Minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.5 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5 compiling parallel circuits 65
5.1 Motivation and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.2 Parallel Circuit Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3 Compiler Assisted Parallelization Heuristics . . . . . . 68
5.4 Inter-Party Parallelization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.5 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6 compiling depth-optimized circuits for multi-round
mpc protocols 94
6.1 Motivation and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.2 Compilation Chain for Low-Depth Circuits . . . . . . . 96
6.3 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.4 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
xi
iii compilation and optimization for hybrid mpc
protocols 116
7 compilation of hybrid protocols for practical
secure computation 117
7.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.2 The HyCC MPC Compiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.3 Protocol Selection and Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.4 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
8 compilation for ram-based secure computation 148
8.1 Motivation and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
8.2 Analysis and Optimization of ORAMs for Secure Com-
putation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.3 Automatized RAM-SC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.4 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
8.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
9 conclusion and future work 167
bibliography 170
xii
A C R O N Y M S
aig AND-Invert Graph
abb Arithmetic Black Box
asap As-soon-as-possible
ast Abstract Syntax Tree
bmc Bounded Model Checking
cfg Control Flow Graph
cgp Coarse-Grained Parallelization
cnf Conjunctive Normal Form
cnn Convolutional Neural Network
csa Carry-Save Adder
csn Carry-Save Network
dag Directed Acyclic Graph
dnf Disjunctive Normal Form
dpf Distributed Point Function
dsl Domain Specific Language
fa Full Adder
fgp Fine-Grained Parallelization
fss Function Secret Sharing
grr Garbled Row Reduction
ha Half Adder
ipp Inter-Party Parallelization
lsb Least Significant Bit
mpc Secure Multi-Party Computation
oram Oblivious RAM
pet Privacy-Enhancing Technology
pir Private Information Retrieval
xiii
ppa Parallel Prefix Adder
prf Pseudo Random Function
rca Ripple Carry Adder
rtt Round Trip Time
se Symbolic Execution
simd Single-Instruction-Multiple-Data
ssa Single Static Assignment
tpc Secure Two-Party Computation
xiv
“Die [...] Gestaltung von Datenverarbeitungssystemen sind
an dem Ziel auszurichten, so wenig personenbezogene Daten
wie möglich zu erheben, zu verarbeiten oder zu nutzen [...],
soweit dies nach dem Verwendungzweck möglich ist
und keinen im Verhältnis zu dem angestrebten Schutz-
zweck unverhältnismäßigen Aufwand erfordert.”
— Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG)
§3a Datenvermeidung und Datensparsamkeit
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The continuous grow of data gathering and processing, which is fired
by cheap sensors (e.g., in smart phones and wearables), cheap storage
costs, and efficient machine learning algorithms enables many use-
ful applications and powerful online services. However, this form of
heavy data processing, often referred to as ‘Big Data’, is also a huge
risk for the individual’s privacy because users of these services be-
come more and more transparent and reveal possibly sensitive data
to an untrusted and possibly unknown service provider. Even when
not assuming any malicious interest of the data collectors, the gath-
ered data is often centrally stored, and thus prone to many possible
breaches, e.g., hackers exploiting vulnerabilities, maliciously acting
employees, requests by state agencies, or insufficient data disposal
management.
Currently, all these risks are mostly ignored by the service providers
as well as the users. The former have (often legitimate) commercial in-
terests in their business use cases and the latter are either unaware of
the actual value of their data, lack alternatives, or have no possibilities
to opt-out if they want to participate in nowadays life. Consequently,
we observe a sincere conflict between business interest and the right
on privacy when processing personal data. Yet, there is a solution
to this dilemma: Namely, since the 1980’s it is (theoretically) known
that any computation over sensitive data from multiple parties can be
performed securely, such that the participating parties do not learn
more about the inputs of the other parties from the computation than
they can already derive from the output [Yao82; Yao86]. This form of
computation is known as Secure Computation or Secure Multi-Party
Computation (MPC) and can be explained by an example application:
Consider two parties Alice and Bob that want to schedule a joint
meeting. Yet, Alice does not want to reveal her own schedule, i.e., her
availability, to Bob, as it might contain sensitive information. For the
same reasons, Bob prefers to maintain his schedule secret. As a solu-
tion they can involve a third person, e.g., Charlie, whom they both
1
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trust. Alice and Bob can send their private schedule, i.e., availabil-
ity slots, to Charlie, who identifies a matching time slot and reveals
this slot to Alice and Bob. Unfortunately, a third party that is trusted
by both parties barely exists in practice. MPC solves this problem by
simulating1 such a trusted third party using cryptographic protocols.
These protocols are run between the two parties, guarantee correct-
ness of the computation and privacy of the users’ data. Consequently,
MPC is a powerful Privacy-Enhancing Technology (PET), as the data
at the service providers can be processed under encryption, while
almost all functionality required for business use cases can be main-
tained.
Naturally, the questions arises: If such powerful cryptographic tech-
niques are available, why are they barely used in practice? The answer
is twofold. First, MPC protocols have noticeable deployment costs in
computation and communication. Second, creating, i.e., developing
efficient applications for MPC by hand, as it had often be done pre-
viously, is a tedious and error-prone task. In this thesis, we address
both challenges by presenting a multitude of compilation techniques and
implement these in compilers that automatically synthesize optimized MPC
applications for different deployment scenarios from high-level code. By au-
tomatizing the creation of MPC applications we significantly lower
the entry barrier to MPC.
Our work is of practical relevance because of two main reasons:
First, applied cryptography and IT infrastructures in general are get-
ting more and more complex. To handle this growing complexity, sim-
pler developer interfaces and further automatization are desirable to
create secure applications. This situation has been identified by indus-
try and academia alike. For example, replacements for standard cryp-
tography libraries have been proposed that provide clearer interfaces
to developers, e.g., [BLS12], and also dedicated tools have been de-
veloped that synthesize secure cryptographic implementations, e.g.,
[Krü+17]. Thus, automated compilation for MPC contributes in this
direction, as it reduces the complexity when designing new PETs.
Second, the right to privacy is known for ages in most civiliza-
tions and therefore most countries have issued data protection laws
that regulate the (commercial) use of data with different scopes and
strengths. For example, an excerpt of the German privacy law, which
has recently been adapted to the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), is printed at the beginning of this chapter. Loosely
translated, this excerpt says that all data processing systems should
be developed with the goal to use, store, and process as little per-
sonal data as possible, if this is reasonable given the technical efforts. The
proof-of-concept compilers developed as part of this thesis illustrate
that the technical efforts to implement privacy-preserving computa-
tion are reasonable and consequently the use of MPC in highly sensi-
1 Not meant in the cryptography way.
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tive areas, e.g., genome processing or the handling of health records,
should be considered.
1.1 research goal and contribution
The goal of this thesis is the design, development, and evaluation of
compilation techniques for efficiency improvements of MPC, when
compiling from a high-level programming language. In this section,
we specify this goal, outline our contributions, and illustrate the con-
nection to related work.
secure multi-party computation. In MPC, two main re-
search directions are distinguished. First, MPC protocols dedicated
for specific applications have been developed, e.g., for recommender
systems [KP08] or privacy-preserving face recognition [Erk+09]. Sec-
ond, generic protocols have been proposed that allow to perform any
computation between two or more parties securely2. Dedicated pro-
tocols require cryptographers to prove their correctness and security,
yet in principal have the possibility to outperform the generic tech-
niques. Generic protocols only need to be proven secure once and
then offer significantly more versatility because any application can
realized on top of these protocols without further security proofs,
and thus without expert knowledge in cryptography. Due to these
reasons, many generic protocols using different cryptographic prim-
itives have been proposed, e.g., [Ara+17; BLW08; Dam+12; GMW87;
Yao82], and also many theoretical and practical optimizations, e.g.,
[Bel+13; KS08; Pin+09; ZRE15] made these protocols ready for prac-
tice. The focus of this thesis is the compilation for generic MPC pro-
tocols.3
application descriptions and compilation. At the heart
of (generic) MPC is the ability to efficiently represent the function-
ality to be computed. Most existing protocols require either a for-
mulation in terms of a Boolean or an Arithmetic circuit. Circuits are
acyclic graphs, where values flow along the edges, i.e., ‘wires’, and
are processed at nodes, representing either Boolean functions (in case
of Boolean circuits), e.g., logical AND, or basic Arithmetic operations
(in case of Arithmetic circuits). Hand-coding these circuits, i.e., effi-
ciently formulating the function to be computed in terms of basic
Boolean or Arithmetic operations, is practically infeasible even for
moderately complex functions, as the manual construction of efficient
2 The term secure is defined more precisely in Section 2.2.
3 The tools developed as part of this thesis are creating applications for MPC with
only two parties, commonly referred to as Secure Two-Party Computation (TPC).
Nevertheless, we remark that the ideas presented in this work transfer for protocols
with any number of parties. Because of this and for the sake of generality we will
use the term MPC in the remainder of this thesis.
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circuits for MPC is a complex and time-consuming task that requires
expert knowledge in hardware design. Therefore, the first practical
framework (protocol implementation) [Mal+04] for Yao’s Garbled Cir-
cuits protocol [Yao86], which is one of the most studied MPC pro-
tocols, also provided a rudimentary compiler for a domain specific
language. In following works, e.g., [Hol+12; Hua+11b], compilation
has been identified as an independent task, separated from MPC pro-
tocol implementations. Since then, a multitude of compilers has been
proposed. We give a detailed overview and classification of these in
Section 2.4.
research goal In this thesis, we study compilation approaches
that translate a high-level language (ANSI C) into optimized circuits
suiting the requirements of different classes of MPC protocols with a
major focus on the optimization for Boolean circuit based protocols.
As such, we aim at compiling circuit descriptions that are compara-
ble or better than previous handmade constructions, given a suitable
high-level description. Consequently, we aim at increasing both, us-
ability and efficiency of MPC.
contributions . A major part of this thesis deals with the com-
pilation and optimization for Boolean circuit based MPC protocols.
Optimizing the created circuits is necessary, as MPC is still multi-
ple orders of magnitude slower than generic computation. Therefore,
we first study hand-optimized building blocks and a fixed-point op-
timization algorithm that adapts circuit synthesis techniques, known
from logic or chip design [Gaj+12; She93], for their use in compilation
for MPC. We implement and evaluate these techniques in the ANSI C
compiler CBMC-GC by Holzer et al. [Hol+12] and illustrate their
capabilities to compile efficient circuits that are capable of outper-
forming commercial hardware synthesis tools. As such, we present
a compile-chain that creates small circuits from a standard program-
ming language. These circuits are useful for all constant round MPC
protocols that operate on Boolean circuits, e.g., Yao’s Garbled Circuits
protocol.
Although creating highly optimized applications, we observed that
MPC in general, and Yao’s protocol in particular, still require substan-
tial computational resources. Therefore, we study parallelization tech-
niques for Yao’s protocol. We propose two parallelization approaches
and introduce a new parallel protocol variant that allows to profit
from parallelization even in single core settings. Furthermore, we
present the first complete and automatized compile chain that cre-
ates and partitions circuits from standard ANSI C code that can be
evaluated efficiently in parallel MPC frameworks.
While working on improving the application efficiency in Yao’s pro-
tocol, many further MPC protocols also advanced and became of prac-
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tical relevance. Especially multi-round protocols based on Boolean
circuits, such as GMW [GMW86] and TinyOT [Nie+12] improved sig-
nificantly due to the advancements in Oblivious Transfers [Ash+13].
Also newer and faster protocols, e.g., [Ara+17], following the same
multi-round paradigm have been proposed. We address these devel-
opments and present an optimizing compiler from ANSI C that cre-
ates depth-minimized Boolean circuits for MPC. For this purpose, we
present new depth-minimized building blocks and adapt high- and
low-level optimization techniques, which allow to automatically gen-
erate circuits that outperform previously handmade constructions.
Recently also hybrid protocols, i.e., MPC protocols that combine
different techniques, e.g., Boolean with Arithmetic circuits or Boolean
circuits with Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [GO96], gained noticeable trac-
tion [DSZ15; Gor+12; Liu+14]. Therefore, we further extend the pre-
viously developed compilation chain to compile hybrid protocols. To
achieve this goal and to also cope with the development of increas-
ing circuit sizes, we present the first scalable compiler that allows to
compile, optimize, and partition hybrid MPC protocols consisting of
the combination of both Boolean and Arithmetic circuits.
Finally, we study the compilation and optimization for ORAM as-
sisted MPC protocols, also known as RAM-SC [Liu+14], which are
necessary for data intensive applications. For this purpose, we present
a cost analyses of relevant ORAM schemes, optimize these, and intro-
duce the first optimizing compilation chain for RAM-SC. In summary,
we make a wide range of MPC protocols accessible for non-domain
experts.
1.2 thesis outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured in three parts.
In Part I – Preliminaries we discuss basic techniques and notations.
In Chapter 2 we recap the basics of Boolean circuit design, give an
overview of MPC protocols relevant for this work, and describe re-
lated compilers for MPC. Moreover, we describe example applications
that are used as MPC benchmarks throughout this thesis. Then, in
Chapter 3 we describe a compiler, named CBMC-GC [Hol+12], which
translates ANSI C into Boolean circuits. This compiler is adapted and
extended in the following chapters to compile and optimize circuits
for the different protocols.
In Part II – Compilation and Optimization for Boolean Circuit based
MPC Protocols we present compilation techniques that focus on stan-
dalone MPC protocols that use Boolean circuits as application de-
scriptions. In Chapter 4 we present our first contribution by study-
ing multiple size-minimizing optimization techniques for their adap-
tion in circuit synthesis for MPC. The created circuits lead to ef-
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ficiency improvements for all constant-round MPC protocols over
Boolean circuits. Next, in Chapter 5, we study the parallelization
of Yao’s Garbled Circuits and present a compilation chain that cre-
ates circuits, which can be efficiently evaluated in parallel. In Chap-
ter 6 we present a compilation and optimization approach that com-
piles depth-minimized Boolean circuits. These are required for multi-
round MPC protocols that are deployed practical network environ-
ments.
In Part III – Compilation and Optimization for Hybrid MPC Protocols
we extend our work towards more advanced MPC protocols. In Chap-
ter 7 we study the compilation of hybrid MPC applications that con-
sist of Boolean and Arithmetic circuits, which allows to mix constant
and multi-round MPC protocols efficiently. Furthermore, we present
a compilation chain for RAM-SC that suits the requirements of data
intensive applications in Chapter 8.
Finally, in Chapter 9 we conclude our work and give an outlook on
future research directions in compilation for MPC.
Part I
P R E L I M I N A R I E S
2
B A S I C T E C H N I Q U E S
Summary: In this chapter, we describe basic techniques required to fol-
low the ideas presented in this thesis. First, in Section 2.1 we describe the
circuit computation model, and recap the properties of Boolean circuits,
which are predominately used in this thesis. Then, in Section 2.2, we de-
scribe three of the most studied secure computation protocols, namely Yao’s
Garbled Circuits protocol and the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) pro-
tocol, which are prototypic for constant-round and multi-round MPC proto-
cols over Boolean circuits, as well as a multi-round additive secret sharing
based protocol over Arithmetic circuits. Furthermore, we introduce the con-
cept of Oblivious RAM (ORAM) in Section 2.3, and show how ORAM can
be combined with secure computation protocols to build more efficient ap-
plications. Afterwards, in Section 2.4 we present a comparison of related
compilers for MPC. Finally, we discuss multiple applications that are used
for benchmarking purposes in Section 2.5.
2.1 digital logic and boolean circuits
Boolean circuits are a common representation of functions in com-
puter science and a mathematical model for digital logic circuits. A
Boolean circuit is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) with l inputs, m
outputs, and s gates. Technically, the graph consists of |V | = l+m+ s
nodes and |E| edges, where each node can either be of type input, out-
put or gate. Due to the relation of digital circuit synthesis, the edges
are called wires. We note that a Boolean circuit, as defined above, is
also referred to as a combinatorial circuit. Combinatorial circuits are
different to sequential circuits, which can be cyclic and carry a state.
As all MPC protocols described in this thesis evaluate combinatorial
circuits, their computational model is the combinatorial circuit model.
boolean gates . Each gate in a Boolean circuit has one or mul-
tiple input wires and one output wire, which can be input to many
subsequent gates. Each gate in a circuit represents a Boolean function
fg, which maps k input bits to one output bit, i.e., g(w1,w2, . . . ,wk) :
{0, 1}k → {0, 1}. In this thesis, we will only consider gates with at most
two input wires, namely unary and binary gates. The relevant unary
gate is the NOT gate (¬), while typical binary gates are AND (∧),
OR (∨), and XOR (⊕). Moreover, we distinguish between linear1 (e.g.,
XOR) and non-linear (e.g., AND, OR) gates, as they have different
1 The Boolean function represented by linear gates can be expressed by a linear com-
bination of its inputs over Z2, e.g., XOR(X, Y) = X+ Y mod 2.
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evaluation costs in secure computation [KS08]. In some works on
MPC, non-linear gates are also referred to as non-XOR gates.
notation. For a function f, we refer to its circuit representation
as Cf. We use s to denote the total number of gates in a circuit, also
referred to as size, i.e., s = size(Cf). Moreover, we use snX to count
the number of non-linear (non-XOR) gates per circuit. We denote the
depth of a circuit by d and use dnX to denote its non-linear depth,
which is the maximum depth of all gates connected to an output
node, defined recursively for a gate g as:
dnX(g) =

0 if g is an input node,
dnX(w1) if g is an unary gate
with input w1,
max(dnX(w1),dnX(w2)) if g with inputs w1,w2
is linear,
max(dnX(w1),dnX(w2)) + 1 if g with inputs w1,w2
is non-linear.
Furthermore, we denote bit strings in lower-case letters, e.g., x. We
refer to individual bits, which can be part of a bit string, by capital
letters X and denote their negation with X. We refer to a single bit at
position i within a bit string as Xi. The Least-Significant Bit (LSB) is
denoted with X0. When writing Boolean equations, we denote AND
gates with ·, OR gates with + and XOR gates with ⊕. Moreover, when
useful, we abbreviate the AND gate A ·B with AB.
integer representation. Integers are represented in binary
form, as typical in computer science and logic synthesis. Hence, the
decimal value of a bit string x is
∑n−1
i=0 2
i · Xi. This common repre-
sentation has the advantage that arithmetic operations for unsigned
binary numbers such as addition, subtraction, and multiplication can
be reused for signed numbers. In the two’s complement, negative
numbers are represented by flipping all bits and adding one: −x =
x+ 1. In the following chapters, we assume a two’s complement rep-
resentation when referring to negative numbers.
fixed and floating point representation. To represent
real numbers, we use two representations. The fixed point represen-
tation has a fixed position of the radix point (the decimal point).
Hence, a binary bit string is split into an integer part and a frac-
tional part. The decimal value of a bit string in fixed point representa-
tion is computed as
∑n−1
i=0 2
i−r · Xi, where r is the position (counted
from the LSB) of the radix point. The IEEE-754 floating point rep-
resentation [Soc85] is the standard representation of floating point
numbers. It divides a bit string in three components, namely sign s,
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significant m and exponent e. Its real value is determined by com-
puting (−1)s ·m · 2e. In the IEEE-754 standard, the bit-width of each
component, as well as their range is determined. Moreover, various
error handling behavior is specified, e.g., overflow or division by
zero [Gol91].
2.2 secure multi-party computation
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC), also referred to as secure
computation, has been proposed in the 1980s as a more theoretical
construct [Yao82]; it only became practical in the last fifteen years.
MPC protocols are cryptographic protocols run between two or more
parties that allow to perform a joint computation of a functionality
f(x1, x2, . . . ) over the private inputs x1, x2, . . . of the participating
parties P1,P2, . . . with guaranteed correctness and privacy. Privacy in
MPC is understood as the guarantee that participating parties do not
learn more about the other party’s inputs than they could already de-
rive from the observed output of the joint computation. Thus, infor-
mally speaking, MPC allows collaboration among mutually distrust-
ing parties by realizing a virtual trusted party that receives the input
of all parties, computes the functionality, and returns the output to
the parties.
In MPC different adverserial models are distinguished. Most rel-
evant is the semi-honest (passive) model, where the adversary tries
to learn as much from the protocol execution as possible, yet does
not deviate from the protocol itself. This is opposed to the malicious
model, where the adversary is allowed to actively violate the protocol.
Examples of further adversarial models are the covert model by Au-
mann and Lindell [AL07] or the dual execution approach that leaks at
most one bit by Huang et al. [HKE12]. Examples for further security
properties of MPC protocols that are currently mostly of theoretic in-
terest are adaptive security (i.e., the adversary is allowed to choose
its input x while running the protocol), fairness (i.e., either all parties
receive the output of the computation or no party learns a single bit),
guaranteed output delivery, and robustness [CDN15].
As we focus on compilation in this thesis, we only give a high-level
description of three MPC protocols, where each is a representative
for a different class (in their application description and cost model)
of MPC protocols. For simplicity and explanatory reasons, we focus
on two-party protocols secure in the semi-honest adversary model, as
these are already sufficient to follow the ideas presented in this the-
sis. Typically, MPC protocols in the semi-honest model are building
blocks for protocols secure against malicious adversaries and are also
used for many privacy-preserving applications on their own. We de-
scribe the two most prominent MPC protocols over Boolean circuits,
namely Yao’s Garbled Circuits and the GMW protocol. Moreover, in
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Chapter 7, we study the compilation of hybrid protocols that consist
of multiple protocols, which involve Yao’s protocol, GMW, as well as
an additive secret sharing based protocol. Therefore, we also give an
introduction in MPC based on additive secret sharing.
We begin with an introduction into Oblivious Transfer, which is a
building block used for many MPC protocols and also used by the
protocols described in the remainder of this section.
2.2.1 Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer (OT) [Rab81; Kil88] is one of the most important
building blocks for MPC protocols. An Oblivious Transfer protocol
is a protocol in which a sender transfers one of multiple messages
to a receiver, but it remains oblivious to the sender which message
has been selected and retrieved by the receiver. At the same time, the
receiver is only able to learn the content of the selected message, yet
not anything about the other messages offered by the sender.
In this thesis, we mostly use 1-out-of-2 OTs, where the sender in-
puts two l-bit strings m0,m1 and the receiver inputs a bit C ∈ {0, 1}.
At the end of the protocol, the receiver obliviously receives mC such
that neither the sender learns the choice C, nor the receiver learns
anything about the other message m1−C.
In a classic result, Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] showed that OT
cannot be constructed from one-way functions in a black-box man-
ner. Moreover, as non-black-box constructions have also not been pre-
sented, it was assumed that OT can only be constructed from asym-
metric cryptography and thus was assumed to be very costly. How-
ever, in 2003 Ishai et al. [Ish+03] presented the idea of OT Extension,
which significantly reduces the computational costs of OTs for most
interesting applications of MPC. In OT Extension, a constant number
κ, i.e., the security parameter (e.g., κ = 128 bit), of OTs are realized
using a traditional OT protocol based asymmetric encryption and re-
ferred to as Base OTs. These Base OTs establish a symmetric key of
length κ that can subsequently be used to execute a larger number of
OTs with comparably cheap symmetric cryptography. Since Base OTs
only need to be established once between two parties, similar to a
key exchange protocol, their costs becomes negligible through amor-
tization in many applications. Finally, we remark that variants of OT
have been proposed that are beneficial for MPC, such as correlated or
random OT [Ash+13]. As a consequence, recent implementations of
OT Extension are capable of performing multiple millions of OTs per
second on a single core [Ash+13; KOS15].
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2.2.2 Yao’s Garbled Circuits Protocol
Yao’s garbled circuits protocol, proposed in the 1980s [Yao86], is the
most studied secure two-party computation protocol, secure in the
semi-honest model. The protocol is run between two parties P0, P1
and operates on functionality descriptions in form of Boolean cir-
cuits over binary Boolean gates. To securely evaluate a functionality
f(x,y) over their private inputs x and y, both parties agree on a circuit
Cf(x,y), which can be seen as the machine code for the protocol.
During protocol execution, one party becomes the circuit genera-
tor (the garbling party), the other the circuit evaluator. The generator
initializes the protocol by assigning each wire wi in the circuit two
random labels w0i and w
1
i of length κ (the security parameter), rep-
resenting the respective Boolean values 0 and 1. For each gate the
generator computes a garbled truth table. Each table consists of four
encrypted entries of the output wire labels wγo . These are encrypted
according to the gate’s Boolean functionality γ = g(α,β) using the
input wire labels wαl and w
β
r as keys. Thus, an entry gtt
αβ
o in the
table is encrypted as
gttαβo = Ewαl (Ewβr
(w
g(α,β)
o )).
After their creation, the garbled tables are randomly permuted and
sent to the evaluator, who, so far, is unable to decrypt a single row of
any garbled table due to the random choice of wire labels. To initiate
the circuit evaluation, the generator sends her input bits x in form
of her input wire labels to the evaluator. Moreover, the wire labels
corresponding to the evaluator’s input y are transferred via an OT
protocol, with the generator being the OT sender, who inputs the
two wire labels, and evaluator being the OT receiver, who inputs its
input bits of the computation. After the OT step, the evaluator is in
possession of the garbled circuit and one input label per input wire.
With this information the evaluator is able to iteratively evaluate the
circuit by decrypting a single entry of each garbled table, starting
from input wires and ending at the output wires. Due to the use of
a double-encryption scheme, the evaluator is unable to decrypt more
than one entry in each garbled table. Once all gates are evaluated,
all output wire labels are known to the evaluator. In the last step of
the protocol, the generator sends an output description table to the
evaluator, containing a mapping between output label and actual bit
value. The decrypted output is then shared with the generator. Note
that this procedure can be adapted to provide different outputs to
the two parties. Alternatively, the generator can encrypt the cleartext
output bits in the garbled tables of all gates connected to output wires,
which allows to reveal the output of the computation to the evaluator
without further communication.
Selective security of Yao’s Garbled Circuits in the semi-honest model
has been proven by Lindell and Pinkas [LP09] and recently also adap-
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tive security has been proven by Jafargholi and Wichs [JW16]. Yao’s
protocol has also been extended to be secure in the malicious model
in multiple works, e.g., [Hua+14; HKE13; LP15; Lin16].
implementations and optimizations . Yao’s original proto-
col has seen multiple optimizations in the recent past. Most important
are point-and-permute [BMR90; Yao86], which allows an efficient per-
mutation of the garbled table such that only one entry in the table
needs to be decrypted by the evaluator, garbled-row-reduction [NPS99],
which reduces the number of ciphertexts that are needed to be trans-
ferred per gate, free-XOR [KS08], which allows to evaluate linear gates
(XOR/XNOR) essentially for ‘free’ without any encryption or com-
munication costs, and finally the communication optimal half-gate
scheme [ZRE15], which requires only two ciphertexts per non-linear
gate while being compatible with free-XOR. Important for practical
implementations is the idea of pipelining [Hua+11b], which allows a
parallel circuit generation and evaluation and which is necessary for
the evaluation of larger circuits and a faster online execution of Yao’s
protocol, as well as the idea of fixed-key garbling [Bel+13], which al-
lows to achieve garbling speeds of more than 10 million gates per
second on a single CPU core using the AES instructions of modern
CPUs.
cost model . Considering all optimizations mentioned above, then
for a given Boolean function f(x,y) and its circuit representation
Cf(x,y), the evaluation costs of a circuit in Yao’s protocol are domi-
nated by the number of the input bits, and by the number of non-linear
gates in the circuit. In an amortized setting, the input gates are trans-
ferred via OT Extension. Current implementations achieve a speed
of more than 10 million OTs per second and require a bandwidth
of two ciphertexts per OT. The garbling and evaluation costs of lin-
ear gates are negligible for most applications, as communication is
the current practical bottleneck of Yao’s protocol. To garble a non-
linear gate, two entries from the garbled table of length κ each have
to be transferred. Assuming a standard key length of κ = 128 bit,
then a garbling throughput of 10 million non-linear gates per second
produces ≈ 2.8Gbit of data per second. Considering that the com-
munication requirement of two ciphertexts per gate is a proven lower
bound for known garbling schemes [ZRE15], minimizing the num-
ber of non-linear gates in a circuit is an important optimization goal
when compiling applications into circuits for Yao’s protocol. We re-
mark that this optimization goal holds for almost all MPC protocols
over Boolean circuits, as these have a mechanism similar to free-XOR,
which allow the evaluation of linear gates without communication.
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2.2.3 Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) Protocol
The Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) protocol [GMW87] also orig-
inates from the 1980s and allows two parties to securely compute
a functionality described in form of a Boolean circuit. In contrast to
Yao’s protocol, which uses the idea of garbled tables, GMW is built on
top of Boolean secret sharing. Each input and intermediate wire value
is shared among the two parties using an XOR based sharing scheme
over single bits, i.e., for every value V ∈ {0, 1} each party P ∈ {0, 1}
holds a share VP, indistinguishable from random, with V = V0 ⊕ V1.
Values can be revealed at the end of the computation by exchanging
and XORing the shares.
Given shared values, XOR gates can be evaluated locally without
any communication between the parties by XORing the respective
wire shares, e.g., both parties compute WP = UP ⊕ VP over their
shares of U and V to compute shares of W = U⊕ V . An AND gate
Z = X · Y requires the parties to run an interactive protocol. One
approach is to perform an 1-out-of-4 OT protocol [SZ13], where the
chooser inputs its share X0 and Y0, and the sender prepares the out-
put accordingly. Thus, the sender samples a random Z1 and computes
its input, i.e., different Z0’s, into the OT protocol according to
Z0 = Z1 ⊕ ((X0 ⊕X1) · (Y0 ⊕ Y1)),
such that Z0 ⊕Z1 = 1 iff X0 ⊕X1 = 1 and Y0 ⊕ Y1 = 1.
The same functionality can be realized in a pre-processing phase,
which is independent of the functionality to be computed and which
enables a very fast online phase that only requires the computation
of a few bit-wise operations. For this purpose Boolean multiplication
triples [Bea92] are used. A multiplication triple consists of three bits
A,B, and C, where C = A · B holds, that are shared between the
parties. Given such a triple, the two parties compute an AND gate
Z = X · Y, by opening (reconstructing) two bits E = A⊕ X and F =
B⊕ Y and computing their shares of Z as
ZP = P · E · F⊕ F ·AP ⊕ E ·BP ⊕CP.
The multiplication triples can be generated in a preprocessing phase
using the 1-out-of-4 OT protocol described above.
implementations and optimizations . A first implementa-
tion was given by Choi et al. [Cho+12] that was subsequently im-
proved by Schneider and Zohner [SZ13]. Furthermore, Asharov et
al. [Ash+13] showed that the triples can be precomputed using only
two random OTs with a total communication of 2κ bits, where κ de-
notes the key length in bits. A protocol secure against malicious ad-
versaries, named TinyOT, was proposed by Nielsen et al. [Nie+12].
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cost model . Since the multiplication triples, which are the most
expensive part of the computation, can be precomputed, only four
bits (two per party) for every AND gate need to be communicated
in the online phase. Moreover, we observe that the computation ef-
fort of AND and XOR gates is negligible in practice when compared
to the communication costs. Thus, when considering a typical band-
width (6 1Gbit) constrained deployment scenario, GMW outper-
forms Yao’s Garbled Circuits in gate throughput significantly, as only
a fraction bits per gate have to be transmitted. GMW is a multi-round
protocol, where the number of rounds is depending on the non-linear
circuit depth. All AND gates on the same layer in the circuit can be
computed in parallel and in the same communication round. Input
sharing is significantly cheaper than in Yao’s Garbled Circuits, as only
one bit per input wire has to be transmitted. We note that the compu-
tation and communication efforts in the preprocessing phase are com-
parable to the garbling cost of a gate in Yao’s Garbled Circuits [DSZ15;
Des+17].
In summary, the performance of the GMW protocol for a given
circuit Cf is dominated by the total number of non-linear gates snX as
well as the non-linear depth dnX of the circuit (number of layers of
AND gates), whereas the number of inputs and outputs marginally
influences the performance of the GMW protocol. This cost model is
prototypic for multi-round MPC protocols over Boolean circuits.
2.2.4 MPC Based on Additive Secret Sharing
In the later part in this thesis we make use of an MPC protocol
based on additive linear secret sharing that evaluates Arithmetic cir-
cuits consisting of only addition and multiplication gates. Many other
MPC protocols with different secret sharing schemes have been pro-
posed, and we refer the reader to the book of Cramer et al. [CDN15]
for a detailed introduction into the topic of MPC and secret sharing.
In this thesis, we make use of the two-party MPC protocol de-
scribed in [Ata+04; DSZ15], where an l-bit value is shared additively
in the ring Z2l . Thus, for every value v ∈ Z2l in the protocol, each
party P ∈ {0, 1} holds a share vP with v = v0 + v1 (this and all follow-
ing computations are performed modulo 2l). To enter a new value
x into the protocol, i.e., to share a value, party P samples a random
xP ∈ Z2l , computes x1−P = x − xP, and sends x1−P to the other
party. To output a shared value x, the parties send their own share
xP to the other party and locally compute x = x0 + x1. Additions
can be performed locally by adding the respective shares. Thus, to
compute z = x+ y over the shares of x and y, both parties compute
zP = xP + yP. Multiplications are performed with an interactive pro-
tocol, which can be precomputed using multiplication triples [Bea92;
Gil99]. To compute z = x · y over shared values x and y, a multiplica-
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tion triple c = a · b is used, such that both parties compute and then
reveal eP = xP − aP and fP = yP − cP. Given eP and fP, both parties
compute their share zP of z as follows:
zP = P · e · f+ f · aP + e · bP + cP.
Multiplication triples can be generated in the preprocessing phase,
independently of the computed functionality with the help of ho-
momorphic encryption [Ata+04] and additive blinding. Alternatively,
multiplication triples can be generated by performing a bit-wise OT
based protocol [Gil99].
implementations . An implementation of the protocol described
above is given by Demmler et al. [DSZ15]. Alternative implementa-
tions of MPC protocols based on additive linear secret sharing are
Sharemind [BLW08], which provides the richest set of functionalities,
VIFF [Dam+09], and the SPDZ [Dam+12] implementation [KSS13] as
well as FRESCO [Dam+16], which both provide security against ma-
licious adversaries.
cost model . The communication and computation costs in addi-
tive secret sharing based MPC is dominated by the number of multi-
plication gates and the multiplicative depth of the circuit. Similar to the
Boolean circuit based protocols, linear operations, i.e., additions, are
for free in the number of cryptographic operations and in communi-
cation. Multiplications have a small online cost, as only the respective
shares have to be transmitted and only cheap local operations are
performed. Moreover, similar to GMW, every multiplicative layer in
the circuit increases the number of communication rounds. The pre-
computation phase is the most expensive part of the protocol execu-
tion. For the generation of the multiplication triples, either multiple
(packed) encryptions in a homomorphic encryption systems or O(l)
OTs of length l have to be performed.
2.2.5 Hybrid Protocols
The efficiency of applications generated by compilers for all afore-
mentioned protocols is bound by the efficiency to represent elemen-
tary operations, also referred to as building blocks, in their respec-
tive cost model. Because of this, the protocols can have substantial
difference in their runtime for the same application. For example, ex-
pressing multiplications over nbit integers in Yao’s protocol or GMW
requires Boolean circuits of size O(n2). Due to this reason, multi-
ple applications based on hybrid protocols, i.e., a mix of multiple
standalone MPC protocols, have been proposed to achieve better ef-
ficiency by exploiting multiple function representations, e.g., [BG11;
Hua+11a; Nik+13a; SK11]. An application independent combination
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of protocols has been studied in [BLR13; Hen+10; SKM11; KSS14].
Most of these works combine Yao’s Garbled Circuits with homomor-
phic encryption, i.e., an asymmetric encryption scheme, which allows
to perform operations on the ciphertexts that resemble arithmetic op-
erations on the respective cleartexts, e.g., addition.
In this thesis, we evaluate hybrid protocols consisting of all three
aforementioned protocols, which has been described by Demmler et
al. [DSZ15]. To combine multiple sequentially aligned MPC proto-
cols into a hybrid protocol, an intermediate state has to be converted
securely between the different protocols. Such an intermediate state
consists of multiple values that are secretly shared between between
the computing parties. In Yao’s protocol, the wire label computed by
the evaluator and the mapping of wire label to cleartext value form
a sharing of one bit. In the two other protocols, the sharing is more
straight-forward, namely either an XOR (Boolean) sharing is used or
an additive (Arithmetic) sharing. The authors proposed conversion
protocols that securely transform one sharing into the other. For ex-
ample, a Yao sharing can be converted into a Boolean sharing at prac-
tically no cost by using the point-and-permute bits (cf. Section 2.2.2).
Unfortunately, other conversions require communication and com-
putation. For example, the conversion from an nbit Arithmetic shar-
ing into n Yao sharings or n Boolean sharings can be realized by eval-
uating a Boolean addition circuit. Thus, both parties have to enter
the bit decomposition of their arithmetic shares as input into either
GMW or Yao’s protocol and then evaluate an addition circuit. A more
detailed explanation of these conversion protocols and their costs is
given in [DSZ15].
2.3 oblivious ram and ram-sc
In Chapter 8, we will present a compilation approach for RAM based
MPC, which is often referred to as RAM-SC. In this section we give
an overview of relevant ORAMs used in RAM-SC, before describing
RAM-SC itself.
2.3.1 Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
Oblivious RAM (ORAM), first introduced by Goldreich and Ostro-
vsky in the context of software protection and simulation of RAM
programs [GO96], is a cryptographic primitive that allows to obfus-
cate the access pattern to an outsourced storage to achieve memory
trace obliviousness. Therefore, each logical access on some virtual ad-
dress space is translated into a sequence of physical accesses on the
memory, which appears to be random to observers, resulting in the
security guarantee that two sequences of virtual accesses of the same
length produce indistinguishable physical access patterns.
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ORAMs are commonly modeled as protocols between an ORAM
client, who is the data owner, and an untrusted ORAM server, who
provides the physical storage. Typically, an ORAM construction is
comprised of two distinct algorithms, the initialization and the ac-
cess algorithm. Thereby, the initialization algorithm introduces a new
oblivious structure for a given number of elements, while the access
algorithm performs an access to one of the elements in the virtual
memory space using a sequence of accesses on the physical memory,
hiding the accessed virtual index and also the type of operation, i.e,
read or write. An ORAM has a capacity m, which describes the num-
ber of data elements it can store. Moreover, most ORAMs require to
store metadata for each data element, which in combination with the
element itself is referred to as block.
The design goals of standalone ORAM constructions are manifold,
e.g., minimizing client side storage, communication or computation
costs. Therefore, many optimized ORAMs have been proposed, e.g.,
[GO96; KLO12; LO13; Ste+13]. For their combination with MPC (de-
scribed next), a different cost model applies, because the ORAM client
has to be evaluated as a circuit. In this thesis, we study the most ef-
ficient known ORAMs for MPC, namely Circuit-ORAM (C-ORAM)
[WCS15], optimized Square-Root ORAM (SQ-ORAM) [Zah+16], FLO-
RAM [Ds17a], and the FLORAM variant CPRG (FCPRG) [Ds17a].
circuit oram (c-oram). C-ORAM by Wang et al. [WCS15] is an
MPC-optimized derivative of Path ORAM [Ste+13], which is the most
practical known standalone ORAM to date. C-ORAM is a tree-based
ORAM that stores m data elements in a binary tree structure of at
most log2 (m) stages and an additional root level called stash, which
can also be imagined as a cache. Each node in the tree is a smaller
ORAM itself, called bucket ORAM, that stores multiple blocks. Each
data element is randomly mapped to one of the leaf nodes, maintain-
ing the invariant that an element with leaf identifier l is contained
in one of the buckets on the path from the root node to leaf l or in
the stash. To read or write an element in tree-based ORAMs, the ac-
cording path from root to the leaf is read, a new leaf identifier for the
read element is chosen, and the accessed path is moved to the stash.
Moreover, after each access an eviction procedure is initiated, which
writes blocks from stash into the tree while moving blocks as close as
possible to their designated leaves.
C-ORAM requires a recursive position map in RAM-SC, which as-
sociates the virtual index of each element with the position in the tree.
Henceforth, a tree-based ORAM has several construction parameters,
including the size of the bucket ORAMs B, the number of recursive
steps r, and a packing factor c describing the number of mappings
contained in one block of the recursive ORAMs.
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square-root oram (sq-oram). SQ-ORAM was one of the two
ORAMs introduced in the seminal paper by Goldreich and Ostro-
vsky [GO96] and later optimized for MPC by Zahur et al. [Zah+16].
SQ-ORAM uses a fundamentally different strategy than Path ORAM.
Its core idea is to randomly permute the memory and to periodically
refresh this permutation. For m elements, the so-called permuted mem-
ory has size m+
√
m, Furthermore, a shelter/stash for
√
m elements
is used. The simulation of a RAM program takes place in so called
epochs of
√
m steps, consisting of three phases: In a first step the
memory is obliviously permuted using a permutation pi that assigns
each element a position in the permuted memory by using random
tags assigned to each element. Afterwards,
√
m virtual accesses can
take place, during which the updated values are written to the shel-
ter. To access an element at index v, first the entire shelter is scanned.
If the element cannot be found, the permuted memory is accessed
to retrieve the element at position pi(v), otherwise, the element has
previously been visited and can thus be found in the shelter, and a
dummy access to the permuted memory is performed. As last step of
an epoch, the permuted memory is updated according the shelter.
Zahur et al. [Zah+16], removed the use of Pseudo Random Func-
tions (PRFs) (needed for the permutation), dummy elements, expen-
sive oblivious sorting algorithms, and identified public metadata. Fur-
thermore, they introduced the usage of recursive maps to compute
the mapping between virtual and physical addresses.
floram . FLORAM, recently introduced by Doerner and she-
lat [Ds17a], differs from the other ORAM constructions as it is built
from Function Secret Sharing (FSS), introduced by Boyle et al. [BGI15].
FLORAM is a distributed ORAM [Ds17b; LO13], where the data is
stored in a secret shared manner (XOR) between two servers. Ele-
ments are accessed using Private Information Retrieval (PIR) tech-
niques, i.e., a short query is evaluated on all elements on the server
to extracted the desired element. A point function fα,β(x) evaluates
to β if x = α and 0 otherwise. Informally, FSS allows to share a
Distributed Point Function (DPF) in such a way, that the parties can
evaluate the point function on arbitrary input, yet neither learn α nor
β. This feature allows the client to send the servers specially crafted
queries q0(i) or q1(i) using FSS to retrieve or to write an element at
index i.
FLORAM distinguishes a read-only memory (OROM) and write-
only memory (OWOM). Data in both is stored using an XOR sharing,
yet in OROM, each share is additionally masked using a PRF with a
key known only to the storing party. After a number of write accesses,
the OWOM memory is converted into the OROM. This process is re-
ferred to as refresh. To read an index i, the client shares a DPF that
evaluates to 1 on input i and to 0 otherwise. The servers evaluate
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the DPF on all indices, multiply the result with each associated ele-
ment share and return their aggregated result to the client. Writing is
performed using a similar approach. A conversion between OWOM
and OROM is too expensive to be performed after every write access,
therefore a stash is used that functions as a cache between refreshes.
The stash is scanned when performing read accesses to identify up-
dated elements.
floram cprg (fcprg). FCPRG [Ds17a] is an extension to FLO-
RAM. The most expensive computation on the client side of FLO-
RAM is the creation of the FSS scheme, which requires to compute
2 · log2(m) PRFs for every access. In MPC the evaluation of the PRFs
can render the scheme expensive and therefore, with FCPRG the au-
thors propose to compute the PRFs locally, i.e., outside of MPC, with
the trade-off thatO(log2(m)) interactions between the computing par-
ties are required.
2.3.2 RAM based MPC (RAM-SC)
MPC protocols evaluate functionalities represented as circuits. Cir-
cuits allow to express arbitrary computations, yet random memory
accesses have to be expressed as a chain of multiplexers of the com-
plete memory, referred to as linear scan (LS). This limits MPC for
applications that rely on dynamic memory accesses. Therefore, Gor-
don et al. [Gor+12] proposed to combine MPC protocols with ORAM
to enable dynamic memory accesses with sublinear overhead. The
authors describe a RAM machine, where the circuit computes an
oblivious machine that evaluates instructions and memory accesses.
A complete RAM machine is often not necessary, and thus the so-
called RAM-SC model was later refined by Liu et al. [Liu+14] for
practical efficiency. Its major concepts are described in the following
paragraphs.
First, the parties performing the MPC protocol also act as distributed
ORAM server, and the ORAM client is implemented as circuit evalu-
ated by the MPC protocol itself. Thus, both roles are shared between
the computing parties. Intuitively, privacy is preserved because the
MPC protocol acts as a virtual third party emulating the ORAM client.
Second, a program is evaluated by interweaving the MPC protocol
with ORAM accesses. Consequently, a RAM-SC program consists of
many small protocols that either perform a computation or an ORAM
access. This behavior is exemplary illustrated in Figure 1.
The construction of RAM-SC, as described, is very generic because
it allows to combine different MPC protocols and ORAMs. When as-
suming composable ORAMs, we observe that in one RAM-SC pro-
gram multiple ORAMs of possibly different type can be used, e.g.,
one ORAM for each array in the input program. Moreover, as in stan-
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P1 P2
computa�ons
x = 1023
oram_read(5)
decrypt(b1, b6, b7)
computa�ons
x = array[5]
MPC protocol
(ORAM client)
ORAM1
(server)
ORAM2
(server)
Figure 1: Exemplary and simplified illustration of RAM-SC. A program flow
is illustrated that is computed within an MPC protocol, run be-
tween two parties P1 and P2. At some point, a value is read from
an array with virtual index 5. Therefore, a circuit representing the
ORAM client functionality is executed that translates the virtual in-
dex into multiple physical addresses. These addresses are revealed
to both parties, who enter the blocks as input to the MPC protocol.
Not shown here is, that often also an intermediate state has to be
transferred between two MPC protocol.
dalone ORAMs, the blocks stored on the ORAM server have to be
encrypted. This can be realized by performing an encryption and de-
cryption within a circuit, which requires (even highly optimized) a
substantial amount of gates, e.g., 5000 non-linear gates to encrypt a
single block of 128 bits AES [BP12], using a secret sharing scheme,
e.g., XOR sharing [Ds17a], or by soldering the existing garbled labels
based on the publicly revealed index [Zah+16]. In the XOR sharing
approach a physical block is read by entering the shares as input to
the MPC protocol, which are then recombined within the protocol.
Similarly, to write to one or multiple blocks, the MPC protocol out-
puts one share for each block to every party. When using the solder-
ing approach, the circuit garbler re-uses the existing wire labels but
remaps them according the accessed indices reveled to both parties,
similar to a multiplexer (array) access with public index. We also re-
mark that in RAM-SC, the ORAM access type, i.e., read or write, can
be revealed to both parties, as the algorithm description is seen as
public knowledge. This access type is also referred to as semi-private
access [Ds17a].
security. RAM-SC provides the same privacy and correctness
properties against semi-honest adversaries as traditional MPC pro-
tocols [Gor+12]. RAM-SC with security against malicious adversaries
has been studied in [Afs+15].
complexity. The computation and communication complexity of
a RAM-SC protocol depends on the circuit complexity of the com-
putation, the circuit complexity of the ORAM client, the number of
protocol rounds, as well as additional ORAM protocol costs that are
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performed outside of the MPC protocol. For ORAMs with less than
O(m) computations or less thanO(m) bandwidth RAM-SC is (asymp-
totically) more efficient than any circuit based MPC protocol.
2.4 compilers for mpc
Due to the complexity of circuit design, multiple compilers for MPC
have been proposed. In this section we give an overview and classifi-
cation of these, which partially form the related work of this thesis.
compiler classification. In general, compilers for MPC share
many similarities with high-level synthesis tools [Gaj+12], known
from digital circuit design. Nevertheless there are substantial differ-
ences between these tools and compilers for MPC, which will be
studied in detail in the following chapters. Therefore, we restrict our
comparison and classification to compilers that have explicitly been
proposed for their use in MPC.
Compilers for MPC can be categorized based on whether they com-
pile a (minimalistic) Domain Specific Language (DSL) or a widely
used common programming language. Moreover, compilers can be inde-
pendent or integrated into an MPC framework. Integrated compilers
produce an intermediate representation, which is interpreted (instan-
tiated by a circuit) only during the execution of an MPC protocol.
These interpreted circuit descriptions commonly allow a more com-
pact circuit representation. Independent compilers create circuits in-
dependent from the executing framework, and thus have the advan-
tage that produced circuits can be optimized to the full extent during
compile time and are more versatile in their use in MPC frameworks.
Especially for Arithmetic circuits it is often hard to make a strict
separation. When compiling these circuits, compilers commonly tar-
get the so called Arithmetic Black Box (ABB) model [DN03], which is
an abstraction between compiler and protocol implementation. The
ABB model provides representations for values and operations on
these, e.g., addition and multiplication, without providing details
about their protocol implementation to the compiler. In principle, an
ABB is Turing complete with only addition and multiplication. Yet,
practical efficiency is only achieved if further functionalities, such as
comparisons, are also provided. We consider an Arithmetic circuit
compiler to be independent if it compiles towards an ABB model
only consisting of elementary functions, involving comparisons and
possibly floating point operations, yet not high-level functionalities
such as sorting or statistical tests, as for example provided by Share-
mind [BLW08].
Some integrated compilers support the compilation of mixed-mode
secure computation. Mixed-mode computation allows to write code
that distinguishes between oblivious (private) and public computa-
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tion. Thus, the public computation is performed locally in the clear,
interweaved by private computations insides an MPC protocol. This
leads to an even tighter coupling between compiler and execution
framework, but allows to express a mixed-mode program in a single
language. Moreover, some integrated compilers support the compila-
tion for hybrid secure computation protocols or RAM-SC. Next, we
give an overview of Boolean circuit and Arithmetic circuit compilers.
boolean circuit compilers . We begin by studying compilers
targeting Boolean circuit based MPC protocols that use a DSL as
input language. The Fairplay framework by Malkhi et al. [Mal+04]
started research on practical MPC. Fairplay compiles a domain spe-
cific hardware description language called SFDL into a gate list for
use in Yao’s protocol. Following Fairplay, Henecka et el. [Hen+10]
presented the TASTY compiler, which compiles its own DSL, called
TASTYL, into an interpreted hybrid protocol. The PAL compiler by
Mood et el. [MLB12] aims at low-memory devices as the compilation
target. PAL also compiles Fairplay’s hardware description language.
The KSS compiler by Kreuter et al. [KSS12] is the first compiler that
shows scalability up to a billion gates and uses gate level optimiza-
tion methods, such as constant propagation and dead-gate elimina-
tion. KSS compiles a DSL into a flat circuit format. TinyGarble by
Songhori et al. [Son+15] uses (commercial) hardware synthesis tools
to compile circuits from hardware description languages such as Ver-
ilog or VHDL. On the one hand, this approach allows the use of a
broad range of existing functionality in hardware synthesis, but also
shows the least degree of abstraction by requiring the developer to be
experienced in hardware design. We remark that high-level synthesis
from C is possible, yet, as the authors note, this leads to significantly
less efficient circuits. Recently, Mood et al. [Moo+16] presented the
Frigate compiler, which aims at very scalable and extensively tested
compilation of another DSL. Frigate and TinyGarble produce com-
pact circuit descriptions that compress sequential circuit structures.
Examples for mixed-mode and hybrid compilers involving Boolean
circuits from a DSL are L1, Wysteria, ObliVM, and Obliv-C. The L1
compiler by Schröpfer et al. [SKM11] compiles a DSL into a hybrid
protocol involving homomorphic encryption. Wysteria by Rastori et
al. [RHH14] creates Boolean circuits applied to GMW from a mixed-
mode DSL that is supported by a strong formal calculus. ObliVM by
Liu et al. [Liu+15b] extends SCVM [Liu+14], which both compile a
DSL that support the combination of oblivious data structures with
MPC. This approach allows the efficient development of oblivious
algorithms. Yet, both compilers provide only very limited gate and
source code optimization methods. The Obliv-C compiler by Zahur
and Evans [ZE15] also supports oblivious data structures, but fol-
lows a different, yet elegant source-to-source translation approach by
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compiling a modified variant of C into efficient mixed-mode applica-
tions. Very recently, EzPC [Cha+17] has been presented that compiles
mixed-mode hybrid protocols involving Boolean and Arithmetic cir-
cuits.
The CBMC-GC compiler [Hol+12] is the first compiler that creates
circuits for MPC from a common programming language (ANSI C).
CBMC-GC follows the independent compilation approach and pro-
duces a single circuit description. Moreover, CBMC-GC applies source
code optimization and provides a powerful symbolic execution. This
compiler is extended throughout this thesis. The PCF compiler by
Kreuter et al. [Kre+13] also compiles C, using the portable LCC com-
piler as a frontend. PCF compiles an intermediate bytecode repre-
sentation given in LCC into a interpreted circuit format. PCF shows
greater scalability than CBMC-GC, yet only supports comparably lim-
ited optimization methods that are only applied locally for every func-
tion. A (partially) formally verified compiler, named CircGen, has
been proposed by Almeida et al. [Alm+17] that extends the Com-
pcert compiler [Ler06] for ANSI C by a new backend that compiles
Boolean circuits.
A detailed overview of Boolean circuits compilers for MPC is given
in Table 1.
arithmetic circuit compilers . The Viff compiler [Dam+09]
jointly with the proposition of a DSL for MPC [NS07] are two of the
first works in the direction of compilation for Arithmetic circuit based
MPC. The most prominent compiler is the Sharemind compiler by
Bogdanov et al. [BLW08], which provides a production ready mixed-
mode compiler suite (and protocol framework) for a DSL called Se-
creC. The PICCO compiler by Zhang et al. [ZSB13] implements a
mixed-mode programming environment for C that supports paral-
lelization. The Armadillo compiler by Carpov et al. [CDS15] and the
ALCHEMY compiler by Crockett et al. [CPS18] target the creation
of Arithmetic circuits for homomorphic encryption. Recently, also an
integrated compiler for SPDZ has been proposed [Spd].
2.5 benchmarking applications for mpc compilers
MPC has many applications, e.g., privacy-preserving biometric au-
thentication [Erk+09], private set intersection [FNP04], or secure auc-
tions [Bog+09]. For research purposes, some (parts of) these appli-
cations have become popular for benchmarking purposes. The most
prominent example is the AES block cipher, which is the de facto stan-
dard benchmark for MPC protocols. In compiler research on MPC,
multiple different functionalities are commonly compiled into cir-
cuits, which are then compared regarding their properties, i.e., size,
depth and fraction of non-linear gates.
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In this section, we give an overview of these commonly bench-
marked functionalities, ranging from very small snippets, e.g., inte-
ger addition, to larger functionalities, e.g., IEEE-754 compliant float-
ing point operations or biometric authentication. In later chapters, we
use these functionalities to evaluate the techniques presented in this
book. Here, we discuss the functionalities together with their com-
plexity and motivate why these functionalities are relevant in the con-
text of MPC and the development of compilers.
Common benchmark functionalities are:
• Integer arithmetic. Due to their (heavy) use in almost every com-
putational problem, arithmetic building blocks are of high im-
portance in high-level circuit synthesis and are often bench-
marked individually. Most common building blocks are addi-
tion, subtraction, multiplication, and division. When studying
these building blocks, one should distinguish the results for dif-
ferent input and output bit widths. Namely, arithmetic opera-
tions can be differentiated in overflow-free operations, e.g., allo-
cating 2n bits for the result of a n×n bit multiplication, and op-
erations with overflow, e.g., when only allocating n bits for the
same multiplication. In later chapters we explicitly state which
input and output bit-widths are studied. To evaluate the scala-
bility of compilers, multiple sequentially (in-)dependent arith-
metic operations can be compiled as a single functionality.
• Matrix multiplication. Algebraic operations, such as matrix or
vector multiplications, are building blocks for many privacy-
preserving applications, e.g., for feature extractors in biometric
matching or the privacy friendly evaluation of neural networks,
and have therefore repeatedly been used to benchmark compil-
ers for MPC [Dem+15; Hol+12; Kre+13]. From an optimizing
compilers perspective, matrix multiplication is a comparably
simple task, as it only involves the instantiation of arithmetic
building blocks. However, it is very well suited to show the scal-
ability of compilers or the capability to fuse multiple arithmetic
operations into single statements, as required for depth mini-
mization (see Chapter 6). Matrix multiplication can be parametri-
zed according the matrix dimensions, the used number repre-
sentation (integer, fixed or floating point) and its bit-width.
• Modular exponentiation. Modular exponentiation, i.e., xymodp,
is relevant in secure computation, as it is a building block for
various cryptographic schemes. For example, blind signatures
can be realized with RSA using modular exponentiation. Blind
signatures allow a signing process, where neither the message
is revealed to the signing party, nor the signing key is revealed
to the party holding the message. Therefore, modular exponen-
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tiation has been used multiple times to study the performance
of MPC [Bel+13; DSZ15; KSS12].
• Distances. Various distances need to be computed in many pri-
vacy preserving protocols and are therefore relevant for MPC,
e.g., in biometric matching applications or location privacy ap-
plications. The Hamming distance is a measure between two bit
strings. Measured is the number of pairwise differences in every
bit position. Due to its application in biometrics, the Hamming
distance has often been used for benchmarking MPC compilers,
e.g., [Hol+12; KSS12; Moo+16]. The Manhattan distance
distMH = |x1 − x2|+ |y1 − y2|
between two points a = (x1,y1) and b = (x2,y2) is the distance
along a two dimensional space, i.e., along the Manhattan grid,
when only allowing horizontal or vertical moves. The Euclidean
distance is defined as
distED =
√
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2.
Due to the complexity of the square root function, it is com-
mon in MPC to benchmark the squared Euclidean distance sep-
arately, as its computation is usually sufficient when comparing
multiple distances. All distances can be parameterized accord-
ing to the used input bit-widths.
• Biometric matching. In biometric matching a party matches one
biometric sample (a vector of features) against the other’s party
database of biometric templates. Example scenarios are face-
recognition or fingerprint-matching [Erk+09]. One of the main
concepts is the computation of a distance (see above) between
a sample and all database entries. Once all distances are com-
puted, the minimal distance determines the best match. The
biometric matching application is very interesting for bench-
marking, as it involves many parallel arithmetic operations, as
well as a large number of sequential comparisons. The biomet-
ric matching application can be parameterized by the database
size, the sample dimension (number of features per sample), the
bit-width of each feature, and the used distance.
• Database analytics. Performing data analytics on sensitive data
has numerous applications and therefore many privacy-preserv-
ing protocols have been studied, e.g., [Bog+15; DHC04]. Using
generic MPC techniques is of special interest in analytics, as it
allows to perform arbitrary computations, e.g., hypothesis test-
ing, or allows to add data perturbation techniques, e.g., differen-
tial privacy, before releasing the result with minimal effort. This
task can be parametrized according the database size(s) and the
applied analyses.
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• Fixed and floating point arithmetics. Fixed and floating point num-
ber representations allow the computation on real numbers us-
ing integer arithmetic. Therefore, these representations are nec-
essary for all applications where numerical precision is required,
e.g., in privacy preserving statistics. The floating point represen-
tation is the more versatile representation, as it allows to repre-
sent a larger range of values, whereas fixed point arithmetic can
be realized with significant less costs and is therefore of interest
in MPC. Floating point operations are also very suited to evalu-
ate the gate level optimization methods of compilers since they
require many bit operations. When implementing floating point
arithmetic we follow the IEEE-754 standard.
• Gaussian elimination. Solving linear equations is required in many
applications with Gaussian elimination being the most studied
solving algorithm. Due to its wide range of use, it is also of
relevance in privacy-preserving applications. In this thesis we
evaluate our compiler using a textbook Gauss solver with par-
tial pivoting. The task can be parameterized by the number of
equations.
• Location-aware scheduling. Privacy-preserving availability schedul-
ing is another application that can be realized with MPC [Bil+11].
The functionality matches the availability of two parties over a
number of time slots, without revealing the individual schedule
to the other party. Location-aware scheduling also considers the
location and maximum travel distance of the two parties for a
given time slot. Therefore, the functionality outputs a matching
time slot where both parties are available and in close proximity
to each other (if existent). The functionality can be parameter-
ized by the number of time slots used per party, the representa-
tion of locations, and the distance measure, e.g., Manhattan or
Euclidean distance.
• Machine learning. Machine learning (ML) with its distinction in
super- and unsupervised learning techniques has many applica-
tions and is a very active field of research. Therefore, protecting
the privacy of training data or ML inputs is also an active re-
search area.
Supervised machine learning – Neural networks. One of the most
powerful ML techniques are Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs). Because of this, many dedicated protocols for private
data classification using CNNs have been proposed, e.g., [Gil+16;
Liu+17; Ria+18]. Computationally, CNNs consists of multiple
matrix multiplications concatenated with convolutions and non-
linear activation functions.
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Unsupervised machine learning – k-means. Clustering is another
ML task, frequently used to identify centroids in unstructured
data. One of the most well known clustering algorithms is k-
means, and multiple works proposed dedicated privacy-preserv-
ing k-means protocols, e.g., [JW05; VC03]. The k-means algo-
rithm can be parametrized according to the number of data
points, the number of clusters, and the number of iterations to
perform the algorithm.
• Median computation. The secure computation of the median is
required in privacy preserving statistics. It is an interesting task
for compilation, as it can be implemented using a sorting al-
gorithm, because a sorted array allows a direct access to the
median element. The compiled circuit depends on the used sort-
ing algorithm. In this book, we evaluate Bubble and Merge sort.
Moreover, the task can be parameterized according to the num-
ber of elements and their bit-width.
implementation differences . We remark that for a fair com-
parison between multiple compilers that compile the same function-
ality, it has to be made sure that the same algorithm as well as the
same abstraction level of the source code is used. To illustrate this
thought we give three example implementations for computing the
Hamming distance, which produce circuits of largely varying sizes
(cf., Section 4.5). The distance can be computed by XOR-ing the input
bit strings and then counting the number of bits. An exemplary im-
plementation is given in Listing 1 that computes the distance between
two bit-strings of length 160 bit, which are split over five unsigned in-
tegers. In Line 7 the number of ones in a string of 32 bit is computed.
This task is also known as population count. In the following para-
graphs we describe three different implementations.
1 #define N 5
2 void hamming () {
3 unsigned INPUT_A_x[N];
4 unsigned INPUT_B_y[N];
5 unsigned res = 0;
6 for(int i = 0; i < N; i++) {
7 res += count_naive32(INPUT_A_x[i]^ INPUT_B_y[i]);
8 }
9 unsigned OUTPUT_res = res;
10 }
Listing 1: Hamming distance computation between two bit strings.
The first implementation is given in Listing 2. In this naïve ap-
proach, each bit is extracted using bit shifts and the logical AND
2.5 benchmarking applications for mpc compilers 30
operator before being aggregated.
1 unsigned char count_naive32(unsigned y) {
2 unsigned char m = 0;
3
4 for(unsigned i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
5 m += (y & (1 << i)) >> i;
6 }
7
8 return m;
9 }
Listing 2: Counting bits using a naïve bit-by-bit comparison
approach.
A variant of this implementation is given in Listing 3. Here, the bit
string of length 32 is first split into chunks of 8 bit (unsigned char).
The ones set in each chunk are then counted as described above.
1 unsigned char count_naive8(unsigned char c) {
2 unsigned char m = 0;
3 for(int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
4 m += (c & (1 << i)) >> i;
5 }
6 return m;
7 }
8
9 unsigned char count_tree32(unsigned y) {
10 unsigned char m0 = y & 0xFF;
11 unsigned char m1 = (y & 0xFF00) >> 8;
12 unsigned char m2 = (y & 0xFF0000) >> 16;
13 unsigned char m3 = (y & 0xFF000000) >> 24;
14
15 return count_naive8(m0) + count_naive8(m1) + \
16 count_naive8(m2) + count_naive8(m3);
17 }
Listing 3: Counting bits over unsigned chars in a tree based manner.
Finally, in Listing 4 a variant optimized for a CPU with 32 bit regis-
ters and slow multiplication is given. This implementation uses only
14 CPU instructions.
1 unsigned count_reg32(unsigned y) {
2 unsigned x = y - ((y >> 1) & 0x55555555);
3 x = (x & 0x33333333) + ((x >> 2) & 0x33333333);
4 x = (x + (x >> 4)) & 0x0f0f0f0f;
5 x += x >> 8;
6 x += x >> 16;
7 return x;
8 }
Listing 4: Counting bits, optimized for a 32 bit register machine.
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Fundamental implementation differences will inevitably lead to dif-
ferent compilation results. Therefore, all benchmarked functionalities
in this book are implemented using the same algorithms, data struc-
tures and data types when using them for the comparison with other
compilers even when using different input languages.
3
F R O M A N S I C C O D E T O B O O L E A N C I R C U I T S
Summary: The practicality of Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) is
hindered by the difficulty to implement applications on top of the under-
lying cryptographic protocols. This is because the manual construction of
efficient applications, which need to be represented as Boolean or arithmetic
circuits, is a complex, error-prone, and time-consuming task. For the prac-
tical use of MPC, and thus the development of further privacy-enhancing
technologies, compilers supporting common programming languages are
desirable to provide developers an accessible interface to MPC.
In this chapter, we describe the translation approach that is followed by
the Boolean circuit compiler CBMC-GC [Hol+12], which is based on the
model checker CBMC [CKL04], and which compiles ANSI C into circuits
ready for their use in MPC protocols. Throughout this thesis, we will extend
the here presented tool-chain to create optimized circuits for MPC.
Remarks: This chapter is based in parts on Chapter 3 of our book – “Compi-
lation for Secure Multi-Party Computation”, Niklas Büscher and Stefan Katzen-
beisser, Springer Briefs in Computer Science 2017, ISBN 978-3-319-67521-3.
3.1 motivation and overview
When visualizing an MPC protocol as a hardware architecture that
can execute programs (functionalities), then the program descriptions
are Boolean circuits (e.g., for Yao’s Garbled Circuits [Yao86]) or Arith-
metic circuits (e.g., for the SPDZ protocol [Dam+12]). Consequently,
a compiler for MPC protocols compiles a functionality written in a
high-level language into an (optimized) circuit representation. The
core focus of this thesis is the creation of optimized Boolean circuits
that also allow developers without a professional background in com-
puter security and hardware design to create efficient applications for
MPC. All techniques presented in this thesis extend an existing com-
piler by Holzer et al. [Hol+12] that is named CBMC-GC and described
in detail in this chapter.
Technically, CBMC-GC is based on the software architecture of the
bounded model checker CBMC by Clarke et al. [CKL04], which ver-
ifies assertions in ANSI C source code. The basic idea of Bounded
Model Checking (BMC) [Bie+99] is to search for a counterexample in
all possible program executions whose length is bounded by some
integer k. The BMC problem can efficiently be reduced to a propo-
sitional satisfiability problem (SAT), and can therefore be solved by
SAT methods. CBMC transforms an input C program, i.e., a function
f, including assertions that encode properties to be verified, into a
32
3.1 motivation and overview 33
Boolean formula Bf which is then (dis-)proved by a SAT solver. The
formula Bf is constructed in such a way that the Boolean variables
reflect the manipulation of all memory bits by the program and the
assertions in the program. Moreover, CBMC is bit-precise, i.e., the for-
mula Bf encodes the actual memory footprint of the analyzed pro-
gram under ANSI C semantics for a specified hardware platform.
Thus, CBMC is essentially a compiler that translates C source code
into Boolean formulas.
The code must meet some requirements, detailed in Section 3.2.1,
so that this transformation is possible in an efficient manner. In partic-
ular, the program must terminate in a finite number of steps. Because
of this, CBMC expects a number k as input which bounds the size
of program traces, yet CBMC also determines if this bound is suffi-
cient. The compiler CBMC-GC inherits these constraints from CBMC.
However, for MPC this property is actually a mandatory requirement
rather than a limitation. This is because combinatorial circuits have
a fixed size and thus deterministic evaluation time in any MPC pro-
tocol. This is a logical consequence from the requirement that the
runtime of an MPC protocol should not leak any information about
the inputs of either party.
We remark that the construction of a compiler out of a well tested
bit-precise model checker is beneficial when aiming at a compilation
chain from C to circuits for MPC that is sound and that covers almost
all language features. Therefore, CBMC-GC is an reasonable choice
to implement all optimization techniques presented in the later chap-
ters. Next, we discuss the (dis-)advantages of using ANSI C as input
language.
ansi c as input programming language . In contrast to
many other compilers for MPC (see Section 2.4), CBMC-GC does not
use a new domain-specific programming language or even a hard-
ware description language. Instead CBMC-GC uses common ANSI C
as input language. ANSI C allows to write low-level as well as high-
level (when compared to a hardware description language) code, and
thus makes it a reasonable choice to perform high-level synthesis
for MPC. Moreover, ANSI C has advantages as existing code can be
reused and application developers do not need to learn a new lan-
guage to explore MPC. For example, in the later chapters we study
the use of floating point numbers in MPC, whose support can be
added by compiling one of the many existing software floating point
implementations.
A drawback of compiling a common programming language is that
the data types are optimized for typical RAM based computing hard-
ware. Thus, only fixed bit-widths of 8, 16, 32, 64, or 128 bit are used.
However, Boolean circuit based MPC protocols support arbitrary bit-
widths, and hence the optimal bit-width for every variable can be
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used for better efficiency. We observe in the next chapter that the ac-
tual required bit-width can often be deduced by the compiler and
thus, is adapted to the actual required bit-width during optimization,
which simplifies programming. Therefore, we are convinced that the
advantages of a common programming language prevail this disad-
vantage.
chapter outline . First, we describe the compilation chain of
CBMC-GC in Section 3.2. Then we study the computational costs of
ANSI C operations in an MPC circuit in Section 3.3.
3.2 cbmc-gc’s compilation chain
CBMC-GC’s compilation pipeline, which is based in most parts on
CBMC’s original compilation pipeline, is illustrated in Figure 2. A
given input source code passes through multiple steps, before being
converted into a circuit:
1. Parsing and type checking. First, CBMC-GC parses the given source
code into a parse tree and checks syntactical correctness of the
source code.
2. GOTO conversion. Then, the code is translated into a GOTO
program, which is the intermediate representation of code in
CBMC-GC.
3. Loop unrolling. Next, the program is made loop free by unrolling
all loops and recursions.
4. Single-Static Assignment (SSA) The loop-free program is rewrit-
ten in SSA form, where every variable is only assigned once.
5. Expression simplification. Using symbolic execution techniques,
constants are propagated and expressions are simplified in the
SSA form.
6. Circuit instantiation. Finally, given the simplified SSA form, a
Boolean circuit is instantiated.
In this section, we first describe the differences between standard
C code and code for CBMC-GC. Then, we give an overview of all the
compilation steps mentioned before and explain them in detail. More-
over, we give code examples and point out the differences between
compiling a program into a SAT formula (CBMC) and compiling into
a logical circuit for MPC (CBMC-GC).
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C Program
CBMC-GC
Circuit
Loop Unrolling
GOTO Conversion
C Parser & Type Checking
Single Static Assignment
Expression Simplification
Circuit Instantiation
Figure 2: CBMC-GC’s compilation chain from C source code into circuits
without optimization.
3.2.1 Input Language and Circuit Mapping
When programming for CPU/RAM architectures, inputs and outputs
of a program are commonly realized by standard libraries that them-
selves invoke system calls of the operating system. Contrasting, in
MPC the only input and output interface available are the input/out-
put (I/O) wires of the circuit. To realize the I/O mapping between
C code and circuits, a special naming convention of I/O variables is
used. The input variables have to be left uninitialized in the source
code and are only assigned a value during the evaluation of the circuit
in an MPC framework. Hence, instead of adding additional standard
libraries, CBMC-GC requires the developer to name input and output
variables accordingly.
To illustrate this naming convention, we give an example source
code of the millionaires’ problem (cf. [Yao82]) in Listing 5. The func-
tion shown is a standard C function, where only the input and output
variables are annotated as designated inputs of party P0 or P1 (Line 2
and Line 3) or as output (Line 4). Hence, variables that are inputs
of party P0 or P1 have to be named with a preceding INPUT_A or
INPUT_B. Similar, output variable names have to start with OUTPUT.
Aside from this naming convention, arbitrary C computations are al-
lowed to produce the desired result, in this case a simple comparison
(Line 6).
1 void millionaires () {
2 int INPUT_A_income; // Input Party A
3 int INPUT_B_income; // Input Party B
4 int OUTPUT_result = 0; // Output
5
6 if (INPUT_A_income > INPUT_B_income) {
7 OUTPUT_result = 1;
8 }
9 }
Listing 5: CBMC-GC code example for Yao’s Millionaires’
problem [Yao82].
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For simplicity, CBMC-GC only distinguishes between two parties
and uses a shared output, which is the simplest case of secure two-
party computation. We follow this approach throughout this thesis.
However, we remark that this is not preventing the compilation of
code for more than two parties or code with outputs that are desig-
nated for specific parties only. This is because, during compilation
only input and output variables are distinguished from other vari-
ables, but not the association with any party. Hence, to compile code
for more parties, an application developer can use her own naming
scheme that extends the one introduced by CBMC-GC. CBMC-GC
outputs a mapping between every I/O variable and their associated
wires in the circuit; this information can be used in any MPC pro-
tocol implementation to correctly map wires back to the designated
parties.
3.2.2 C Parser and Type Checking
CBMC-GC parses the given source code using standard compilation
techniques, e.g., using an off-the-shelf C preprocessor (e.g., gcc -E)
that implements the macro language of C. The preprocessed code is
then parsed using a common lexer and parser setup, namely GNU flex
and bison to parse the code into an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) repre-
sentation. During parsing, a symbol table is created, which tracks all
occurring symbols and their bit-level type information. Type check-
ing is already performed during parsing using the symbol table. If
any inconsistencies are detected, CBMC-GC will abort the compila-
tion. The whole parsing process resembles a typical compiler frontend,
as it is also required when compiling for CPU/RAM architectures.
More background on this part of the compile chain can be found
in [Muc97].
3.2.3 GOTO Conversion
In the second phase of the compilation chain, the parsed AST is trans-
lated in a GOTO program, which is the intermediate representation
of code in CBMC-GC. In this representation all operations respon-
sible for diverging control flow, such as for, while, if, or switch
statements are replaced by equivalent guarded goto statements. These
statements can be seen as if-then-else statements with conditional
jumps, similarly to conditional branches in assembly language. Us-
ing a GOTO representation allows for a uniform treatment of all
non-sequential control flow, i.e., no distinction between recursion and
loops has to be made, which is beneficial for the next compilation step
to unroll all loops. We also remark that in this phase CBMC-GC is ca-
pable of handling complex language features, such as function point-
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signed int i;
signed int x;
i = 0;
!(x < 100)?
i = 1;
true
x = x * 2;
false
!(i < 5)? Goto
return x;
true
x = x * (x - 1);
false
Goto i = i + 1;
End of Function Goto
Figure 3: Shown is the CFG of an exemplary program using the GOTO rep-
resentation as generated by CBMC(-GC) for the example code in
Listing 6.
ers, which are resolved using static analysis to identify and branch all
candidate functions.
goto conversion example . To illustrate the conversion of
source code into a GOTO program, we study the example code given
in Listing 6. In this code, two types of loops are used, which will have
the same representation in the GOTO program.
1 int main() {
2 int i, x;
3 i = 0;
4 while(x < 100) {
5 x *= 2;
6 }
7 for(i = 1; i < 5; i++) {
8 x = x * (x - 1);
9 }
10 return x;
11 }
Listing 6: Exemplary code snippet with one for and one while loop.
The resulting Control Flow Graph (CFG) after the conversion into a
GOTO program is shown in Figure 3. We observe that both loops have
been replaced by a conditional branch ending in a GOTO statement.
Recursive functions are translated in the same manner.
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3.2.4 Loop Unrolling
Boolean formulas and circuits are purely combinatorial, i.e., they only
consist of Boolean operators (gates). Cyclic structures, which are still
present in the GOTO program, have to be removed during compila-
tion, because these cannot be represented in combinatorial form. To
make the program acyclic, CBMC-GC performs symbolic execution
to (greedily) unwind all loops and recursion in the program. Unwind-
ing is done until either a termination of the cycle is detected during
symbolic execution, e.g., the range of a for loop has been exceeded,
or a user specified bound k has been reached. This bound can be set
locally for every function, or globally for the complete program.
Technically, unwinding works by replacing all loops (cyclic GOTOs)
by a sequence of k nested if statements. In CBMC the sequence is fol-
lowed by a special assertion (called unwinding assertion), which can be
used to detect insufficient k. For CBMC-GC, the assertion is omitted
because it cannot be checked during circuit evaluation and therefore,
the programmer has to ensure a correct upper bound for all loops.
Automatically deriving an upper bound is impossible in many cases,
as this relates to the undecidable halting problem. Thus, instead of re-
stricting the input language, which would be the alternative solution,
CBMC-GC’s approach allows the programmer to use any cyclic code
structure, as long as an upper bound for every cycle can be provided.
loop unwinding example . We explain the process of loop un-
winding using a generic while loop expression (which is easier to
read, yet actually replaced by a GOTO program at this compilation
step):
while(condition) {
body;
}
In the first unwinding iteration i = 1, the first iteration of the loop
body is unrolled, which leads to the following code:
if(condition) {
body;
while(condition) {
body;
}
}
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In the second unwinding iteration i = 2, the second loop iteration is
unrolled:
if(condition) {
body;
if(condition) {
body;
while(condition) {
body;
}
}
}
In the last iteration i = k, the loop is completely unrolled:
if(condition) {
body;
if(condition) {
body;
[...]
if(condition) {
body;
}
}
}
To provide a concrete example, the loop given below
int x[3];
int i = 0;
while(i < 3){
x[i] = x[i] * x[i];
i = i + 1;
}
is unrolled to the following code:
int x[3];
int i = 0;
if(i < 3) {
x[i] = x[i] * x[i];
i = i + 1;
if(i < 3) {
x[i] = x[i] * x[i];
i = i + 1;
if(i < 3) {
x[i] = x[i] * x[i];
i = i + 1;
}
}
}
We remark that recursive functions can be handled in the same
way as loops are unrolled by expanding the function body k times,
as recursion and loops use the same representation in a GOTO pro-
gram. We also observe that for loops with at most k steps, unwinding
preserves the semantics of the program.
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3.2.5 Conversion into Single Static Assignment Form
Once the program is acyclic, CBMC-GC turns it into SSA form. This
means that each variable x in the program is replaced by fresh vari-
ables x1, x2, . . . , where each of them is assigned a value only once.
For instance, the code sequence
x = x + 1;
x = x * 2;
is replaced by
x2 = x1 + 1;
x3 = x2 * 2;
Conditionals occurring in a program are translated into guarded
assignments. The core idea is that instead of branching at every con-
ditional, both branches are evaluated on distinct program variables.
After both branches have been evaluated, the effect on the variables,
which are possibly modified by either of the two branches, is applied
depending on the branch condition, also referred to as the guard. For
example, the body of the following function, which computes the ab-
solute of a value,
int abs(int x) {
if (x < 0)
x = -x;
return x;
}
is transformed into guarded SSA form as follows:
int abs(int x1) {
_Bool guard1 = (x1 < 0);
int x2 = -x1;
int x3 = guard1 ? x2 : x1
return x3;
}
The SSA representation has the important advantage that (guarded)
assignments of program variables can be used and manipulated as
mathematical equations. In contrast, the straightforward interpreta-
tion of any assignment as equation, leads to unsolvable equations,
e.g., x=x+1;. The indices of the variables in SSA form essentially cor-
respond to different intermediate states in the computation.
3.2.6 Expression Simplification
Expression simplification, e.g., constant folding, and constant prop-
agation allow to perform computation on constants and to remove
unnecessary computations already during compile time. Hence, re-
moved operations do not need to be translated into circuits.
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For example, the expressions
x = a + 0;
y = a * 0 + b * 1;
z = -3 + a + 6 / 2;
can be simplified to
x = a;
y = b;
z = a;
by reordering the expressions and evaluating constant parts or by
template based matching, such as rewriting 0 * X by 0, where X can
be any side-effect free arithmetic expression. In Section 3.3, we will
show that array accesses in MPC are comparably inefficient. There-
fore, expression simplification is especially effective and important
for the computation of array indicies. Expression simplification can
also be performed before loop unrolling, yet, in most cases more sim-
plifications are possible after unrolling, as some variables will become
constant, e.g., copies of a loop index variable.
3.2.7 Circuit Instantiation
In the final step, CBMC-GC translates the simplified code given in
SSA form, which can be seen as a sequence of arithmetic equations,
into Boolean formulas (circuits). To this end, CBMC-GC first replaces
all variables by bit vectors. For instance, an integer variable is repre-
sented as a bit vector consisting of 32 literals. For more complex vari-
ables such as arrays and pointers, CBMC-GC replaces all dereference
operators by a function that maps all pointers to their dereferenced
expression. More details can be found in [CKY03].
Correspondingly, operations over variables (e.g., arithmetic com-
putations) are naturally translated into Boolean functions over these
bit vectors. Internally, CBMC-GC realizes these Boolean functions as
circuits of Boolean gates whose construction principles are inspired
by methods from hardware design. For example, the guarded assign-
ment (INPUT_A_X == INPUT_B_Y)? t = 0 : t = 1; is translated into
a circuit consisting of two Boolean functions, namely an equivalence
check and a multiplexer. We refer to these elementary Boolean func-
tions as building blocks. The resulting circuit in this example is illus-
trated in Figure 4. An implementation of the equivalence building
block is illustrated in Figure 5 for a bit-width of two bits. In the next
chapter, we present optimized building blocks for all elementary op-
erations. We also remark that for some operations, e.g., bit shifts or
multiplications, building blocks with constant and variable inputs are
distinguished during circuit instantiation. This is because operations
with inputs known to be constant during compile time can be repre-
sented by a smaller circuit than those with variable input.
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Figure 4: Circuit (left: input, right: output) consisting of two Boolean func-
tions, as created by CBMC-GC from the guarded assignment
(INPUT_A_X==INPUT_B_Y)? t = 0 : t = 1;.
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Figure 5: The Boolean equivalence function for two input bit strings of
length two, a = A0A1 and b = B0B1, implemented as a circuit
consisting of two XOR, one OR and one NOT gate.
In the default setting, CBMC translates the resulting circuit into
a Boolean formula in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) form, ready
for its use in a SAT solver. In CBMC-GC the translation into CNF is
omitted. Moreover, the circuit generation of CBMC has to be adapted
for CBMC-GC: Since CBMC aims to produce efficiently solvable in-
stances for a SAT solver, it is allowed to instantiate circuits which are
equisatisfiable with the expected circuits, but not logically equivalent,
e.g., integer division is transformed into a multiplication. This is a
useful trick to decrease the runtime of SAT solvers for all operations
that result in a large Boolean formulas. In these cases CBMC intro-
duces circuits with free input variables, and adds constraints which
require them to coincide with other variables. All operations that in-
stantiated equisatisfiable circuits in CBMC have been adapted to in-
stantiate purely logical circuits for CBMC-GC.
3.3 complexity of operations in mpc
When programming efficient applications for Boolean circuit based
MPC it is important to consider that the resulting program will be
evaluated in the circuit computation model, cf. Section 2.2.2. Thus,
some operations that are efficient in the CPU/RAM model can be
very inefficient in the circuit model of MPC. In this section, we give
a high-level overview on the performance of various operations of
ANSI C in the circuit model. A detailed discussion on how the dif-
ferent operations are implemented as a circuit and how these are
optimized for MPC is given in the next chapter.
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Table 2 shows a summary of the circuit complexities, i.e., the num-
ber of non-linear gates, which describe the computation costs in MPC,
of various operations in ANSI C. Moreover, we illustrate the actual cir-
cuit sizes for a standard integer with a bit-width of n = 32 bit and
give an estimate on the number of possible operations per second,
when garbling each operation in Yao’s protocol secure against semi-
honest adversaries. The estimates are given using the fastest known
garbling scheme [Bel+13], which garbles around 10 million (M) gates
per second on single core of a commodity laptop CPU. We remark
that already 4M non-linear gates per second are sufficient to saturate
a network link with a capacity of 1 Gbit [ZRE15].
Bit level operations in ANSI C, such as logical ANDs, OR, XOR
are very efficient on the circuit level, as they directly translate into
the according gate types with a total circuit size that is linear in the
data type’s bit-width (AND, OR) or even zero (XOR). Shifts (« or »)
with variable offset are more costly by a logarithmic factor. All logical
operations are for free, when being used with a constant.
Some arithmetic operations, i.e., addition and subtraction, are like-
wise efficient with a circuit size linear in the bit-width. For example,
it is possible to perform more than 300, 000 additions per second on
a single core in Yao’s protocol. Multiplications and divisions are sig-
nificantly more costly with a circuit size that is quadratic in the bit-
width1. Hence, for a typical integer, multiplications are by a factor of
32 slower than additions. Nevertheless, in Yao’s protocol more than
10, 000 multiplications can be performed per second.
The assignment or copying of variables requires no gates in MPC,
as assignments are represented by wires. The same holds for array ac-
cess (read and write) with an index known at compile time. However,
a main performance bottleneck in MPC is the access to an array with
a variable index. Each access (read or write) of an array element re-
quires a circuit that has the size of the array itself. Assuming an array
with m elements of bit-width n, a circuit for read or write access has
size O(mn). Consequently, for an exemplary, moderately sized array
with 1024 integers, only 300 read or write access can be performed
per second.
In summary, integer arithmetic and logical operations are very fast,
while multiplications and divisions are the slowest operations, yet
still can be performed at a speed of 10, 000 of operations per second.
However, dynamic array access can become an obstacle for any practi-
cal application that requires arrays of noticeable size. Therefore, in the
next chapter we also study techniques that aim at detecting constant
array accesses to avoid the use of compilation of dynamic accesses
whenever possible.
1 For larger bit-widths a complexity of multiplication ofO(n1.6) can be achieved using
Karatsuba multiplication [KS08].
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Circuit
complexity
Complexity
for 32 bit
integers
Ops / sec
in Yao’s
protocol
Logical Operators
AND (&) O(n) 32 312,500
OR (|) O(n) 32 312,500
XOR (ˆ) O(n) 0 > 10M
Shift («/») variable O(n log(n))) 160 62,500
one of the above
with constant
0 0 > 10M
Arithmetic Operators
Addition (+) O(n) 31 322,580
Subtraction (-) O(n) 32 312,500
Multiplication (*) O(n2) 993 10,070
Division (/) O(n2) 1,085 9,216
Modulo (%) O(n2) 1,085 9,216
Assignments
var← var 0 0 > 10M
var← Arraym[const] 0 0 > 10M
Arraym[const]← var 0 0 > 10M
var← Arraym[var] O(mn) 31744 305
Arraym[var]← var O(mn) 34816 287
Table 2: Circuit complexity of operations in ANSI C depending on the bit-
width n in the number of non-linear gates and the size of an array
m. Shown is also the size of each operation for a typical integer
bit-width of n = 32 bit and an exemplary array size of m = 1024,
as well as the number of possible operations in current state-of-the-
art semi-honest Yao’s Garbled Circuits on a single CPU core (10M
non-linear gates per second [Bel+13]).
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Summary: Even though MPC became ‘practical’ in recent years, it is still
multiple orders of magnitude slower than generic computation. Therefore,
when developing efficient applications on top of MPC protocols, it is of
interest to optimize these to the full extent. In this chapter, we detail the
need for optimization in application development for MPC, before deriving
requirements for efficient circuit design for Boolean circuit based constant-
round MPC protocols. Then we describe the optimization techniques that
we applied in CBMC-GC to optimize circuits for this class of protocols. This
approach consists of two parts, namely hand-optimized building blocks and
a fixed point optimization algorithm employing multiple gate level opti-
mization techniques, such as pattern rewriting or SAT sweeping. The effec-
tiveness of our approach is demonstrated by an experimental evaluation of
various benchmark functionalities. For example, we show that the optimiza-
tion techniques of CBMC-GC lead to circuits that are 70% smaller for the
computation of an Euclidean distance or between 20− 50% smaller for dif-
ferent implementations of the the Hamming distance when compared to the
best compilers in related work.
Remarks: This chapter is based in parts on our article “On Compiling Boolean
Circuits Optimized for Secure Multi-party Computation”, Niklas Büscher, Mar-
tin Franz, Andreas Holzer, Helmut Veith, Stefan Katzenbeisser, which ap-
peared in Formal Methods in System Design, vol. 51, no. 2, 2017, and on
Chapter 4 of our book – “Compilation for Secure Multi-party Computation”,
Niklas Büscher and Stefan Katzenbeisser, Springer Briefs in Computer Sci-
ence 2017, ISBN 978-3-319-67521-3.
4.1 motivation and overview
When evaluating a circuit in an MPC protocol each gate in the circuit
is evaluated in software using different cryptographic instructions
depending on the gate types (see Section 2.2.2). Therefore, assuming
a fixed set of input and output wires, the performance of MPC ap-
plications depends both on the size of a circuit that represents the
functionality to be computed and the gate types used therein [KS08].
We also observe that for almost all deployment scenarios of MPC
protocols, the circuit is generated once, whereas the MPC protocol
itself will be run multiple times. Especially when considering the
high computational and communication costs of MPC protocols (com-
pared to generic computation), it is worthwhile to optimize circuits
during their creation. In this chapter, we identify and evaluate opti-
mization techniques that minimize a Boolean circuit for an applica-
tion in MPC protocols with constant rounds.
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optimization challenge . The compilation of an efficient high-
level description of a functionality for RAM based architectures does
not necessarily translate into an efficient representation as a circuit.
For example, in Section 4.5 we compare the circuit sizes when com-
piling a Merge and a Bubble sort algorithm. Merge sort is commonly
superior in efficiency when computed on a RAM based architecture,
yet Bubble sort compiles to a significantly smaller circuit. Due to this
reasons dedicated algorithms have been developed in hardware syn-
thesis (e.g., sorting networks), which are optimized for a circuit based
computation. To the best of our knowledge, no generic (and practical)
approach is known that is capable of transforming a functionality op-
timized for a RAM machine into a representation that is best suited
for circuit synthesis. Therefore, in this chapter we focus on minimizing
circuits for a given algorithmic representation.
illustrating the need for optimization. Optimization is
important for the wide-spread use of MPC. For example, when writ-
ing source code for RAM based architectures, developers commonly
rely on a few data types that are available, e.g., unsigned int or
long. In contrast, on the circuit level, arbitrarily bit-widths can be
used. However, it is a tedious programming task to specify precise bit-
widths for every variable to achieve minimal circuits. Consequently,
optimizing compilers should (beside other means) identify overly al-
located bit-widths on the source code level and adjust them on the
gate-level accordingly. Without advanced optimization techniques, the
developer is required to be very familiar with circuit synthesis for
MPC and compiler internals to write code that compiles into an effi-
cient circuit and thus, efficient application.
To further illustrate the need for optimization in circuit compila-
tion, we study an example code snippet given in Listing 7. The main
part of the code begins in Line 7, where an input variable is declared
that is only instantiated during protocol evaluation. Hence, its actual
value is unknown during compile time. Next, a variable t is declared
and initialized with a constant value of 43210. Then, a helper function,
declared in Line 1, is called that checks whether the given argument
is an odd number. Depending on the result of the helper function, t
will be incremented by one in Line 10.
A naive translation of this code into a Boolean circuit leads to a
circuit consisting of four building blocks, namely, a logical AND, an
integer equality check, an integer addition as well as a conditional
integer assignment. Figure 6 illustrates the circuit that is generated
by such a direct translation. When using the best known building
blocks (these are described in Section 4.3) and assuming a standard
integer bit-width of 32 bit, 31 or 32 non-linear gates are required for
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1 int is_odd(int val) {
2 return ((val & 1) == 1);
3 }
4
5 int main() {
6 [...]
7 int INPUT_A_x;
8 int t = 43210;
9 if(is_odd(INPUT_A_x) {
10 t = t + 1;
11 }
12 [...]
13 }
Listing 7: Code example to illustrate the need for optimization.
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Figure 6: Circuit after naïve translation from source code in Listing 7 to three
building blocks of bit-width 32 bit.
each building block. This results in a total circuit size of snX = 126
non-linear gates.
However, an optimizing compiler could detect that the comparison
is only a single bit comparison, whose result is equal to the Least
Significant Bit (LSB) of INPUT_A_x. Hence, no gate is required for the
comparison. Moreover, as variable t is initialized by an even constant,
the addition in Line 10 can be folded into an assignment of the LSB,
which leads to a circuit that consists only of a single wire and that
does not even contain a single gate, i.e., the LSB of t is set to the LSB
of INPUT_A_x. In this example, the difference in circuit sizes between
the naïve translation and an optimized compilation is significant.
Such a size reduction directly relates to an improvement in the proto-
col’s runtime, as the (amortized) computational cost of evaluating an
MPC protocol scales linear with the circuit size.
Therefore, in this chapter we present the optimization techniques
that we implemented in CBMC-GC that allow the compilation of ef-
ficient circuits for MPC protocols with constant rounds, i.e., circuits
with a minimal number of non-linear gates. With these techniques,
we are able to offer a high level of abstraction from both MPC and
circuits by compiling from standard ANSI C source code. For the
creation of size-minimized circuits, we first provide an overview of
optimized building blocks and then present a fixed point algorithm
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that combines techniques from logic minimization, such as constant
propagation, SAT sweeping, and pattern rewriting, to compile circuits
that are significantly smaller than those generated by compilers from
related work.
chapter outline . We first given an overview on the circuit op-
timization process in CBMC-GC in Section 4.2. Then, in Section 4.3
we describe size-optimized building blocks for MPC, before describ-
ing multiple gate-level optimization techniques in Section 4.4. Finally,
the effectiveness of these optimization techniques is studied in Sec-
tion 4.5.
4.2 circuit minimization for mpc
optimization goal . In Section 2.2.2, we introduced Yao’s Gar-
bled Circuits protocol, which is the most researched constant round
MPC protocol. We use Yao’s protocol to derive a cost model and cir-
cuit optimization goal, yet, we remark that all known practical MPC
protocols over Boolean circuits with constant rounds have a very sim-
ilar cost model and therefore profit from the ideas presented here.
The runtime of Yao’s protocol depends on the input and output
sizes as well as the circuit that is used to compute the functionality
f(x,y). Assuming a correct specification of inputs and outputs1, the
runtime of an application in Yao’s protocol can only be improved
by changing the circuit representation Cf(x,y) into a more efficient
representation C ′f(x,y). The circuit runtime depends on the number
of linear and non-linear gates. For security models relevant in prac-
tice2, only non-linear gates require computation of encryptions and
communication between the parties, whereas the linear gates are con-
sidered as being for ‘free’ (see Section 2.2.2), because they neither
require communication nor cryptographic operations. Thus, the pri-
mary goal of circuit optimization for Yao’s protocol, and most other
known constant round MPC protocols, is to minimize the number of
non-linear (AND) gates. Nevertheless, once the number of non-linear
gates is minimized, as a secondary goal the total number of linear
(XOR) gates could also be minimized, because in a practical deploy-
ment linear gates also generate (albeit very small in comparison to
AND gates) computation costs, e.g., fetching and storing wire labels
from the memory. Moreover, for the best known protocol secure in
the standard model, XOR gates have a relevant cost, as they cannot
be garbled for free [Gue+15]. Albeit less costs than garbling AND
1 Our optimization methods also detect and display unused input as well as constant
output.
2 The best known techniques secure in the standard model also require encryptions
for linear gates [Gue+15].
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Figure 7: CBMC-GC’s compilation pipeline with circuit optimization.
Marked in gray are the parts described in this chapter that lead
to size-minimized circuits for MPC.
gates, a minimal number of XOR gates is thus also relevant in this
scenario.
With communication being the most relevant bottleneck for prac-
tical MPC, the techniques described in the next sections mainly aim
at achieving the primary goal, yet an unnecessary increase in XOR
gates is always avoided. Finally, we remark that circuit optimization
is a time constrained problem, as a programmer in practices expects
the compiler to finish its optimization after a reasonable time T .
minimizing strategy. Unfortunately, finding a minimal circuit
for a given circuit description is known to be ΣP2 complete [BU11].
Therefore, in CBMC-GC we follow a heuristic approach. First, during
circuit instantiation (see Chapter 3), we use size-minimized building
blocks that are described in Section 4.3. Second, the instantiated cir-
cuit is optimized on the gate level by using a best-effort fixed point op-
timization algorithm that is discussed in detail Section 4.4 and added
as an additional step to the compilation chain of CBMC-GC. The full
compilation chain of CBMC-GC, including optimizations, is shown
in Figure 7.
4.3 building blocks for boolean circuit based mpc
Optimized building blocks are an essential part of designing complex
circuits. They facilitate efficient compilation, as they can be highly
optimized once and subsequently instantiated at practically no cost
during compilation. In the following paragraphs, we give a compre-
hensive overview over the currently best known building blocks with
a minimal number of non-linear gates for the most common arith-
metic and control flow operations.
adder . An n-bit adder takes two bit strings x and y of length n,
representing two (signed) integers, as input and returns their sum as
an output bit string S of length n + 1. An adder is commonly con-
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structed of smaller building blocks, namely Half Adders (HAs) and
Full Adders (FAs). A HA is a combinatorial circuit that takes two bits
A and B and computes their sum S = A⊕B and carry bit Cout = A ·B.
A FA allows an additional carry-in bit Cin as input. The best known
constructions [KS08] for computing the sum bit of a FA is by XOR-ing
all inputs
S = A⊕B⊕Cin,
while the carry-out bit can be computed by
Cout = (A⊕Cin)(B⊕Cin)⊕Cin.
Both HA and FA have a non-linear size snX = 1. The standard and
best known n bit adder is the Ripple Carry Adder (RCA) that consists
of a successive composition of n FAs. Thus, RCA has a circuit size
snXRCA(n) = n. We note that, according to the semantics of ANSI C,
an addition is computed as x + y mod 2n and no overflow bit is
returned, which reduces the circuit size by one non-linear gate.
subtractor . A subtractor for two n-bit strings can be imple-
mented with one additional non-linear gate by using the two’s com-
plement representation x− y = x+ y+ 1. Thus, the addition of neg-
ative numbers in the two’s complement representation is equivalent
to an addition of positive numbers.
comparator . An equivalence (EQ) comparator checks whether two
input bit strings of length n are equivalent and outputs a single result
bit. The comparator can be implemented naïvely by a successive OR
composition over pairwise XOR gates that compare single bits. This
results in a size of snXEQ(n) = n− 1 gates [KS08]. A greater-than (GT)
comparator that compares two integers can be implemented with
help of a subtractor by observing that x > y ⇔ x− y− 1 > 0 and re-
turning the carry out bit, which yields to a circuit size of snXGQ(n) = n.
multiplier . In classic hardware synthesis, a multiplier (MUL)
computes the product of two nbit strings x and y, which has a
bit-width of 2nbit. However, in many programming languages, e.g.,
ANSI C, multiplication is defined as an n → n bit operation, where
the product of two unsigned integers is computed as x · y mod 2n.
The standard approach for computing an n → 2nbit multiplication
is often referred to as the “school method”. Using a bitwise multiplica-
tion and shifted addition, the product is computed as
∑n−1
i=0 2
i(Xiy).
This approach leads to a circuit requiring n2 1-bitmultiplications and
n− 1 shifted n-bit additions, which in total results in a circuit size
of snXMUL(n) = 2 · n2 − n gates [KSS09]. When compiling a n → nbit
multiplication with the same method, only half of the one bit multi-
plications are relevant, leading to a circuit size of snXMUL(n) = n
2 − n
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Figure 8: Circuit consisting of a multiplexer tree when compiling an exem-
plary array read of four bits D0,D1,D2,D3.
gates. The n → n multiplication of negative numbers in the two’s
complement representation can be realized with the same circuit. Al-
ternatively, for a n → 2nbit multiplication the Karatsuba-Ofmann
multiplication (KMUL) can be used, achieving an asymptotic com-
plexity of O(nlog2(3)). Henecka et al. [Hen+10] presented the first
adoption for MPC, which was subsequently improved by Demm-
ler et al. [Dem+15] by 3% using commercial hardware synthesis tools.
For an n → 2nbit multiplication their construction outperforms the
school method for bit-widths n > 19 bit.
multiplexer . Control flow operations, e.g., branches and array
read accesses, are expressed on the circuit level through multiplexers
(MUX). A 2:1 n-bit MUX consists of two input bits strings d0 and
d1 of length n and a control input bit C. The control input decides
which of the two input bit strings is propagated to the output bit
string o. For an array read access, a multiplexer with more inputs
is required. A 2:1 MUX can be extended to a m:1 MUX that selects
between m input strings d0,d1, . . . ,dm using dlog2(m)e control bits
C0,C1, . . . ,Cdlog(m)e by a tree based composition of 2:1 MUXs. For ex-
ample, a read access to an array consisting of four bits D0,D1,D2,D3
and two index bits i = C1C0 can be realized as illustrated in Figure 8.
Kolesnikov and Schneider [KS08] presented a construction of a
2:1 MUX that only requires one single non-linear gate for every pair
of input bits by computing the output bit as O = (D0 ⊕D1)C⊕D0.
This leads to a circuit size for an n-bit 2:1 MUX of snXMUX(n) = n.
The circuit size of a tree based m:1 MUX depends on the number of
choices m, as well as the bit-width n, yielding snXMUX_tree(m,n) =
(m− 1) · snXMUX(n).
demultiplexer . Write accesses to an array require a building
block, where only the element addressed by a given index is replaced.
All other elements should be unchanged. Hence, this resembles very
closely the inverse of a multiplexer, referred to as demultiplexer (DE-
MUX). A 1:m DEMUX has an input index i, an input bit string x,
a number m of input bit strings d1,d2, . . . ,dm and outputs m bit
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strings d ′1,d
′
2, . . . ,d
′
m, where an output d ′j is set to x if j = i and to dj
if otherwise.
A construction for a 1:m DEMUX is given by Malkhi et al. [Mal+04]:
Each output dout,i is controlled by a multiplexer, which assigns d ′i ←
x, if the constant index j is equivalent to the index input bit string i.
This construction is similar to a sequence of if clauses, i.e.,
if(i==0)
d[0] = x;
else if(i==1)
d[1] = x;
[...].
This yields a circuit size of
snXDMUX_EQ(m,n) =
m · (snXEQ(n) + snXMUX(n)) = m · (dlog2(m)e− 1+n).
A 1:m DEMUX can be constructed more efficiently using a one-hot
encoder that translates the input choice string c into an output bit
string o of length m, where the c’th bit is set to one, and all other bits
are set to zero. The output bit string can be connected to a multiplexer
for every data input, as described above. A one-hot encoder can be
constructed in a tree based manner using 1-bit encoders that have an
input bit I, a choice input C and two output O0 and O1. The outputs
are computed as O0 = (I ∧ C) ⊕ I and O1 = (I ∧ C) ⊕ I. The root
input is set to I = 1 and the m final outputs are connected to the
multiplexers controlling the data inputs. In total n− 1 1-bit encoders
are required, which can be computed with only a single AND gate.
This is because the intermediate result I∧ C has only be computed
once to be used for both outputs. In total, this yields a circuit size of
snXDMUX_tree(m,n) = encoders+multiplexers
= n− 2+mn
≈ n · (m+ 1).
division. A divisor computes the quotient and remainder for a
division of two binary integer numbers. The standard approach for
integer division is known as long division and works similar to the
school-method for multiplication. Namely, the divisor is iteratively
shifted and subtracted from the remainder, which is initially set to
the dividend. Only if the divisor fits into the remainder, which is
efficiently decidable by overflow free subtraction, a bit in the quotient
is set and the newly computed remainder is used. Thus, a divisor can
be built with help of n subtractors and n multiplexers, each of bit-
width n, leading to a circuit size of snXSDIV(n) = 2n
2. The divisor can
be improved by using restoring division [Rob58], which leads to a
circuit size of snXRDIV(n) = n
2 + 2n+ 1.
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Figure 9: Illustration of CBMC-GC’s minimization procedure.
4.4 gate-level circuit minimization
As identified in Section 4.1, with the compilation being a one-time
task, it is very useful to invest computation time in circuit optimiza-
tion during compilation. Moreover, as shown, a naïve translation of
code into optimized building blocks does not directly lead to a min-
imal circuit. Therefore, after the instantiation of all building blocks,
and thus construction of the complete circuit, a circuit minimization
procedure is run that reduces the number of non-linear gates. The
procedure is an heuristic approach that itself consists of multiple dif-
ferent algorithms. We begin with a discussion of the general proce-
dure, before discussing the different components in detail.
minimization procedure . An overview of the minimization
routine is illustrated in Figure 9. It begins with the translation of the
circuit into an intermediate AND-Invert Graph (AIG) representation,
which is a circuit description consisting of only AND and inverter
(NOT) gates that allows efficient gate-level optimizations [MCB06].
After the AIG translation, a fixed point minimization routine is initi-
ated. The algorithm is run until no further improvements in the cir-
cuit size are observed or a user given time bound T has been reached.
In both cases, the result of the latest iteration is returned.
In every iteration of the algorithm a complete and topological pass
over all gates from from inputs to outputs is initiated. During this
pass, constants (zero or one) are propagated (constant propagation),
duplicate gate structures are eliminated (structural hashing) and small
sub-circuits are matched and replaced by hand-optimized sub-circuits
(rewrite patterns). If any improvement, i.e., reduction in the number of
non-linear gates, is observed, a new pass is initiated. If no improve-
ment is observed, a more expensive optimization routine is invoked
that detects constant and duplicate gates using a SAT solver (SAT
sweeping).
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aig , constant propagation and structural hashing . An
AND-inverter graph is a representation of a logical functionality us-
ing only binary AND gates (nodes) with (inverted) inputs. AIGs have
been identified as a very useful representation for circuit minimiza-
tion, as they allow very efficient graph manipulations, such as addi-
tion or merging of nodes. CBMC-GC utilizes the ABC library [Ber] for
AIG handling, which provides state-of-the-art circuit synthesis meth-
ods. As a first step in CBMC-GC, input and output wires are created
for every input and output variable. Then, during the instantiation
of building blocks, the AIG is constructed by substituting every gate
type that is different from an AND gate by a Boolean equivalent AIG
sub-graph. For example, an XOR gate (A⊕B) can be replaced by the
following AIG: VA · VB · VA · VB, where VA is the node representing
A in the AIG.
Whenever a node is added to the AIG, two optimization techniques
are directly applied. First, constant inputs are propagated. Hence,
whenever an input to a new node is known as constant, the added
node is replaced by an edge. For example, when adding a node Vnew
with inputs from some node Vj and node Vzero, which is the node
for the constant input zero, then Vnew will not be added to the AIG.
Instead, all edges originating Vnew will be remapped to originate
from Vzero instead, because Vnew · 0 is equivalent to 0. Similarly,
Vnew = Vj · 1 will be replaced by Vj. Second, structural hashing is
applied. Structural hashing [Dar+81] is used to detect and remove
duplicate sub-graphs, i.e., graphs that compute the same function-
ality over the same inputs. Duplicate sub-graphs are also detected
when new nodes are added. Hence, when adding a node Vnew to the
AIG, it is checked that no other node exists that uses the same inputs.
If such a node Vj is found, Vnew will be replaced by Vj, as described
above.
pattern rewriting . Circuit (and AIG) rewriting is a greedy op-
timization algorithm used in logic synthesis [MCB06], which was first
proposed for hardware verification [BB04]. A rewrite pattern consists
of a (small) template circuit to be matched and a substitute circuit.
Both circuits are functionally equivalent, yet can have a different struc-
ture or different gates. Pattern based rewriting has been shown to be
a very effective optimization technique in logic synthesis, as it can be
applied with very little computational cost [MCB06]. In CBMC-GC’s
compilation chain, rewrite patterns are of high importance due to
multiple reasons. First, they are responsible for translating the AIG
back into a Boolean circuit representation with a small number of
non-linear gates. This is necessary, because all linear gates have been
replaced by AND gates during the translation in the AIG represen-
tation. Second, pattern based rewriting allows for MPC specific op-
timizations by applying patterns that favor linear gates and reduce
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Figure 10: Counter example for circuit rewriting. The sub-circuit indicated
by the solid lines is a candidate for rewriting. Yet, due to its in-
termediate outputs, marked with dotted lines, a rewriting would
actually increase the overall circuit size.
the number of non-linear gates. Finally, in CBMC-GC each rewrite
pass is also used for constant propagation and structural hashing, as
described above. We remark that these techniques are responsible for
reducing the bit-width declared on the source code level to the actual
required bit-width, by identifying unused or constant gates.
For circuit rewriting all gates are first ordered in topological order
by their circuit depth. Subsequently, by iterating over all gates, the pat-
terns are matched against all gates, and thus all possible sub-circuits.
Whenever a match is found, the sub-circuit becomes a candidate for a
replacement. However, the sub-circuit will only be replaced if the sub-
stitution leads to an actual improvement in the circuit size. This is of-
ten not the case, because matched gates might provide inputs to other
gates, which can render the substitution ineffective. In these cases the
sub-circuit will not be replaced. An example is shown in Figure 10,
where a sub-circuit matches a template: (A ·B)⊕ (A ·C)→ (A⊕C) ·A.
Yet the detected sub-circuit has intermediate outputs to gates outside
the template, which would still need to be computed when rewriting
the computation of O.
The outcome and performance of this greedy replacement approach
depends not only on the patterns themselves, but also on the or-
der of patterns applied. Therefore, in CBMC-GC, small patterns are
matched first, e.g., single gate patterns, as they can be matched with
little cost and offer guaranteed improvements, before matching more
complex patterns that require to compare sub-circuits consisting of
multiple gates and inputs. Table 3 lists some exemplary rewrite pat-
terns that are used in CBMC-GC and that have been shown to be very
effective in our evaluation. In total more than 80 patterns are used for
rewriting.
sat sweeping . SAT sweeping is a powerful minimization tool,
widely used for equivalence checking of combinatorial circuits [Kue04;
Mis+06]. The core idea of SAT sweeping is to prove that the output
of a sub-circuit is either constant or equivalent to another sub-circuit
(detection of duplicity). In both cases one of the two sub-circuit is un-
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Search pattern Substitute Size reduction
(snX/s)
Propagate Pattern
0 1 0 / 1
0 ·A or A · 0 0 1 / 1
0+A or A+ 0 A 1 / 1
0⊕A or A⊕ 0 A 0 / 1
1 0 0 / 1
1 ·A or A · 1 A 1 / 1
1+A or A+ 1 1 1 / 1
Trivial Patterns
A ·A A 1 / 1
A ·A 0 1 / 2
A+A A 1 / 1
A+A 1 1 / 2
A⊕A 0 0 / 1
A⊕A 1 0 / 2
A A 0 / 2
AND/OR Patterns
(A ·B) · (A ·C) A ·B ·C 1 / 1
(A ·B) + (A ·C) A · (B+C) 1 / 1
(A+B) · (A+C) A+ (B ·C) 1 / 1
(A+B) +A 1 2 / 3
(A ·B) ·A 0 2 / 3
(A+B) + (A+C) 1 3 / 4
(A ·B) · (A ·C) 0 3 / 4
XOR Patterns
A⊕B A⊕B 0 / 2
(A+B)⊕ (A ·B) A⊕B 2 / 2
(A+B) · (A ·B) A⊕B 3 / 3
A ·B ·A ·B A⊕B 3 / 6
(A · (B⊕ (A ·C))) A · (B⊕C) 1 / 1
(A ·B)⊕ (A ·C) (A⊕C) ·A 1 / 1
(A ·C)⊕ (B ·C) (A⊕B) ·C 1 / 1
Table 3: Exemplary rewrite patterns used in CBMC-GC. The patterns consist
of a search pattern and a substitute circuit, which lead to different
improvements, i.e., size reductions.
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necessary and can be removed. As common, SAT sweeping is applied
in CBMC-GC in a probabilistic manner. A naïve application, which
checks every possible combination of sub-circuits, would result in in-
feasible computational costs. Thus, for efficient equivalence checking,
the circuit is first evaluated (simulated) multiple times with different
random inputs. The gates in every run are then grouped by their out-
put, i.e., gates with the same output behavior over all runs form a can-
didate equivalence class. Moreover, gates that always output one or
always output zero are presumingly constant. These hypotheses are
then verified using the efficient tool of a SAT solver. For this purpose,
sub-circuit are converted into CNF and passed to the solver. Due to
its high computational cost in comparison with the circuit rewriting,
SAT sweeping is only applied if other optimization methods cannot
minimize the circuit any further.
4.5 experimental evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of different optimization techniques, we
study the circuit sizes when compiling example applications that
emerged as standard benchmarks for MPC, described in detail in Sec-
tion 2.5. We first present a comparison of circuits created by the dif-
ferent releases of CBMC-GC, which use an increasing number of op-
timization techniques described in this chapter. Then, we present a
comparison of the circuits generated by CBMC-GC with circuits gen-
erated by other state of the art compilers for Boolean circuit based
MPC.
4.5.1 Evaluation of Circuit Minimization Techniques
It is almost impossible to benchmark the described circuit minimiza-
tion techniques in isolation. This is because of the many dependencies
between the optimization techniques. For example, SAT sweeping is
highly ineffective without efficient constant propagation. Moreover,
often rewrite patterns can become ineffective without the application
of other rewrite patterns. To provide a further example, when us-
ing less efficient building blocks, the circuit minimization phase will
partly be able to compensate inefficient building blocks and start op-
timizing these. However, the computation time spent on optimizing
the building blocks can consequently not be applied to the remain-
ing parts of the circuit. For these reasons, we abstain from an indi-
vidual evaluation of the described optimization methods but rather
show that the combination of techniques described in this thesis have
evolved over previous work, such that the circuit sizes of all bench-
mark applications have significantly been reduced when compared
to earlier compiler versions.
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Figure 11: The circuit sizes in the number of non-linear gates produced by
CBMC-GC v0.8 [Hol+12], v0.9 [Fra+14], and the current version
for five example applications, cf. Table 4.
In Table 4, which is also illustrated in Figure 11, a comparison of
circuit sizes between the first release of CBMC-GC v0.8 [Hol+12] in
2012, its successor CBMC-GC v0.9 [Fra+14] from 2014, and the current
version described in this thesis is given. Moreover, the improvement
between the initial and the current version of CBMC-GC is shown.
The initial release of CBMC-GC provided no gate-level minimization
techniques, yet it contained first optimized building blocks. In CBMC-
GC v0.9 a first version of the fixed point optimization algorithm, was
introduced. The most recent version that implements all techniques
and building blocks described in this chapter.
For comparison purposes, we use a selection of applications intro-
duced in Section 2.5. All applications have been compiled from the
same source code and optimized with a time limit of 10 minutes on
a commodity laptop. We observe that the improvement in building
blocks is directly visible in the example applications performing ran-
dom arithmetic operations and a matrix multiplication, which have
been improved up to a factor of two, between the first and the cur-
rent release of CBMC-GC. These two applications purely consist of
arithmetic operations that utilize almost the complete bit-width of
the used data types and operations, and thus, barely profit from
gate-level optimizations. The resulting circuit sizes for the Hamming
distance computation show significant improvements when compar-
ing the first and the current release, yet only marginal improvement
in comparison to CBMC-GC v0.9. More complex applications, such
as Bubble sort based median computation, which involve noticeably
more control flow logic, have been improved by more than a factor
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of 10 between the first and the current release of CBMC-GC. Simi-
larly, for the location aware scheduling application, which involves a
mix of arithmetic operations and control flow logic, we observe an
improvement up to a factor of 3 between the first and the current re-
lease. In summary, the proposed fixed point optimization routine is
very effective to minimize the number of non-linear gates for a given
circuit.
4.5.2 Compiler Comparison
We compare CBMC-GC with Frigate [Moo+16] and OblivC [ZE15],
which are the most promising compilers for a comparison, as they
create circuits with the least number of non-linear gates (at the time
of writing) according the compiler analysis by Mood et al. [Moo+16].
Even though all compilers use different input languages, we ensure a
fair comparison by implementing the functionalities using the same
code structures (i.e., functions, loops), data types and bit-widths. More-
over, to present a wider variety of applications, we also investigate
more integrated example applications, such as the biometric match-
ing (BioMatch) application or floating point operations, which are
all described in Section 2.5. All applications have been compiled with
the latest available versions of Frigate and OblivC. For CBMC-GC, we
again set an optimization time limit of 10 minutes on a commodity
laptop. The resulting circuit sizes and the improvement of CBMC-GC
over the best result from related work are presented in Table 5 and
partly illustrated in Figure 12. Circuit sizes above one million (M)
gates are rounded to the nearest 100, 000.
We observe that the current version of CBMC-GC outperforms re-
lated compilers in circuit size for almost all applications. For exam-
ple, the BioMatch application, or scheduling applications improve by
more than 25%. Most significant is the advantage in compiling float-
ing point operations, where a 77% improvement can be observed
for the dedicated multiplication operation. A similar improvement
is achieved for the computation of the Euclidean distance or matrix
multiplication (MMul) on floating point and fixed point values. The
operations are dominated by bit wise operations and thus, can be
optimized with gate-level optimization when compiled from high-
level source code. No improvement is observed for the integer based
MMul. As discussed above, the MMul compiles into a sequential com-
position of building blocks, which barely can be improved further.
The Hamming distance computation is well suited to show imple-
mentation dependent results and illustrates the challenges of writing
source code that compiles into efficient circuits. Here we compare
three variants described in more detail in Section 2.5. The tree based
computation shows the smallest circuit size, even though it is the
most inefficient CPU implementation. This is because a tree-based
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Figure 12: Circuit size comparison of Frigate [Moo+16], OblivC [ZE15] and
the current version of CBMC-GC, cf. Table 5.
composition allows to apply adders with small bit-widths for the ma-
jority of the bit counting. Comparing the compilers, we also observe
differences between the implementations. The tree based and naïve
implementation are significantly more optimized, i.e., up to a factor
of two, in CBMC-GC than in the other compilers. The implementation
optimized for register based computation compiles into a circuit that
is also smaller in CBMC-GC than in related work, yet only by 20%.
This is because the compilation of the naïve bit counting profits signif-
icantly from constant propagation, as only a few bits per expression
are required on the gate-level. The register optimized implementation
maximizes the number of bits used per arithmetic operation, thus, al-
lows only little gate-level optimization. We remark that Frigate and
OblivC compile larger applications noticeably faster than CBMC-GC,
yet the circuits created by CBMC-GC are up to a factor of four smaller.
4.6 related work
logic synthesis . Since the development of the first CPUs, logic
minimization and optimization have continuously been evolved for
logic synthesis in hardware design. Many algorithms and techniques
have been developed, e.g., the ESPRESSO logic minimization [Bra+]
or DAG rewriting [Mis+06], which are also of relevance for logic syn-
thesis for MPC. An overview of the many existing algorithm is given
in [She93].
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circuit minimization for mpc . In classic logic synthesis, non-
linear gates are often cheaper than linear gates, therefore, to the best
of our knowledge, minimizing the non-linear complexity has barely
been studied in this context. However, in cryptography a minimal
number of non-linear gates is not only relevant for MPC but also for
zero-knowledge proofs, homomorphic encryption or verifiable out-
sourced computation. With the practical advancement of these pro-
tocols, recently dedicated logic synthesis methods became of rele-
vance. For example, theoretical minimization limits have been stud-
ied [BPP00; BU11; TP14] and also first optimization routines have
been proposed [BP10].
The only compiler for MPC next to CBMC-GC that employs a com-
plete logic minimization tool-chain is TinyGarble [Son+15], which
adapts a commercial logic synthesis tool to the needs of MPC. Other
compilers (see Section 2.4), such as Frigate [Moo+16], only provide
limited minimization mechanisms, e.g., local constant propagation.
ObliVM [Liu+15b] presented a loop rewriting optimization approach
for for efficient compilation. An expression rewriting optimization
technique has been proposed by Kerschbaum [Ker11; Ker13]. Its core
idea is to use knowledge interference between the parties to detect
operations that can be locally computed rather than securely. Re-
cently, Kennedy et al. [KKW17] and Laud and Pankova [LP16] in-
dependently presented two similar optimization approaches that aim
at detecting and fusing duplicated functionalities.
Cryptography primitives have been optimized independently. For
example, the AES S-Box has been (hand-)optimized in regard to its
non-linear complexity [BP10] and also new cipher designs with a fo-
cus on minimal non-linear complexity have been proposed [Alb+15;
Alb+16]. Moreover, many arithmetic and control flow building blocks
known from hardware design (cf. 4.3) have been hand optimized, e.g.,
[Dem+15; KSS09; KS08; ZE13].
Further circuit optimization problems are discussed in Chapter 6
and Chapter 7.
5
C O M P I L I N G PA R A L L E L C I R C U I T S
Summary: Practical MPC has seen a lot of progress over the past decade.
Yet, compared to generic computation, MPC is still multiple orders of mag-
nitude slower. To improve the efficiency of secure computation protocols,
we describe a practical and compiler assisted parallelization scheme, exem-
plary applied to Yao’s Garbled Circuits: First, we study how Yao’s Garbled
Circuits can be parallelized effectively following a fine-grained and coarse-
grained parallelization approach. Then we present a compiler extension for
CBMC-GC that detects parallelism at the source code level and automati-
cally transforms C code into parallel circuits. These circuits allow more scal-
able execution on parallel hardware, as we show in an evaluation of three
example applications. Finally, by switching the roles of circuit generator and
evaluator between both computing parties in the semi-honest model, our
scheme makes better use of computation and network resources. This inter-
party parallelization approach leads to significant efficiency increases already
on single-core hardware without compromising security.
Remarks: This chapter is based in parts on our paper – “Faster Secure Compu-
tation through Automatic Parallelization”, Niklas Büscher and Stefan Katzen-
beisser, which appeared in the Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security
Symposium, 2015, Washington DC, USA.
5.1 motivation and overview
At the time of writing, millions of gates can be computed (garbled)
in frameworks implementing Yao’s Garbled Circuits on a consumer
grade CPU within seconds. Nonetheless, compared with generic com-
putation, Yao’s Garbled Circuits protocol is still multiple orders of
magnitude slower. Even worse, an information theoretic lower bound
on the number of ciphertexts has been identified for gate-by-gate gar-
bling techniques by Zahur et al. [ZRE15], which makes further sim-
plification of computations unlikely. Observing the ongoing trend to-
wards parallel hardware, e.g., smartphones with many-core architec-
tures on a single chip to reduce power consumption, the questions
arises, whether Yao’s Garbled Circuits can be parallelized. In this
chapter, we answer this question positively and describe strategies
to garble and evaluate circuits in parallel. In particular, we system-
atically look at three different levels of compiler assisted parallelization
that have the potential to significantly speed up applications based
on secure computation.
fine grained parallelization. As the first step, we observe
that independent gates, i.e., gates that do not provide input to each
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other, can be garbled and evaluated in parallel. Therefore, a straight
forward parallelization approach is to garble gates in parallel that are
located at the same circuit depth, because these are guaranteed to
be independent. We refer to this approach as Fine-Grained Paralleliza-
tion (FGP). We will see that this approach can be efficient for circuits
of suitable shape. Nevertheless, the achievable speed-up heavily de-
pends on circuit properties such as the average circuit width, which
can be comparably low even for larger functionalities when compil-
ing from a high-level language.
coarse grained parallelization. To overcome the limita-
tions of FGP for inadequately shaped circuits, we make use of high-
level circuit descriptions, such as program blocks, to automatically
detect larger coherent clusters of gates that can be garbled indepen-
dently. We refer to this parallelization as Coarse-Grained Paralleliza-
tion (CGP). We describe how CBMC-GC can be extended to detect
concurrency at the source code level to enable the compilation of par-
allel circuits. Hence, one large circuit is automatically divided into
multiple smaller, independently executable circuits. We show that
these circuits lead to more scalable and faster execution on parallel
hardware. Furthermore, integrating automatic detection of parallel re-
gions into a circuit compiler gives potential users the opportunity to
exploit parallelism without detailed knowledge about Boolean circuit
based MPC and thus, relieves them of writing parallel circuits.
inter-party parallelization (ipp). Finally, we present an
extension to Yao’s Garbled Circuits protocol itself (secure against
semi-honest adversaries), which balances the computation costs of
both parties for parallel circuits. Thus, Inter-Party Parallelization (IPP)
allows to profit from parallelization without the necessity of parallel
hardware.
In the original protocol (using the point-and-permute optimization
[Bea+91; Mal+04]), the garbling party has to perform four times the
cryptographic work than the evaluating party. Hence, assuming simi-
lar computational capabilities the overall execution time is dominated
by the garbling costs. Given the identified coarse-grained parallelism,
the idea of the proposed protocol is to divide the work in a symmetric
manner between both parties by switching the roles of the garbling
and evaluating party to achieve better computational resource utiliza-
tion without compromising security in the semi-honest model. This
approach can greatly reduce the overall runtime. Moreover, we show
how IPP and CGP can be combined, hence using load balancing and
parallel execution to decrease the runtime even further.
chapter outline . Next, we describe the basics of parallel cir-
cuits and their parallel evaluation in Yao’s Garbled Circuits in Sec-
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tion 5.2. Then we introduce different parallelization approaches as
well as a compiler extension to CBMC-GC in Section 5.3. Moreover,
the idea of IPP is presented in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5 an evaluation
the presented parallelization approaches in a practical setting along-
side example applications is given. Finally, a comparison with related
work is given in Section 5.6.
5.2 parallel circuit evaluation
We first discuss the basic notations of sequential and parallel circuit
decomposition used throughout this chapter, before describing how
Yao’s Garbled Circuits protocol can be parallelized.
parallel and sequential circuit decomposition. In this
chapter, we again consider a given functionality f(x,y) with two in-
put bit strings x, y (representing the inputs of the parties) and an
output bit string o. Furthermore, we use Cf to denote the circuit
that represents functionality f. We refer to a functionality f as sequen-
tially decomposable into two sub-functionalities f1 and f2 iff f(x,y) =
f2(f1(x,y), x,y).
Moreover, we consider a functionality f(x,y) as parallel decompos-
able into sub-functionalities f1(x,y) and f2(x,y) with non-zero out-
put bit length, if a bit string permutation σf exists such that f(x,y) =
σf(f1(x,y)||f2(x,y)), where || denotes bitwise concatenation.
Thus, functionality f can directly be evaluated by independent eval-
uation of f1 and f2. We observe that the permutation σf is only a
formal requirement, yet when representing f1 and f2 as circuits, the
permutation is instantiated by connecting input and output wires at
no cost. Furthermore, we note that f1 and f2 do not necessarily have
to be defined over all bits of x and y. Depending on f they could
share none, some, or all input bits. We use the operator  to express
a parallel composition of two functionalities through the existence of
a permutation σ. Thus, we write f(x,y) = f1(x,y)  f2(x,y) if there
exists a permutation σf such that f(x,y) = σf(f1(x,y)||f2(x,y)).
We call a parallelization of f to be efficient if the (non-linear) circuit
size of the parallelized functionality is roughly equal to the circuit
size of the sequential functionality: size(Cf) ≈ size(Cf1) + size(Cf2).
Furthermore, we refer to a parallelization as symmetric if sub-function-
alities have almost equal circuit sizes: size(Cf1) ≈ size(Cf2).
Finally, we refer to functionalities that can be decomposed into a
sequential and a parallel part as mixed functionalities. For example the
functionality f(x,y) = f3(f1(x,y)  f2(x,y), x,y) can first be decom-
posed sequentially in f3 and f1  f2, where the latter part can then be
further decomposed in f1 and f2. Without an explicit formalization,
we note that all definitions can be extended from the dual case f1 and
f2 to the general case f1, f2, . . . , fn.
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parallel circuit creation and evaluation. A decomposi-
tion of a circuit into sequential and parallel sub-circuits forms a DAG
from inputs to output bits. Parallel sub-circuits can be garbled in any
order by one or multiple computing units (threads). This is exem-
plary illustrated in Figure 13, where three threads are used to garble
and two thread to evaluate a circuit. We note that the garbling order
has no impact on the security [LP09]. After every parallel decompo-
sition a synchronization between the different threads is needed to
guarantee that all wire labels for the next sequential sub-circuit are
computed. Multiple subsequent parallel regions with possibly differ-
ent degrees of parallelism can be garbled, when ensuring synchro-
nization in between.
The circuit evaluation can be parallelized in the same manner. Se-
quential sub-circuits are computed sequentially, parallel sub-circuits
are computed in parallel by different threads. After every paralleliza-
tion a thread synchronization is required to ensure data consistency.
For efficiency reasons, implementations of Yao’s garbled circuits
commonly do not need to store the gate id next to the computed
garbled table, as their garbling and evaluation order is determinis-
tic. Hence, given a list of garbled tables, the garbled table associated
with each gate can be identified by the position in the list. When
using parallelization in combination with pipelining (i.e., garbled ta-
bles are sent immediately after their generation) the order of garbled
tables could be unknown to the evaluator. Hence, a mapping mech-
anism between gate and garbled table has to be used to ensure data
consistency between generator and evaluator. We propose three dif-
ferent variants. First, all garbled tables can explicitly be numbered,
which allows an unordered transfer to the evaluator. The evaluator is
then able to reconstruct the original order based on the introduced
numbering. This approach has the disadvantage of an increased com-
munication cost. Second, garbled tables could be sent in a strict order
using thread synchronization. This approach functions without ad-
ditional communication, yet could lead to an undesirable “pulsed”
communication pattern, as threads have to wait for each other. The
third approach functions by strictly separating the communication
channels for every parallel sub-circuit. This can either be realized by
multiplexing within the MPC framework or by exploiting the capabil-
ities of the underlying operating system. Due to the aforementioned
reasons, the results described in Section 5.5 are based on an imple-
mentation using the latter approach.
5.3 compiler assisted parallelization heuristics
To exploit parallelism in Yao’s protocol, groups of gates that can be
garbled independently need to be identified. As described, indepen-
dent gates can be garbled and evaluated in parallel. However, de-
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Figure 13: Interaction between a parallel circuit generator and evaluator. The
layer n of the presented circuit is garbled and evaluated in paral-
lel. The independent partitions of the circuit can be garbled and
evaluated by different threads in any order.
tecting independent, similar sized groups of gates is known as the
NP-hard graph partitioning problem [MG90]. The common approach
to circumvent the expensive search for an optimal solution is to use
heuristics. In the following paragraphs we study a fine- and a coarse-
grained heuristic, where the first operates on the gate level and the
latter on the source code level.
5.3.1 Fine-Grained Parallelization (FGP)
A first heuristic that decomposes a circuit into independent parts is
the fine-grained gate level approach. Similar to the evaluation of a
standard Boolean circuit, gates in garbled circuits are processed in
topological execution order. Gates provide input to other gates and
hence, can be ordered by the circuit level (depth) when all their inputs
are ready or the level when their output is required for succeeding
gates. Consequently, gates on the same level can be garbled in par-
allel [Bar+13; Hus+13]. Thus, a circuit is sequentially decomposable
into different levels and each level is further decomposable in parallel
with a granularity up to the number of gates in each level. Figure 14
illustrates fine-grained decomposition of a circuit into three levels L1,
L2 and L3.
compiler-assisted fgp in yao’s garbled circuits . With
millions of gates garbled and evaluated during the protocol execu-
tion, it is useful to identify and annotate the circuit levels already
during compilation to achieve an efficient distribution of gates onto
threads during protocol runtime. Furthermore, FGP can be improved
by considering linear and non-linear gates independently (because
they have very different workloads) when distributing them onto
all threads, as this enables a more symmetric workload distribution
among multiple threads. Consequently, the computation will not be
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Figure 14: Circuit decomposition. Each level L1, L2 and L3 consists of mul-
tiple gates that can be garbled using FGP with synchronization
in between. The circuit can also be decomposed in two coarse-
grained partitions P1 and P2.
stalled by threads waiting for other threads. Therefore, each thread
gets assigned a similar number of linear and non-linear gates to gar-
ble per circuit level. This is exemplary illustrated in Figure 15, where
two threads share the task of garbling a circuit layer with a similar
workload.
We extended the CBMC-GC compiler with the capability to mark
levels and to strictly separate linear from non-linear gates within each
level. This information is stored in the circuit description that is then
interpreted in a protocol implementation.
Finally, we remark that when using Non-Uniform Memory Access
(NUMA) hardware, e.g., multiple cores on a CPU that differentiate
between local and shared storage or multiple CPUs on different sock-
ets, the efficiency of FGP can further be improved by fine-tuning the
distribution of gates onto threads to maximize the storage proxim-
ity of gates with sequential dependencies. In this way, more gates,
which are directly connected, can be garbled on the same CPU core
with more efficient caching and less communication between differ-
ent cores.
XORAND
k-1
k
Thread 1 Thread 2 Thread 1 Thread 2
Thread
Sync.
Figure 15: Illustration of the fine grained parallelization approach for one
party. Level k is distributed symmetrically on two threads. Each
thread is tasked to garble two non-linear gates. In-between two
levels, a thread synchronization is needed to ensure data avail-
ability.
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overhead. In practice, multi-threading introduces an computa-
tional overhead due to thread management and thread synchroniza-
tion. To decide whether parallelization is useful on a given hardware,
it is useful to determine a system dependent threshold τ that de-
scribes the minimal number of gates that are required per level to
profit from parallel execution. When sharing the workload of less
than τ gates onto multiple threads, the performance might actually
decrease. Even though τ is circuit dependent, it is a very fast heuris-
tic to decide on the effectiveness of FGP per circuit layer.
For example, in our testbed (see Section 5.5) we observe that at least
∼ 8 non-linear gates per core are required to observe first speed-ups.
To reach a parallelization efficiency of 90%, i.e., a speed up of 1.8 on 2
cores, at least 512 non-linear gates per core are required, which is not
guaranteed for most applications. This limitation can be overcome
with Coarse-Grained Parallelization.
5.3.2 Coarse-Grained Parallelization (CGP)
Another useful heuristic to partition a circuit is to use high-level func-
tionality descriptions. Given a circuit description in a high-level lan-
guage, parallelizable regions of the code can be identified using code
analysis techniques. The detected code regions allow a parallel code
decomposition; independent code parts can then be compiled into
sub-circuits that are guaranteed to be independent of each other and
therefore can be garbled in parallel. We refer to this parallelization
scheme as Coarse-Grained Parallelization (CGP). Figure 14 illustrates
such a decomposition for an exemplary circuit in two coarse-grained
partitions P1 and P2. In the following paragraphs, we introduce a
compiler extension for CBMC-GC that automatically produces coarse-
grained parallel circuits. Furthermore, we note that FGP and CGP can
be combined by utilizing FGP within all coarse partitions.
compiler extension for cgp in yao’s garbled circuits .
Our parallel circuit compiler extension ParCC extends CBMC-GC to
compile circuits with coarse-grained parallelism. Its core functionality
is to identify data parallelism in loops and to decompose the source
code in a pre-processing step before its translation onto the circuit
level. Conceptually, ParCC detects parallelism within ANSI C code
carrying CBMC-GC’s I/O annotations and compiles a global circuit
that is interrupted by one or multiple sub-circuits for every parallel
code region. The global circuit and all sub-circuits are interconnected
by inner input and output wires. These are not exposed as inputs
or outputs to the MPC protocol, but allow the recombination of the
complete and parallel executable circuit. If a parallel region follows
the Single-Instruction-Multiple-Data (SIMD) paradigm, it is sufficient
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Figure 16: ParCC’s compilation pipeline. First, parallelism in the input
source is detected. Then, the code is decomposed in parallel and
sequential parts. Each part is compiled individually with an un-
modified variant of CBMC-GC. Finally, the resulting sub-circuits
are recombined into a single circuit with annotated parallelism.
to compile only one sub-circuit to save compilation time as well as
storage cost.
Our implementation is built on top of state of the art source code
parallelization tools to detect parallelism and to perform code trans-
formations. Namely, the parallellization framework Pips [Bon+08] is
used to detect and to annotate parallelism with the polyhedral loop
optimizer POCC [Pou12]. The source-to-source transformation of the
annotated code, i.e., the program decomposition described below, is
realized with the help of Pips, as well as the static source code analy-
sis toolkit Frama-C [Cuo+12]. The complete compilation process, as
illustrated in Figure 16, consists of four different steps:
(1) In the first step, parallelism in C code is detected by one of the
algorithms provided by Pips and annotated using the OpenMP nota-
tion [DM98]. OpenMP is the de-facto application programming inter-
face for shared memory multiprocessing programming in C.
(2) The annotated C code is parsed by ParCC in the second step. Ac-
cording to the identified and annotated parallelism, the source code
is decomposed using source-to-source techniques into a global sequen-
tially executable part, which is interrupted by one or multiple paral-
lel executable sub-parts. This is realized by exporting each loop body
into an individual function, and providing an interface between the
original code location and the newly introduced function in form
of CBMC-GC I/O variables. Additionally, OpenMP reduction state-
ments, e.g, sum, are replaced with a code template and become part
of the global part that is later compiled into an according circuit. Re-
duction functions require a separate treatment, as they are not em-
barrassingly parallel. Furthermore, information about the degree of
detected parallelism as well as the interface between the global and
sub-parts is extracted for later compilation steps.
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(3) Given the decomposed source code, the different parts are com-
piled independently with CBMC-GC. Hence, one global and multiple
independent sub-circuits are created.
(4) In the final step information about the mapping of wires between
gates in the global and the sub-circuits is exported for use in MPC
frameworks. This information is determined based on the I/O vari-
ables identified in step (2) and the I/O mapping between wires and
I/O variables created for each sub-circuit in step (3). Furthermore,
for performance reasons, we distinguish static wires that are shared
between parallel sub-circuits and wires that are dedicated for each
individual sub-circuit.
compilation example . To illustrate the functionality of ParCC,
we discuss the source-to-source compilation steps on a small fork and
join task, namely computation of the dot product between two vectors
a and b of length n:
r = a · b = a0 · b0 + · · ·+ an−1 · bn−1.
The source code of the function dot_product() using CBMC-GC’s
I/O notation is presented in Listing 8.
1 void dot_product () {
2 int INPUT_A_a [100] , INPUT_B_b [100];
3 int res = 0;
4 for(i = 0; i < 100; i++)
5 res += INPUT_A_a[i] * INPUT_B_b[i];
6 int OUTPUT_res = res;
7 }
Listing 8: Dot vector product written in C with CBMC-GC input/output
notation.
In this example code, two parties provide input for one vector in
form of constant length integer arrays (Line 2). A loop iterates pair-
wise over all array elements (Line 4), multiplies the elements and
aggregates the result. In the first compilation step, Pips detects the
loop parallelism and annotates this parallel region accordingly. The
annotated code is printed in Listing 9, with the OpenMP annotation
added in Line 2.
1 [. . . ]
2 #pragma omp parallel for reduction (+:res)
3 for(i = 0; i <= 99; i++) {
4 res += INPUT_A_a[i] * INPUT_B_b[i];
5 }
6 [. . . ]
Listing 9: Annotation of parallelism as detected and added by the Pips
framework after the first compilation step of the dot vector
product example.
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ParCC parses the annotations in the second compilation step and
exports the loop body in a new function named loop0(), as it is the
first loop encountered during compilation. The exported function is
printed in Listing 10.
1 void loop0(int INPUT_A_0 , int INPUT_A_1 , int
OUTPUT_return)
2 {
3 OUTPUT_LOOP0_return = INPUT_A_0 * INPUT_A_1;
4 }
Listing 10: Exported sub-function with CBMC-GC input-output
notation.
The function expects two integer variables as input according to the
notation of CBMC-GC. The result is returned in form of an (inner)
output variable. Note, that during the protocol execution all inner
wires are not assigned to any party, instead they connect gates in
the global circuit and sub-circuits. Yet, to keep compatibility with
CBMC-GC a concrete assignment for the party P0 is specified. The
later exported mapping information is used to distinguish between
inner wires and actual input wires of both parties. Moreover, in the
same step, the global function dot_product(), printed in Listing 11,
is transformed by ParCC to replace the loop by an unrolled version
of itself.
1 void dot_product () {
2 int INPUT_A_a [100] , INPUT_B_b [100];
3 int res = 0;
4 int OUTPUT_LOOP0_a [100];
5 int OUTPUT_LOOP0_b [100];
6 int i;
7 for(i = 0; i <= 99; i++) {
8 OUTPUT_LOOP0_a[i] = INPUT_A_a[i];
9 OUTPUT_LOOP0_b[i] = INPUT_B_b[i];
10 }
11 int INPUT_A_LOOP0_res [100];
12 for(i = 0; i <= 99; i++)
13 res += INPUT_A_LOOP0_res[i];
14 int OUTPUT_res = res;
15 }
Listing 11: Rewritten function dot_product(). The loop has been
replaced by inner input/output variables (marked with
LOOP0).
For this purpose, the two arrays INPUT_A_a and INPUT_B_b, which
are iterated over in the original loop, are now exposed as inner out-
put variables to create the mapping between the global circuit and
sub-circuits. Therefore, from Line 4 to Line 10 ParCC added two new
output arrays using CBMC-GC’s I/O notation that are assigned to
the two arrays. Furthermore, an inner input array for the results of
the exported sub-functionality is introduced in Line 11. Finally, the re-
5.4 inter-party parallelization 75
duction statement is substituted by synthesized additions over all in-
termediate results in Line 13. Multiple parallel parts in a given source
code are exported and handled individually by independent decom-
position of each part.
5.4 inter-party parallelization
In this section, we show how a better load balancing between the
computing parties can be achieved in Yao’s protocol using a coarse
grained circuit decomposition, as created by ParCC. We first illustrate
the general idea and then give a detailed protocol extension that al-
lows to balance computation and communication costs between par-
ties, assuming symmetric efficiently parallelizable functionalities. We re-
fer to this protocol extension as IPP. Without compromising security,
we show in Section 5.5 that the protocol runtime can be reduced in
practical applications when using IPP. This is also the case when us-
ing only one CPU core per party.
load balancing through ipp. The computational costs that
each party has to invest in Yao’s protocol secure against semi-honest
adversaries is driven by the encryption and decryption costs of the
garbled tables as well as their communication costs. Considering the
garbling technique with the least number of cryptographic opera-
tions, namely Garbled Row Reduction (GRR) combined with free-
XOR (see Section 2.2.2), the generator has to compute four ciphertexts
per non-linear gate, whereas the evaluator has to compute only one
ciphertext per non-linear gate. When considering the communication
optimal half-gate approach [ZRE15], the generator has to compute
four and the evaluator two ciphertexts per non-linear gate. Assuming
two parties that are equipped with similar computational power, a
better overall resource utilization would be achieved, if both parties
could be equally involved in the computation process. This can be
realized efficiently for parallel functionalities by sharing the roles of
generator and evaluator, i.e., both parties are equally involved in gen-
erating and evaluating the garbled circuit. Thus, the overall protocol
runtime could be decreased. Figure 17 illustrates this efficiency gain.
applications of ipp. IPP is most beneficial in Yao’s protocol se-
cure against semi-honest adversaries. Yao’s protocol secure against
malicious adversaries is commonly build using cut-and-choose tech-
niques, which tend to have a more symmetric workload and thus, re-
quires less load balancing. However, one can imagine many scenarios
where the semi-honest adversary model is sufficient and of interest.
These are scenarios where either the behavior is otherwise restricted,
e.g., limited physical access, or where the parties have sufficient trust
into each other. Moreover, IPP can be used in all the scenarios where
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Figure 17: The idea and performance gain of IPP visualized. The OT phase
and output sharing are omitted. In Figure 17a the sequential ex-
ecution of Yao’s protocol is visualized. Given a parallel decom-
position by two circuits representing parallal program regions
as displayed in Figure 17b, the protocol runtime can be reduced
when sharing the roles generator and evaluator, as displayed in
Figure 17c.
the parties inputs and seeds could be revealed at a later point to
identify cheating parties. Examples might be negotiations (auctions)
or games, such as online poker. Another field of application is the
joint challenge creation, e.g., factorization in RSA. Using secure com-
putation, two parties can jointly create a problem instance without
already knowing the solution. This allows them to create a problem
and to participate in the challenge at the same time without a com-
putational advantage. Once a solution is computed, all parts of the
secure computation can be verified in hindsight, as shown by Buch-
mann et al. [Buc+16]. We also note that the core idea of IPP could
be applied in other MPC protocols. To profit from IPP, a secure state
sharing mechanism is required as well as an asymmetric workload be-
tween the parties. One example might be the highly asymmetric STC
protocol by Jarecki and Shmatikov [JS07] that uses zero-knowledge
proofs over every gate.
In the following two sub-sections we first show how to extend Yao’s
protocol to use IPP for purely parallel functionalities. In a second step
we generalize this approach by showing how mixed functionalities
profit from IPP.
5.4.1 IPP for Purely Parallel Functionalities
We assume that two parties P0 and P1 agree to compute a function-
ality f(x,y) with x being P0’s input and y being P1’s input. More-
over, we assume f(x,y) to be parallelizable into sub-functionalities
f0, . . . , fn:
f(x,y) = f0(x,y)  . . .  fn(x,y).
Given such a decomposition, all sub-functionalities can be com-
puted independently with any MPC protocol (secure against semi-
honest adversaries) without any sacrifices towards the security [HL10].
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This observation allows us to run two independent executions of
Yao’s protocol, each for one half of f’s sub-functionalities, instead
of computing f with a single execution of Yao’s protocol. Hence, P0
could garble one half of f’s sub-functionalities, for example feven =
f0, f2, . . . , and P0 could evaluate the other half fodd = f1, f3, . . . . Vice
versa, P1 could evaluate feven and garble fodd. Applying this ap-
proach to Yao’s Garbled Circuits, P0 and P1 have to incorporate both
roles (sender and receiver) during the OT phase of Yao’s protocol. In
the output phase, both parties have to share their output labels with
each other.
analytical performance gain. As discussed, the computa-
tional costs for Yao’s protocol are dominated by encrypting and de-
crypting the garbled tables. Thus, idealizing and highly abstracted,
the time spent to perform a computation ttotal is dominated by the
time to garble a circuit tgarble. Using GRR with free-XOR, which al-
lows to assume that tgarble is approximately four times the time to
evaluate a circuit teval, by symmetrically sharing this task the total
time could be reduced to:
t ′total ≈
(tgarble + teval)
2
≈ (4 · teval + teval)
2
≈ 2.5 · teval.
This result translates to a theoretical speed-up of ttotal/t ′total =
4/2.5 = 1.6. When using the half-gate approach the approximate com-
putational speed-up is 1.33.
trade-off . Investigating the trade-off of IPP, we observe that dur-
ing the cost intensive garbling and evaluation phase, no computa-
tional complexity is added. Particularly, the number of cryptographic
operations and messages is left unchanged. However, if both parties
provide a different number of input bits, the overall number of OTs
could be increased up to half of the total number of input bits. This is
only the case if the garbling party in the traditional execution will pro-
vide more inputs that the evaluating party. Moreover, when using OT
Extension, a constant one-time overhead for the base OTs in the size
of the security parameter k is introduced to establish an OT Extension
in both protocol directions, cf. Section 2.2.1. A detailed experimental
study on the performance gain through IPP is given in Section 5.5.5.
5.4.2 IPP for Mixed Functionalities
To exploit IPP in mixed functionalities, a protocol extension is re-
quired, allowing to switch from sequential (dedicated roles) to IPP
(shared roles) without violating the privacy. Therefore, we introduce
the notion of transferring roles to securely interchange between IPP
and sequential execution.
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transferring roles . The core idea of the transferring roles pro-
tocol is to run a secure computation up to the point where the roles of
the parties are changed. Then, the state of the protocol is secret shared
(using Boolean sharing) between the parties. Afterwards a second se-
cure computation is invoked, using the secret shared state as input
for both parties. We describe the full protocol in two steps. First we
sketch an insecure protocol, which is then made secure in a second
step.
To switch the roles of evaluator and generator during execution,
we consider two parties P0, P1 and the sequentially composed func-
tionality f(x,y) = f2(f1(x,y), x,y). In the following description, f1 is
computed using Yao’s protocol with P0 being generator and P1 being
evaluator, f2 is computed with reversed roles.
The transfer protocol begins by computing f1(x,y) with Yao’s orig-
inal protocol. Once f1 is computed, the roles have to be switched. For
this purpose, the parties reveal the intermediate result o1 = f1(x,y)
to each other by opening the output wires. In the second phase of
the protocol, f2 is computed using Yao’s protocol. This time, P0 and
P1 switch roles, such that P1 garbles f2 and P0 evaluates f2. The de-
crypted output bits o1 = f1(x,y) are used by P0 as input to Yao’s pro-
tocol, i.e., as input to the OT protocol. After garbling f2, the output
is shared between both parties. This protocol resembles a pause/con-
tinue pattern and preserves correctness. However, this protocol leaks
o1 to both parties, which violates the privacy of MPC. Therefore, we
propose to use an XOR-blinding (Boolean sharing) during the role
switch. The full protocol is shown below.
Protocol: Transferring Roles
P0 and P1 agree to securely compute the sequentially decompos-
able functionality f(x,y) = f2(f1(x,y), x,y) without revealing the
intermediate result f1(x,y) to either party, where x is P0’s input
bit string, y is P1’s input bit string. The protocol consists of two
phases, one per sub-functionality.
Phase 1: Secure computation of f1(x,y)
1. f1 is extended with a XOR blinding for every output bit.
Thus, the new output o ′1 = f
′
1(x,y||yr) = f1(x,y) ⊕ yr is
calculated by xor-ing the output of f1 with additional, ran-
domly drawn input bits by the evaluator of f1.
2. P0 and P1 securely compute f ′1 using Yao’s protocol. We
assume P0 to be the generator. Additional randomly drawn
input bits are then input of P1.
3. The blinded output o ′1 of the secure computation is only
made visible to the generator P0. This is realized by trans-
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mitting the output wire labels to P0, but not sharing the
decrypted result with P1.
Phase 2: Secure computation of f2(o1, x,y)
1. The circuit representing f2 is extended with a XOR un-
blinding for every input bit of o ′1. Hence, f
′
2(o
′
1, x,y,yr) =
f2(o
′
1 ⊕ yr, x,y).
2. P0 and P1 securely compute f ′2 using Yao’s protocol. We
assume P1 to be the generator. P0 provides the input o ′1
and P1 provides the input bits for the blinding with yr.
3. The output of the computation is shared with both parties.
We observe that, informally speaking the protocol preserves pri-
vacy, since the intermediate state o1 is secret shared between both
parties. A detailed formal proof on sequentially decomposed func-
tionalities is given by Hazay and Lindell [HL10, page 42ff]. Correct-
ness is preserved due to blinding and unblinding with the equal bit
string yr:
f ′2(f
′
1(x,y||yr), x,y,yr) = f
′
2(f1(x,y)⊕ yr, x,y,yr)
= f2(f1(x,y)⊕ yr ⊕ yr, x,y)
= f2(f1(x,y), x,y).
Finally, we note that the transferring roles protocol can further be
improved for efficiency. Namely, when using the de facto standard
point-and-permute optimization [Mal+04], the point-and-permute bits
attached to every wire label already form a Boolean sharing between
generator and evaluator, cf. [DSZ15]. Using this sharing, it is possi-
ble to securely share the intermediate state o1 without any additional
computation or communication. The experimental evaluation given
in Section 5.5.1 utilizes this idea.
transferring roles for mixed functionalities . With the
idea of transferring roles, IPP can be realized for mixed functionali-
ties. In the following paragraphs, we show how to switch from IPP
to sequential computation. Switching in the other direction, namely
from sequential to IPP can be realized analogously. With protocols
to switch in both directions, it is possible to garble and evaluate any
functionality that consists of an arbitrary number of sequential and
parallel regions.
To show the switch from IPP to sequential computation, we assume
a functionality that is sequentially decomposable into a parallel and
a sequential functionality:
f(x,y) = f3(f1(x,y)  f2(x,y), x,y).
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Figure 18: The IPP protocol for a mixed functionality with a switch from par-
allel to sequential computation. Functionality f1  f2 is garbled in
parallel using IPP, f3 is garbled sequentially in combination with
f1. No interaction between parties is shown. The blinded output
o ′1 of f1 is only made visible to P0 and used as additional input
for the computation of f3 using the transferring roles protocol.
Note that f1, f2 and f3 could further be composed of any sequential
and parallel functionalities. We observe that f3 can be merged with
f1 (or f2) into one combined functionality fc. Thus, f(x,y) can also be
decomposed as f(x,y) = fc(f2(x,y), x,y) with fc being the sequential
composition of f3 and f1. Given such a decomposition, fc and f2 can
be computed with alternating roles in Yao’s protocol by following the
transferring roles protocol. Hence, fc could be garbled by P0 while f2
could be garbled by P1 to securely compute f.
As a second observation we note that the output of f2 is not re-
quired to start the computation of fc. Therefore, the computation
of fc can start in parallel to the computation of f2. This inter-party
parallelism can be exploited to achieve further speed-ups. Figure 18
illustrates this approach. Party P0 garbles fc and P1 garbles f2. The
first part of fc, namely f1 can be garbled in parallel to f2. Once the
blinded output o ′1 of f2 is computed, the parties can start computing
the second part of fc, namely f3. Switching from sequential to IPP
computation can be realized in the same manner.
We remark that FGP, CGP and IPP can be combined to achieve
even further speed-ups. Therefore, every parallel region has first to
be decomposed in two parts for IPP. If the parts can further be de-
composed in parallel functionalities, these could be garbled using
CGP and FGP.
trade-off . IPP for mixed functionalities has the same trade-off
has IPP for parallel functionalities, i.e., to switch from and to IPP in
mixed functionalities, additional OTs in the size of the intermediate
state are required. Thus, the performance gain through IPP for mixed
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functionalities not only depends on the ratio between parallel and se-
quential regions, but also on the ratio of circuit size and secret shared
state. These ratios are application dependent. An experimental eval-
uation of the trade-off between overhead and performance gain is
presented in Section 5.5.5.
5.5 experimental evaluation
To show the performance gains through parallelization, we describe
an evaluation and implementation of FGP, CGP and IPP. We begin
by introducing a parallel Yao’s Garbled Circuits framework named
UltraSFE and benchmark its performance on a single core in Sec-
tion 5.5.1. The applications and their circuit descriptions used for
benchmarking are described in Section 5.5.2. We evaluate the offline
garbling performance of the proposed parallelization techniques in
Section 5.5.3, before evaluating the promising CGP in an online set-
ting in Section 5.5.4. Finally, in Section 5.5.5 we benchmark the IPP
approach.
5.5.1 UltraSFE
UltraSFE is a framework for Yao’s garbled circuits that implements
CGP, FGP, as well as IPP. To realize efficient parallelization, all data
structures, the memory layout, and the memory footprint are all op-
timized with the purpose of parallelization in mind. All these im-
plementation optimizations are of importance, due to the specific re-
source requirements of Yao’s garbled circuits. When garbling millions
of gates per second, memory read and write accesses quickly become
a bottleneck. Wire labels in the size of hundred(s) of megabytes per
second have to be fetched and written from and to memory in an
unaligned manner. Therefore, a reduction of the overall memory foot-
print leads to better caching behavior, which becomes even more im-
portant when using multi core architectures.
UltraSFE is written in C++ using SSE4, OpenMP and Pthreads to
realize multi-core parallelization. Conceptually, UltraSFE implements
the fixed-key garbling scheme JustGarble [Bel+13] and uses ideas from
the Java based memory efficient ME_SFE framework [HS13], which
itself is based on the FastGC framework [Hua+11b]. Oblivious trans-
fers are realized with the help of the highly efficient and parallelized
OTExtension library written by Asharov et al. [Ash+13]. Moreover, Ul-
traSFE adopts the best known techniques and practical optimizations
for Yao’s protocol. This includes pipelining, point-and-permute, gar-
bled row reduction, free-XOR, fixed-key garbling, and the half-gate
approach [Bel+13; Hua+11b; KS08; Mal+04; Pin+09; ZRE15].
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BCPU
[Bar+13]
HCPU
[Hus+13]
KSS
[KSS12]
GraphSC
[Nay+15]
JG
[Bel+13]
Ours
gates /
second
0.11M <0.25M 0.1M 0.58M 8.3M 8.3M
clocks /
gate
>3500 - >6500
[Bel+13]
> 1200 ∼ 110 ∼ 110
archi-
tecture
E5-2609 E5-2620 i7-970 E5-2666
v3
E5-2680
v2
E5-2680
v2
Table 6: Single core garbling speed comparison of different frameworks on
circuits with more than 5 million gates. Metrics are the number
of non-linear gates per second that can be garbled on a single core
in millions (M) and CPU clocks per gate. All results have been ob-
served on the Intel processor specified in row architecture. Note, for
HCPU [Hus+13] only circuit evaluation times have been reported
on the CPU, the garbling speed can be assumed to be lower, as it
requires four times the number of encryptions.
framework comparison. To illustrate the practical perfor-
mance gains through parallelization schemes in a fair manner, it is
necessary to compare the results to a highly optimized single core im-
plementation. To illustrate that UltraSFE is suited to evaluate the scal-
ability of different parallelization approaches, we present a compari-
son of its garbling performance with other state-of-the-art (at the time
of publication) frameworks for CPU architectures in Table 6. Namely,
we compare the single core garbling speed of UltraSFE, which is
practically identical to the performance of the JustGarble (JG) imple-
mentation by Bellare et al. [Bel+13], with the parallel frameworks
by Barni et al. (BCPU) [Bar+13], Husted et al. (HCPU) [Hus+13],
Kreuter et al. (KSS) [KSS12], and GraphSC by Nayak et al. [Nay+15].
Note, these results are compared in the offline setting, i.e., truth tables
are written to memory, rather then sent to the evaluator. This is be-
cause circuit garbling is the most cost intensive part of Yao’s protocol
and therefore the most interesting when comparing the performance
of different frameworks. The previous parallelization efforts HCPU
and BCPU actually abstained from implementing an online version of
Yao’s protocol that supports pipelining. As metrics we use number of
garbled non-linear gates per second and the average number of CPU
clock cycles per gate, as proposed in [Bel+13] for a more processor in-
dependent benchmark. The numbers are taken from the cited publica-
tions and if not given, the clock cycles per gate results are calculated
based on the CPU specifications. Even when considering theses num-
bers only as rough estimates, due to the different CPU types, we ob-
serve that UltraSFE performs approximately 1-2 orders of magnitude
faster than existing parallelizations of Yao’s protocol. This is mostly
due to the efficient fixed-key garbling scheme using the AES-NI hard-
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BioMatch MExp MVMul
Code size 22 LOC 28 LOC 10 LOC
Circuit size 66 M 21.5 M 3.3 M
Fraction of non-linear gates 25% 41% 37%
# Input bits P0/P1 131K/256 1K/1K 17K/1K
Offline garbling time 2.07s 1.136s 0.154s
Table 7: Circuit properties of benchmarked functionalities. Presented are the
code size, the overall circuit size in the number of gates, the fraction
of non-linear gates that determine the majority of computing costs,
the number of input bits as well as the sequential offline garbling
time with UltraSFE.
ware extension and a carefully optimized implementation using SSE4.
Summarizing, UltraSFE shows competitive garbling performance on
a single core, which makes it a very promising candidate to study the
effectiveness of parallelization.
5.5.2 Evaluation Methodology
To evaluate the different parallelization approaches we use three ex-
ample applications that have been used to benchmark and compare
the performance of Yao’s garbled circuits in the past. A detailed de-
scription of these can be found in Section 2.5. The benchmarked ap-
plications and the chosen configurations are:
• Biometric matching (BioMatch). In BioMatch one party matches a
biometric sample against the other’s party database of biomet-
ric templates. In the evaluation we use the squared Euclidean
distance as distance function between two samples, a database
of size n = 512, a degree (number of features) of d = 4, and an
integer bit-width of b = 64 bit. These values have been used in
previous works on MPC [DSZ15; KSS14].
• Parallel Modular exponentiation (MExp). MExp can be used for
blind signatures and its parallel version in online signing ser-
vices. We study a circuit with k = 32 parallel instances of mod-
ular exponentiation and an integer bit-width of b = 32 bit.
• Matrix-vector multiplication (MVMul). MVMul is a building block
for many privacy-preserving applications. We parameterize this
task according the size of the matrix m× k = 16× 16 and vec-
tor of length k = 16, as well the integer bit-width of each ele-
ment b = 64 bit.
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circuit creation. All circuits are compiled twice with CBMC-
GC using textbook C implementations, once with ParCC enabled and
once without. The time limit for the circuit minimization through
CBMC-GC is set to 10 minutes. The resulting circuits and their prop-
erties are shown in Table 7. The BioMatch circuit is the largest circuit
and has the most input bits. The MVMul garbles in a fraction of a
second and thus, is suitable to evaluate the performance of paral-
lelelization on smaller circuits. The MExp circuit shows a large cir-
cuit complexity in comparison to the number of input bits. Even so
not shown here, we note that the sequential (CBMC-GC) and paral-
lel (ParCC) circuits slightly differ in the overall number of non-linear
gates due to the circuit minimization techniques of CBMC-GC, which
profit from decomposition.
environment. As testing environment we used Amazon EC2
cloud instances. These provide a scalable number of CPUs and can be
deployed at different sites around the globe. If not stated otherwise,
for all experiments instances of type c3.8xlarge have been used.
These instances report 16 physical cores on 2 sockets with CPUs of
type Intel Xeon E5-2680v2, and are equipped with a 10Gbps ethernet
connection. A fresh installation of Ubuntu 14.04 was used to ensure
as little background noise as possible. UltraSFE was compiled with
gcc 4.8 -O2 and numactl was utilized when benchmarking with
only a fraction of the available CPUs. Numactl allows memory, core
and socket binding of processes. Results have been averaged over 10
executions.
methodology. Circuit garbling is the most expensive task in
Yao’s protocol. Therefore, we begin by evaluating FGP and CGP for
circuit garbling independent of other parts of Yao’s protocol. This al-
lows an isolated evaluation of the computational performance gains
through parallelization. Following the offline circuit garbling phase
is an evaluation of Yao’s full protocol in an online LAN setting. This
evaluation also considers the bandwidth requirements of Yao’s proto-
col. Finally, we present an evaluation of the IPP approach in the same
LAN setting. Therefore, we first evaluate the performance of IPP on
a single core, before evaluating its performance in combination with
CGP. The main metric in all experiments is the overall runtime and
the number of non-linear gates that can be garbled per second.
5.5.3 Circuit Garbling (offline)
We begin the evaluation of FGP and CGP by studying the indepen-
dent task of circuit garbling, which can be executed by the generator
offline in a pre-processing phase. In practice the efficiency of any par-
allelization is driven by the ratio between computational workload
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Figure 19: Thread utilization experiment. Shown is the efficiency of FGP for
different circuit level widths, i.e., the number of non-linear gates
per level. A larger width increases the efficiency of parallelization.
per thread and synchronization between threads. When garbling a
circuit with FGP, the workload is bound by the width of each level.
When garbling with CGP the workload is bound by the size of par-
allel partitions. Both parameters are circuit and hence, application
dependent.
thread utilization. To get a better insight, we first empirically
evaluate the possible efficiency gain for different sized workloads, in-
dependent of any application. This also allows to observe a system
dependent threshold τ, introduced in Section 5.3.1, which describes
the minimal number of gates required per thread to profit from par-
allelization. Therefore, the following experiment was run in the envi-
ronment previously described. For level widths w ∈ {24, 25, . . . , 210}
we created random circuits of depth d = 1000. The width is kept
homogeneous in all levels. Furthermore, the wiring between gates
on different levels is randomized and only non-linear gates are used.
Each circuit is garbled using FGP and we measured the paralleliza-
tion efficiency, which is the speed-up over the single core perfor-
mance divided by the number of cores, when computing with dif-
ferent numbers of threads. The results are illustrated in Figure 19.
The experiment shows that on the tested system τ ≈ 8 non-linear
gates per thread are sufficient to observe first performance gains
through parallelization when using CPU cores that are located on
the same socket. To achieve an efficiency of 90% approximately 512
non-linear gates per thread are required. The noticeable gap between
8 (1 socket with 8 cores) and 16 cores (2 sockets with 8 cores each)
is due to the communication overhead between the sockets. Thus, a
significantly larger workload per thread (at least one order of magni-
tude) is required to profit from further parallelization on a two socket
machine.
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Figure 20: The speed-up of circuit garbling for all three applications when
using the FGP, CGP and different numbers of computing threads.
CGP significantly outperforms FGP for all applications.
example applications . We evaluate the speed-up of circuit gar-
bling when using FGP and CGP for the three applications BioMatch,
MExp and MVMul compiled with ParCC disabled (FGP) and enabled
(CGP). The speed-up is calculated in relation to the single core gar-
bling performance given in Table 7. The results, which have been ob-
served for a security level of k = 128 bit, are presented in Figure 20.
Studying the results for FGP, we observe that all applications profit
from parallelization. BioMatch and MExp show very limited scala-
bility, whereas the MVMul circuit can be executed with a speed-up
of 7.5 on 16 cores. Analyzing the performance of CGP, we observe
that all applications achieve practically ideal parallelization when us-
ing up to 4 threads. In contrast to the FGP approach, scalability with
high efficiency is observable with up to 8 threads. When scaling to 16
threads (two sockets), significant further speed-ups are noticeable in
the MExp and MVMul experiments, with a total throughput of more
than 100M non-linear gates per second.
In summary, for all presented applications the CGP approach sig-
nificantly outperforms the FGP approach regarding scalability and
efficiency due to its coarser granularity, which implies a better thread
utilization.
circuit width analysis . The limited scalability of FGP is ex-
plainable when investigating the different circuit properties. In Fig-
ure 21 the distribution of level widths for all circuits are shown when
compiled with CBMC-GC.
For the MVMul application, the CBMC-GC compiler produces a
circuit with a median level width of 2352 non-linear gates per level,
whereas the BioMatch and MExp circuits only show a median width
below 100 non-linear gates per level. The major reason for small cir-
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Figure 21: The distribution of non-linear gates per level (circuit width) when
compiling the BioMatch, MExp and MVMul applications with
CBMC-GC.
cuit widths in comparison to the overall circuit size is that high-level
MPC compilers such as CBMC-GC have been developed with a focus
on minimizing the number of non-linear gates. Minimizing the circuit
depth or maximizing the median circuit width barely influence the se-
quential runtime of Yao’s protocol and is therefore not addressed in
the first place. These observations are also a motivation for the next
chapter, where we study the depth minimization of circuits. Looking
at the building blocks that are used in CBMC-GC, we observe that
arithmetic blocks (e.g., adder, multiplier) show a linear increase in the
average circuit width when increasing the input size. Integer compar-
isons have a constant circuit width for any input bit size. However,
multiplexers (MUXs), as used for dynamic array accesses and for if-
statements, have a circuit width that is independent (constant) of the
number of choices. Thus, a 2-1 MUX and a n-1 MUX are compiled
to circuits with similar sized levels, yet with different circuit depths.
Based on these insights we deduce, that the MVMul circuit shows a
significantly larger median circuit width, because of the absence of
any dynamic array access, conditionals or comparisons. This is not
the case with the BioMatch and MExp applications. Considering that
every insufficient saturation of threads leads to an efficiency loss of
parallelization, we conclude that scalability of FGP is not guaranteed
when increasing input sizes.
5.5.4 Full Protocol (online)
To motivate that the parallelization of circuit garbling provides ad-
vantages in Yao’s full protocol with pipelining and assuming a fast
network connection, we study the protocol runtime for all applica-
tions running on two separated cloud instances in the same Ama-
zon region (LAN setting). We observed an average round trip time
of 0.6± 0.3ms and a bandwidth of 5.0± 0.4 Gbps using iperf. Fol-
lowing the results of the offline experiments, we only benchmark the
more promising CGP approach in the online setting.
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BioMatch MExp MVMul
ttotal [s]
κ = 128 2.71± 0.02 1.43± 0.01 0.20± 0.00
κ = 80 2.56± 0.03 1.42± 0.01 0.19± 0.00
gates/second [M]
κ = 128 6.23± 0.04 6.17± 0.05 6.22± 0.00
κ = 80 6.56± 0.07 6.21± 0.04 6.43± 0.00
bandwidth [Gbps]
κ = 128 1.48± 0.01 1.47± 0.01 1.48± 0.00
κ = 80 0.97± 0.01 0.92± 0.01 0.95± 0.00
tinput [s]
κ = 128 < 0.02 < 0.01 < 0.01
κ = 80 < 0.02 < 0.01 < 0.01
Table 8: Single-core performance of Yao’s protocol. The runtime (ttotal),
non-linear gate throughput in million gates per second, required band-
width and time spent in the input phase (tinput), including the OTs
when executing Yao’s protocol for all applications in a LAN setting.
To precisely measure the speed-up of parallelization, we first bench-
mark the single core performance of Yao’s protocol in the described
network environment. Table 8 shows the sequential runtime for all
applications using two security levels κ = 80 bit (short term) and
κ = 128 bit (long term). This runtime includes the time spent on the
input as well as the output phase. Furthermore, the observed through-
put, measured in non-linear gates per second, as well as the required
bandwidth are presented. We observe that for security levels of κ = 80
and κ = 128 a similar gate throughput is achieved. Consequently, we
deduce that in this setup the available bandwidth is not stalling the
computation. We also observe that that the time spent on OTs in all
applications is practically negligible (< 5%) in comparison with the
time spent on circuit garbling.
In Figure 22 the performance gain of CGP is presented. The speed-
up is measured in relation to the sequential total runtime. The timing
results show that CGP scales almost linearly up to 4 threads when
using κ = 80 bit labels. Using κ = 128 bit labels, no further speed-
up beyond 3 threads is noticeable. Thus, the impact of the network
limits is immediately visible. Five (κ = 80 bit), respectively three
(κ = 128 bit) threads are sufficient to saturate the available band-
width in this experiment. Achieving further speed-ups is impossible
without increasing the available bandwidth or using different MPC
techniques, e.g., IPP, which is evaluated in the next sub-section.
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Figure 22: CGP performance in Yao’s protocol. Shown is the speed-up of
all three applications in the LAN setting with κ = 128 bit and
κ = 80 bit security.
5.5.5 Inter-Party Parallelization
IPP in Yao’s protocol is introduced in Section 5.4. Here, we describe
and analyze experiments that show IPP in practical settings. The first
experiment measures the computational efficiency gain in the same
setting as described in Section 5.5.4. In the second experiment the ben-
efits of IPP in a WAN setting with limited bandwidth are presented.
computational efficiency gain. In this experiment the raw
IPP performance for all example applications, as well as the combi-
nation of CGP and IPP techniques is explored. To realize IPP, we
use multiple threads per core to utilize the load balancing capabili-
ties of the underlying OS without implementing a sophisticated load
balancer. Due to the heterogeneous hardware environment, e.g., un-
predictable caching and networking behavior, we evaluated three dif-
ferent workload distribution strategies. The first strategy uses one
thread per core and thus only functions with at least two cores. Then,
each party has exactly one garbling and one evaluating thread. The
second and third strategy use two or four independent threads per
core to garble and evaluate at the same time. Moreover, to illustrate
that IPP is also beneficial for mixed functionalities and thus a mod-
ular concept, all circuits are evaluated using a sequential code block
that exposes all inner input and output wires before and after ev-
ery parallel region. Consequently, all results include the time spent
on transferring all required input bits to and from parallel regions.
Otherwise applications such as the MVMul application, which is a
pure parallel functionality, would profit more easily from IPP. Even
though this weakens the results for the example applications, we are
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convinced that this procedure provides a better insight into the prac-
tical performance of IPP.
The results of this experiment are reported in Table 9. We first ob-
serve that only the MExp application significantly profits from IPP.
This is due to the small sharing state in comparison to the circuit
complexity. For both security levels IPP outperforms the raw CGP
approach with an additional speed-up of 10− 30% on all cores. The
performance of the MVMul applications actually decreases when us-
ing IPP. This is because of the large state that needs to be transferred.
The performance gain through IPP cannot overcome the newly intro-
duced overhead for the Transferring Roles protocol of 31ms, which
is more than 15% of the sequential runtime.
In summary, parallelizable applications that show a small switch-
ing surface (measured in number of bits compared to the overall cir-
cuit size) profit from IPP. Thus, IPP is a promising extension to Yao’s
protocol that utilizes circuit decomposition beyond naive paralleliza-
tion, independently of other optimization techniques.
bi-directional bandwidth exploitation. The second ex-
periment aims towards increasing the available bandwidth by ex-
ploiting bidirectional data transfers. Commonly, Ethernet connections
have support for full duplex (bi-directional) communication. When
using standard Yao’s Garbled Circuits, only one communication direc-
tion is fully utilized. However, with IPP the available bandwidth can
be doubled by symmetrically exploiting both communication chan-
nels. This practical insight is evaluated in a WAN setting between
two cloud instances of type m3.xlarge with 100± 10ms latency and
a measured bandwidth of 92± 27 Mbps. Each hosts runs two threads
(a garbling and a evaluating thread) using only a single core. The
results of this experiment are illustrated in Table 10. IPP leads to sig-
nificant speed-ups of BioMatch and MExp, showing the successful
exploitation of bi-directional data transfers. MVMul shows limited
performance gains because the time spent on the newly introduced
communication rounds for the transferring roles protocol becomes
significant. Summarizing, IPP can be very useful for MPC protocols
with asymmetric workload in bandwidth limited environments.
5.5.6 Evaluation Summary
MPC based on Yao’s Garbled Circuits protocol can greatly benefit
from compiler assisted parallelization. The FGP approach can be ef-
ficient for some circuits, yet its scalability highly depends on the cir-
cuit’s width. This problem is addressed in more detail in the next
chapter, where we study how to compile circuits with a shallow depth
(and thus larger width). The CGP approach shows a more efficient
parallelization, given suitable, i.e., parallel decomposable, applica-
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BioMatch MExp MVMul
κ = 128
w/o IPP 45.02± 0.49s 24.13± 0.21s 4.83± 0.05s
w/ IPP 29.94± 0.31s 16.05± 0.12s 4.66± 0.35s
speed-up 1.50 1.50 1.03
κ = 80
w/o IPP 30.34± 0.62s 14.56± 0.21s 4.31± 0.23s
w/ IPP 19.13± 0.47s 11.16± 0.32s 3.84± 0.12s
speed-up 1.58 1.30 1.12
Table 10: Runtime evaluation of IPP on a single core with limited network-
ing capabilities. Measured is the total protocol runtime, when com-
puting with and without IPP. Furthermore, the speed-up between
the two measurements is calculated.
tions. Moreover, we observe that the symmetric workload distribution
of IPP leads to runtime improvements in practical setting, even when
using only a single CPU core.
5.6 related work
We describe related protocol and compiler parallelization approaches
for Yao’s protocol secure in the semi-honest and malicious model.
parallelization in the semi-honest model . Husted et
al. [Hus+13] showed a CPU and GPU parallelization with significant
speed-ups on both architectures. Their approach is based on the idea
that every gate can be garbled independently from all other gates.
Afterwards all sequential dependencies are resolved using an addi-
tional (XOR) encryption layer. This approach enables very efficient
fine-grained parallelization, yet requires additional communication.
Therefore, it is very well suited in scenarios where communication is
cheap and not a bottleneck. Unfortunately, further bandwidth saving
optimizations, such as garbled row reduction, are incompatible.
Barni et al. [Bar+13] proposed a parallelization scheme similar to
the here described, which distinguishes between fine- and coarse-
grained parallelism. Their approach shows speed-ups for two exam-
ple applications. However, for coarse-grained parallelism manual user
interaction is required to annotate parallelism in handcrafted circuits.
Unfortunately, their timing results are hardly comparable with other
work, due to the missing implementation of concurrent circuit gen-
eration and evaluation, i.e., pipelining, which is required to garble
larger circuits.
Nayak et al. [Nay+15] presented a framework named GraphSC that
supports the parallel computation of graph oriented applications us-
ing RAM based secure computation (cf. Section 2.3). GraphSC shows
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very good scalability for data intensive computations. Yet, parallelism
has to be annotated manually and has to follow a Map Reduce pat-
tern. To exploit further parallelism within different computing nodes
of GraphSC, the ideas presented in this chapter could be exploited.
parallelization in the malicious model . The “Billion
gates” framework by Kreuter et al. [KSS12] was designed to execute
large circuits on cluster architectures. The framework supports par-
allelization in the malicious model using message passing technolo-
gies. Frederiksen et al. [FJN14] also addressed the malicious model,
yet they targeted the GPU as execution environment. In both cases,
the protocol is based upon the idea of cut-and-choose, which consists
of multiple independent executions of Yao’s protocol secure against
semi-honest adversaries. This independence enables naive paralleliza-
tion up to the constant number of circuits required for cut-and-choose.
This degree of parallelism cannot be transferred to the semi-honest
setting studied in this thesis.
Yet, in recent works on protocol extensions secure against malicious
adversaries, e.g., [RR16; Fur+17; LR14; LR15], application paralleliza-
tion becomes of importance. This is because, these MPC protocols
profit from a batched execution of the same functionality, as the num-
ber of circuit in a cut-and-choose approach can be reduced. Hence,
the CGP approach is a necessity to achieve efficient execution in these
protocols when compiling from a high-level language.
parallel compiler for mpc . Zhang et al. [ZSB13] presented
a compiler for distributed secure computation with applications for
parallelization. Their compiler converts manually annotated paral-
lelism in an extension of C into secure implementations. Even so the
compiler is targeting Arithmetic circuits, it could be used as an addi-
tional front-end to the ideas presented in this work.
6
C O M P I L I N G D E P T H - O P T I M I Z E D C I R C U I T S F O R
M U LT I - R O U N D M P C P R O T O C O L S
Summary: Many practical relevant MPC protocols, such as GMW and
SPDZ, have a round complexity that is dependent on the circuit’s depth.
When deploying these protocols in real-world network settings, with net-
work latencies in the range of tens or hundreds of milliseconds, the round
complexity quickly becomes a significant performance bottleneck. In this
chapter, we describe a compiler extension to CBMC-GC that optimizes cir-
cuits for a minimal depth. We first introduce novel optimized building
blocks that are up to 50% shallower than previous constructions. We then
present multiple high- and low-level depth-minimization techniques. Our
implementation achieves significant depth reductions over hand-optimized
circuits (for some applications up to a factor of 2.5). Moreover, evaluating
exemplary functionalities in the GMW protocol, we show that depth reduc-
tions lead to significant speed-ups in real-world network setting.
Remarks: This chapter is based in parts on our paper – “Compiling Low Depth
Circuits for Practical Secure Computation”, Niklas Büscher, Andreas Holzer,
Alina Weber, and Stefan Katzenbeisser, which appeared in the Proceedings
of the 21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ES-
ORICS), Heraklion, Greece, 2016.
6.1 motivation and overview
In the previous chapters, we focussed on describing techniques to
compile circuits with a minimal number of non-linear gates. However,
we also observed that circuits with a shallow depth are of interest
for efficient parallelization (cf. Chapter 5). Moreover, one of the first
MPC protocols, namely the GMW protocol by Goldreich, Micali and
Widgerson [GMW87] and many subsequent protocols, e.g., BGW by
Ben-Or et al. [BGW88], Sharemind by Bogdanov et al. [BLW08], SPDZ
by Damgard et al. [Dam+12], TinyOT by Nielsen et al. [Nie+12], or the
protocol by Furukuwa et al. [Fur+17] have a round complexity that is
linear in the circuit depth. Hence, for this class of MPC protocols it is
crucial to also consider the circuit depth as a major optimization goal,
because every layer in the circuit increases the protocol’s runtime by
the Round Trip Time (RTT) between the computing parties. This is
of special importance, as latency is the only computational resource
that has reached its physical boundary. For computational power and
bandwidth, parallel resources can always be added. Thus, for appli-
cations using the aforementioned multi-round MPC protocols it is
commonly more vital to minimize the depth of circuits, rather than
improving computational efficiency of the protocols themselves, es-
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operation previous best [SZ13] this work
n-bit Addition 2 log2(n) + 1 log2(n) + 1
n-bit Multiplication 3 log2(n) + 4 2 log2(n) + 3
m:1 Multiplexer log2(m) dlog2(dlog2(m+ 1)e)e
Table 11: Depth of building blocks. Comparison of the depth of the here pre-
sented building blocks with the previously known best construc-
tions.
pecially when considering that in theory infinite parallel hardware
resources could be added.
We illustrate these thoughts with exemplary practical numbers:
The recent MPC protocol by Furukuwa et al. [Fur+17], which pro-
vides security against malicious adversaries assuming a honest ma-
jority in a three-party setting, can compute more than 1 billion gates
on a server CPU with 20 cores. At the same time, the network latency
between Asia and Europe1 is in the range of a hundred milliseconds.
In such a setting with a latency of 100ms, a gate-level parallelism
of at least 100 million gates is required to fully saturate the CPUs.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to study optimization and compilation
techniques for the automatic creation of Boolean circuits with mini-
mal depth.
In this chapter, we describe how to compile circuits with a minimal
depth. We implement the techniques as part of a compiler extension
to CBMC-GC named ShallowCC using a three-fold approach:
First, we describe minimization techniques operating on the source
code level. For example, we discuss how aggregations, e.g., sum or
minima computation over an array, described in a sequential man-
ner, can be regrouped in a tree structure. This allows to achieve a
circuit with a logarithmic instead of a linear depth. We also portray a
technique that detects consecutive arithmetic operations and replaces
them by a more efficient dedicated circuit (known as Carry-Save Net-
works (CSNs)) rather than a composition of multiple individual arith-
metic building blocks. Second, we present depth- and size-optimized
constructions of major building blocks, e.g., adder and multiplexer,
required for the synthesis of larger circuits. An overview of these and
a comparison with previous constructions is given in Table 11. Third,
we adapt CBMC-GC’s gate-level optimization methods, described in
Section 4.4, to also optimize for depth.
1 Even though the performance of MPC is often evaluated in a LAN setting, a WAN
setting is the more natural deployment model of MPC, as mutually distrusting par-
ties are unlikely to have hardware deployed in close proximity.
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C Program
ShallowCC
Circuit
Loop Unrolling & SSA
Parsing & GOTO
Preprocessing Reductions
Sequential Arithmetics
Building Blocks
Circuit Minimization
Figure 23: ShallowCC’s compilation chain from ANSI C to Boolean circuits.
Marked in gray are all modifications to the original compilation
chain of CBMC-GC.
chapter outline . In Section 6.2 we describe the adaptions to
CBMC-GC’s compilation chain for depth-minimization, including a
description of building blocks as well as an adapted fix-point min-
imization algorithm. A detailed experimental evaluation is given in
Section 6.3. Related work is discussed in Section 6.4.
6.2 compilation chain for low-depth circuits
The size-minimized circuits generated by CBMC-GC are not neces-
sarily depth-minimized, as both optimization goals can be orthogonal.
Therefore, we introduce multiple techniques that deviate from CBMC-
GC’s compilation chain to create depth-minimized circuits. An im-
plementation of these techniques is realized as a compiler extension
to CBMC-GC named ShallowCC. The differences to the compilation
chain of CBMC-GC are illustrated in Figure 23 and described in this
section.
The extended compilation chain begins with a code preprocessing
step to detect and transform reduction statements on the source code
level (see Section 6.2.1). The next steps are the same as in the tool
chain of CBMC-GC, i.e., the code is parsed and translated into a
GOTO program, all bounded loops and recursions are unrolled us-
ing symbolic execution and the resulting code is transformed into
SSA form. In the fourth step, the SSA form is used to detect and anno-
tate successive arithmetic statements (see Section 6.2.2). Afterwards,
all statements are instantiated with depth-minimized building blocks
(see Section 6.2.3), before a final gate-level minimization takes place
(see Section 6.2.4).
6.2.1 Preprocessing Reductions
We refer to a reduction as the aggregation of multiple variables into a
single result variable, e.g., the sum of an array. An exemplary reduc-
tion is illustrated in the code example in Listing 12. This code com-
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1 unsigned max_abs(int a[], unsigned len) {
2 unsigned i, max = abs(a[0]);
3 for(i = 1; i < len; i++) {
4 if(abs(a[i]) > max) {
5 max = abs(a[i]);
6 }
7 }
8 return max;
9 }
Listing 12: Exemplary function that computes the maximum norm.
putes the maximum norm of a vector. It iterates over an integer array,
computes the absolute value of every element and then reduces all el-
ements to a single value, namely their maximum. A straight forward
translation of the maximum computation leads to a circuit consist-
ing of len− 1 sequentially aligned comparators and multiplexers, as
illustrated for four values in Figure 24a. However, the same function-
ality can be implemented with logarithmic depth when using a tree
structure, as illustrated in Figure 24b. Thus, when compiling circuits
with minimal depth, it is worthwhile to rewrite sequential reductions.
To relieve the programmer from this task, ShallowCC aims at auto-
matically replacing sequential reductions found in loop statements
by tree-based reductions.
Since detecting reductions in loop statements is a common task in
automatized parallelization, we can reuse compilation techniques pre-
sented in Section 5.3.2. Parallelization frameworks are not only very
suited to detect parallelism but also to detect sequential reductions,
as these can significantly degrade the performance of parallelization.
Therefore, we extend the techniques presented in Section 5.3.2 to
parse reduction annotations and to rewrite the code with clang (source-
to-source compilation). For this, we identify the loop range and re-
duced variable to instantiate a code template that computes the re-
duction in a tree structure. Such a template is illustrated in Listing 13
for an arbitrary comparator function cmp() and datatype DT. A sim-
ilar template can be used for sum or product computations. Albeit
being commutative operations, we remark that as in parallelization a
developer needs to be aware that an operation reordering can lead to
different results when integer overflows occur.
This optimization improves the depth of reductions over m ele-
ments from O(m) to O(logm). To illustrate the effect of this opti-
mization in practice we study an exemplary minimum computation
over an array with 100 integers (32-bit). In this small example, the
difference in the depth of the compiled circuit is more than one or-
der of magnitude, i.e., the tree based computation can be performed
with a depth of 42 non-linear gates, whereas the sequential computa-
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1 DT reduction_tree(DT *a, unsigned len , (*cmp)(DT , DT)){
2 unsigned i, step = 1;
3 while(step < len) {
4 for(i = 0; i + step < len; i += (step << 1)) {
5 a[i] = (*cmp)(a[i], a[i+step]) ? a[i] : a[i+step];
6 }
7 step <<= 1;
8 }
9 return a[0];
10 }
Listing 13: Simplified tree reduction template for an arbitrary array a
of length len, as applied when rewriting reductions in loop
statements for an abritary datatype DT.
A
B
C
D
>
MUX >
MUX >
MUX O
(a) Sequential circuit
A
B
C
D
>
MUX >
MUX>
MUX
O
(b) Tree circuit
Figure 24: Maximum circuit. Shown are circuit variants to compute the max-
imum of four values consisting of comparators and multiplexers.
The circuit in Figure 24a uses a sequential organization of build-
ing blocks, whereas the circuit in Figure 24b follows a tree struc-
ture.
tion results in a circuit with a depth of 592 non-linear gates. Further
examples are given in Section 6.3.3.
6.2.2 Sequential Arithmetics and Carry-Save Networks (CSNs)
In the early 1960s, Carry-Save Addition was introduced for the fast
addition of three or more numbers by Earle et al. [Ear65]. The main
component of a Carry-Save Addition is the 3:2 Carry-Save Adder
(CSA). For three given numbers a,b and c, a CSA computes two
numbers x and y, whose sum is equal to the sum of a,b and c, i.e.,
a + b + c = x + y. The key benefit of CSAs is that their computa-
tion can be done with significantly less (constant) depth than when
computing the actual sum of two out of the three numbers, which
requires an adder circuit that has a depth logarithmic in the numbers’
bit-widths. Given a 3:2 CSA, the sum of k numbers can be computed
by first reducing the k numbers to two numbers using a network of
k− 2 CSAs, called CSN and then computing the final addition using
a standard adder. For example, the addition of four numbers a,b, c,d
in such a CSA tree is illustrated in Figure 25.
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a
b
c
d
CSA
CSA ADD o
Figure 25: Carry-Save Network. Addition of four numbers using a CSN con-
sisting of two CSAs and one adder (ADD).
csa construction. A CSA for three n bit numbers a,b, and c
can be constructed using n parallel FAs, cf. Section 4.3, where the sum
bits and carry-out bits each form the two numbers x and y. Hence for
every bit position i ∈ [0,n− 1], Xi and Yi+1 are set to
Xi = Ai ⊕Bi ⊕Ci
Yi+1 = (Ai ⊕Ci)(Bi ⊕Ci)⊕Ci,
with Y0 = 0. The sum bit Xi can actually be computed for free and
the carry-out bit Yi+1 only requires a single non-linear gate. Thus,
a 1 bit CSA has depth and size snX = dnX = 1 in MPC. Using a
tree based aggregation and exploiting the property that one output
of a CSA can be computed with zero non-linear gates, the partial
sums x and y for k numbers can be computed with depth dnXCSA(k) =
dlog2(k) − 1e [SZ13]. Hence, CSNs are efficient circuit constructions
for multiple successive arithmetic operations that outperform their
individual composition in size and depth.
example . Consider the following lines of code as an example:
unsigned a, b, c, d;
unsigned t = a + b;
unsigned sum = t + c + d;
A straight forward compilation, as in CBMC-GC, leads to a cir-
cuit consisting of three binary adders: sum = ADD(ADD(ADD(a,b), c),
d). However, if it is possible to identify that a sum of four indepen-
dent operands is computed, a CSN as given in Figure 25, could be
used instead. In this concrete example, the circuit’s depth reduces
from 18 to 7 non-linear gates when using 32 bit integers. Hence, an
automatic detection and translation of sequential arithmetic opera-
tions into CSNs is highly desirable. Detecting these operations on
the gate level is feasible, for example with the help of pattern match-
ing, yet impractically costly considering that circuits reach sizes in
the range of billions of gates. Therefore, ShallowCC aims at detecting
these successive statements before their translation to the gate level.
algorithm . The detection is performed using the SSA form, which
allows efficient data flow analyses and as such, also the search for
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successive arithmetic operations. We propose a greedy detection algo-
rithm that consists of two parts. First, a breadth-first search from out-
put to input variables is initiated. Whenever an arithmetic assignment
is found, a second backtracking algorithm is initiated to identify all
preceding (possibly nested) arithmetic operations. This second algo-
rithm stops whenever an operation is found that is not of type +, -, or
*. Once all preceding inputs are identified, the initial assignment can
be replaced by a CSN. After every replacement, the search algorithm
continues its search towards the input variables. Once all relevant as-
signments have been replaced by a CSN, all now unused expressions
are removed (dead code elimination). We note that this greedy re-
placement approach is depth-minimizing, yet not necessarily size op-
timal. This is because intermediate results in nested statements may
be computed multiple times. A trade-off between size and depth is
possible by only instantiating CSNs for non-nested arithmetic state-
ments.
Quantifying the improvements in depth reduction and assuming
that the addition of two numbers requires a circuit of depth dnXAdd,
we deduce thatm > 2 numbers can sequentially be added with depth
(m− 1) · dnXAdd. When using a tree-based structure the same sum can
be computed with a depth of dlog2(m)e · dnXAdd. When using a CSN,
m numbers can be added with a depth of only dlog2(m) − 1e+ dnXAdd.
We remark that CSNs can not only constructed for additions but
also for any mix of subsequent multiplications, additions and subtrac-
tions, because every multiplication internally consists of additions of
partial products and a subtraction is an addition with the bitwise in-
verse, cf. Section 4.3. To illustrate the improvement in practice, for the
exemplary computation of a 5×5 matrix multiplication, an improve-
ment in depth of more than 60% can be observed when using a CSN,
as shown in Section 6.3.3.
6.2.3 Optimized Building Blocks
Optimized building blocks are an essential part when designing com-
plex circuits. They facilitate efficient compilation, as they can be highly
optimized once and subsequently instantiated at practically no cost
during compilation, cf. Chapter 4. In the following paragraphs, we
present building blocks primarily optimized for depth (and only sec-
ondary for size) for basic arithmetic and control flow operations.
adder . An n-bit adder takes two bit strings a and b of length n,
representing two (signed) integers, as input and returns their sum
as an output bit string s of length n + 1. The standard adder, de-
scribed in Section 4.3, is the Ripple Carry Adder (RCA) that consists
of a successive composition of n FAs. It has a circuit size and depth
snXRCA = d
nX
RCA = O(n) that is linear in its bit-width. For faster addi-
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A7B7 A6B6 A5B5 A4B4 A3B3 A2B2 A1B1 A0B0 Cin
PG7 PG6 PG5 PG4 PG3 PG2 PG1 PG0
PG6:5 PG4:3 PG2:1 G0:−1
PG6:3 PG5:3 G2:−1 G1:−1
G6:−1 G5:−1 G4:−1 G3:−1
S7 S6 S5 S4 S3 S2 S1 S0
Figure 26: 8-bit Sklansky PPA. Shown are the computed generate and prop-
agate signals. Marked in gray are the longest paths.
tion, Parallel Prefix Adders (PPAs) are widely used in logic synthesis.
Their core concept is to use a tree based network to propagate the
carry-out bit, which achieves a logarithmic depth under a size trade-
off. Various different tree structures have been proposed. Here, we
first discuss their general design before comparing two different tree
structures relevant for an application in MPC.
In general, the PPA design distinguishes two signals (output bits),
named the generate Gi:j and the propagate Pi:j signal, used to handle
the fast propagation of carry-out bits. A generate signal announces
whether the prefix sum of the two input strings ai:j and bi:j, i.e.,
AiAi−1 . . . Aj + BiBi−1 . . . Bj,
will generate a carry-out bit. A propagate signal over the same range
announces that a carry-out bit will be propagated if additionally a
carry-in bit is set. A complete PPA consists of three parts. First, the
initial generate and propagate signals are computed over pairs of in-
put bits as Gi:i = Ai · Bi (carry-out bit) and Pi:i = Ai ⊕ Bi (sum bit).
Second, subsequent generate and propagate signals are typically com-
puted in hardware synthesis using the following formula [Har03]:
(Gi:j, Pi:j) = (Gi:k+1 + Pi:k+1Gk:j, Pi:k+1Pk:j).
Finally, in the last step each output bit Si can then be computed as
the XOR of the generate and propagate bit Si = Pi:−1 ⊕Gi−1:−1. We
observe that the initial and output phase have a constant depth and
that the depth of the intermediate phase depends on the structure
of the used parallel prefix network. A close look at the generate and
propagate signals reveals, that only one of the two can be set for
every bit range. Hence, in circuit design for MPC it is very reasonable
6.2 compilation chain for low-depth circuits 102
to replace the OR (+) by an XOR (⊕) in the formula of the generate
signal:
(G ′i:j, Pi:j) = (G
′
i:k+1 ⊕ Pi:k+1G ′k:j, Pi:k+1Pk:j).
This insight halves the delay in every computation step in parallel pre-
fix network, as only one instead of two non-linear gates are required.
A proof of the correctness of this substitution is given below.
Theorem 1 All grouped generate Gi:j = Gi:k+1 + Pi:k+1 Gk:j and
propagate signals Pi:j = Pi:k+1Pk:j with i > k > j used during the binary
addition of two numbers A = AnAn−1 . . . A1 and B = BnBn−1 . . . B1
are mutually exclusive.
Thus, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, with i > j:
Pi:jGi:j = 1. (1)
Proof using induction, base case i = j: For a single pair of bits, the
propagate signal is defined as Pj:j = (Aj ⊕ Bj), the generate signal
as Gj:j = AjBj. Using these definitions in Equation 1, we observe that
both are mutually exclusive:
Pj:jGj:j = (Aj ⊕Bj)AjBj = AjBj ⊕AjBj = 1.
Induction step ([i : j]→ [p : j], p > i): We assume that Pp:i+1Gp:i+1 = 1
and Pi:jGi:j = 1 hold for p > i > j. By successively applying De
Morgan’s law, we deduce:
Pp:jGp:j = (Gp:i+1 + Pp:i+1Gi:j)Pp:i+1Pi:j
= Gp:i+1Pp:i+1Pi:j + Pp:i+1Gi:jPp:i+1Pi:j
= (Gp:i+1Pp:i+1Pi:j)(Pp:i+1Gi:jPp:i+1Pi:j)
= (Gp:i+1Pp:i+1 + Pi:j)(Gi:jPi:j + Pp:i+1)
=BC (1+ Pi:j)(1+ Pp:i+1) = 1. 
Applying this idea to the Sklansky PPA design, which is the fastest
PPA structure according to the taxonomy by Harris [Har03], our con-
struction achieves a depth of dnXSk (n) = dlog2(n)e+ 1 and a size of
snXSk = ndlog2(n)e for an input bit length of n and output bit length
of n+ 1.
In Table 12 a depth and size comparison between the standard RCA,
the Ladner-Fischer adder, described by Schneider and Zohner [SZ13],
the Sklansky PPA, and an alternative PPA structure, namely the Brent-
Kung PPA [Har03] is given for different bit-widths. We observe that
the RCA provides the smallest size and the Sklansky adder the shal-
lowest depth. The Brent-Kung adder provides a trade-off between
size and depth. The here optimized Sklansky and Brent-Kung adder
significantly outperform the previous best known depth-minimized
construction in size and depth.
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depth dnX size snX
Bit-width n 16 32 64 n 16 32 64
Ripple-Carry n− 1 15 31 63 n− 1 15 31 63
Ladner-Fischer[SZ13] 2dlog(n)e+ 1 9 11 13 1.25ndlog(n)e+ 2n 113 241 577
Brent-Kung-opt 2dlog(n)e− 1 7 9 11 3n 48 96 192
Sklansky-opt dlog(n)e+ 1 5 6 7 ndlog(n)e 64 160 384
Table 12: Adders. Comparison of circuit size snX and depth dnX of the stan-
dard RCA, the previously best known depth-minimized Ladner-
Fischer PPA [SZ13; Dem+15], and the Brent-Kung and Sklansky
PPAs with the described generate signal optimization.
subtractor . As described in Section 4.3, a subtractor can be im-
plemented using an adder and one additional non-linear gate with
the help of the two’s complement representation, which is −a = a+ 1
with a being the inverted binary representation. Consequently, a− b
can be represented as a+ b+ 1. Hence, the subtractor profits to the
same degree from the optimized addition.
comparator . A depth-minimized equivalence (EQ) comparator
can be implemented by a tree based OR composition over pairwise
XOR gates to compare single bits, similar to the size-minimal con-
struction presented in Section 4.3. This yields a depth of dnXEQ(n) =
dlog2(n)e and size of snXEQ(n) = n− 1 gates [SZ13].
A depth-minimized greater-than (GT) comparator can be implemen-
ted in the same way as the size-minimized GT (see Section 4.3) com-
parator by using the observation that x > y ⇔ x − y − 1 > 0 and
returning the carry-out bit. This approach leads to a circuit depth
that is equivalent to the depth of a subtractor.
multiplier . In the size-minimized multiplication (see Section 4.3),
n partial products of length n are computed and then added. This ap-
proach leads to a quadratic size snXMUL,s = 2n
2 − n and linear depth
dnXMUL,s = 2n− 1. A faster addition of products can be achieved when
using CSAs. Such a tree based multiplier consists of three steps: First,
the computation of all n× n partial products, then their aggregation
in a tree structure using CSAs, before the final sum is computed us-
ing a two-input adder. The first step is computed with a constant
depth of dnXPP = 1, as only one single AND gate is required. For
the last step, two bit strings of length 2n− 1 have to be added. Us-
ing the optimized Sklanksy adder, this addition can be realized in
dnXSk (2n− 1) = dlog2(2n− 1)e+ 1. The second phase allows many dif-
ferent designs, as the CSAs can arbitrarily be composed. The fastest
composition is the Wallace tree [Wal64], which leads to a depth of
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depth dnX size snX
Bit-width n 16 32 64 n 16 32 64
Standard 2n− 1 45 93 189 n2 −n 496 2016 8128
MulCSA [SZ13] 3dlog(n)e+ 4 16 19 22 ≈ 2n2 + 1.25n log(n) 578 2218 8610
Wallace-opt 2dlog(n)e+ 3 11 13 15 ≈ 2n2 +n log(n) 512 2058 8226
Table 13: Multipliers. Comparison of circuit depth dnX and size snX of the
school method, the multiplier given in [SZ13] and our optimized
Wallace construction.
dnXCSA(n) = log2(n) for MPC. Combing all three steps, a multiplica-
tion can be realized with depth
dnXWa(n) = d
nX
PP + dCSA(n) + d
nX
Sk (2n− 1) = 2dlog2 (n)e+ 3.
In Table 13 we present a comparison of the multipliers discussed
above with the depth optimized one presented in [SZ13]. Compared
with this implementation, we are able reduce the depth by at least a
third for any bit-width.
multiplexer . We recap Section 4.3, where we described a 2:1
MUX that select between to two data inputs D0 and D1 based on a
control input C. A MUX over two bit strings requires one single non-
linear gate for every pair of input bits by computing each output as
Oi = (D
0
i ⊕D1i )C⊕D0i . Hence, a 2:1 n-bit MUX has size snXMUX(n) =
n and depth of dnXMUX(n) = 1. A 2:1 MUX can be extended to a
m:1 MUX that selects between m input strings d0,d1, . . . ,dm using
log2(m) control bits c = C0,C1, . . . Clog(m) by tree based composition
described in detail Section 4.3. This circuit construction has a size of
snXMUX_tree(m,n) = (m− 1) · snXMUX(n) and a depth that is logarithmic
in the number of data inputs dnXMUX_tree(m,n) = log2(m).
A further depth-minimized m:1 MUX can be constructed under a
moderate size trade-off, by using a design that is similar to a Disjunctive
Normal Form (DNF) over all combinations of choice bits. Every con-
junction of the DNF encodes a single choice together with the associ-
ated data wire. For MPC, this construction leads to a very low depth,
because the disjunctive ORs can be replaced by XORs, as all choices
are mutually exclusive. For example, a 4:1 MUX is then expressed as
O = d0C0C1 ⊕ d1C0C1 ⊕ d2C0C1 ⊕ d3C0C1.
Consequently the depth of a depth-minimized DNF m:1 MUX, re-
ferred to as MUXDNFd, is equivalent to the depth of a single con-
junction. A single conjunction can be computed in a tree-based man-
ner, for example one conjunction of a 128:1 MUX can be encoded
as (((d127C0)(C1C2))((C3C4)(C5C6))), which leads to depth that is
logarithmic in the number of control bits:
dnXMUX_DNFd(m,n) = dlog2(dlog2(m)e+ 1)e.
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depth dnX size snX
Choices m 8 128 1024 m 8 128 1024
MUXTree dlog(m)e 3 7 10 (m− 1) ·n 244 4,064 32K
MUXDNFd dlog(dlog(m) + 1e)e 2 3 4 mn · dlog(m)e 768 28,672 320K
MUXDNFs dlogdlog(m)e)e+ 1 3 4 5 n · (m+ 1) 288 4,128 32K
Table 14: Multiplexers. Exemplary comparison of circuit depth dnX and size
snX of m:1 multiplexers for a different number of inputs m of bit-
width n = 32 bit.
Unfortunately, a straightforward implementation ofm:1MUXDNFd
over data inputs with a width of n-bit that follows the description
above has a size that is log(m) times larger than the size of a tree
based MUX:
snXMUX_DNFd(m,n) = log(m) ·mn.
This increase by a logarithmic factor can be quite significant for larger
m. Therefore, we describe a second DNF based construction, referred
to as MUXDNFs, which offers a more practical size-depth trade-off.
The idea is to first compute every conjunction using the one-hot en-
coder presented in Section 4.3, before AND-gating each “encoded”
choice with the data input. This construction has a depth similar to
the depth of MUX_DNFd:
dnXMUX_DNFs(m,n) = dlog2(dlog2(m)e)e+ 1.
However, with the separation of control and data inputs, the com-
putation of various combinations of choice bits can be merged more
effectively between different conjunctions, e.g., the choices C0C1C2
and C0C1C2 require both the computation of C1C2. This reduces the
size to:
snXMUX_DNFs(m,n) = one-hot encoder+AND data inputs
= n− 2+mn
≈ n · (m+ 1).
In Table 14 a comparison of the three MUXs is given for a different
number of inputs m and a typical bit-width of 32 bits. In summary,
we improved the depth of MUXs from O((log(m)) to O(log(log(m))),
which is almost constant in practice, with a moderate increase in size.
6.2.4 Gate Level Minimization Techniques
Minimizing the circuit on the gate level is last step in CBMC-GC’s
compilation chain. For ShallowCC, we left parts, e.g., structural hash-
ing and SAT sweeping, of the fix-point minimization algorithm un-
modified, because they do not have a dedicated depth-minimizing
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counterpart and both already help to reduce the circuit complexity
and thus also contribute to reduce the circuit depth. Instead, we adapt
the template based rewriting phase.
Circuit rewriting in CBMC-GC only considers patterns that are size
decreasing and have a depth of at most two binary gates. For depth
reduction, however, it is useful to also consider deeper circuit struc-
tures, as well as patterns that are size preserving but depth decreas-
ing. For example, sequential structures of form X = A + (B + (C +
(D+ E))) can be replaced by tree based structures of form X = ((A+
B) + C) + (D+ E) with no change in circuit size. Therefore, in Shal-
lowCC we extend the rewriting phase by several depth-minimizing
patterns, which are not necessarily size decreasing. In total 21 pat-
terns changed, resulting in more than 80 patterns that are searched
for. Furthermore, circuit rewriting as described in Section 4.4 applies
a pattern matching algorithm, which searches for all search patterns.
However, to replace sequential structures by tree based structures, it
is worthwhile to identify arbitrary sequential compositions of gates
without generating all possible search patterns beforehand. There-
fore, we replaced the fixed pattern matching algorithm by a flexi-
ble and recursive search for sequential structures. For example, in-
stead of having dedicated patterns for X = A · (B · (C · (D · E))) and
X = A · (B ·C · (D ·E)), both are matched with the recursive algorithm
that replaces all possible sequential structures of non-linear gates that
a free of intermediate outputs.
Finally, we modify the termination condition of the fix-point opti-
mization routine such that the algorithm only terminates if no further
size and depth improvements are made (or a user defined time limit is
reached). Moreover, for performance reasons, the rewriting first only
applies fixed depth patterns before applying the recursive search for
deeper sequential structures.
Quantifying the improvements of individual patterns is challeng-
ing. This is because the heuristic approach commonly allows multi-
ple patterns to be applied at the same time and every replacement
has an influence on future applicability of further patterns. Neverthe-
less, the whole set of patterns that we identified is very effective, as
circuits before and after gate level minimization differ up to a factor
of 20 in depth, see Section 6.3.3.
6.3 experimental evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of automatized depth-minimization in
a three-fold approach. First, we compare the circuits generated by
ShallowCC with circuits that have been optimized for depth either by
hand or by using state-of-the-art hardware synthesis tools. Then, we
study the effectiveness of different implemented optimization tech-
niques individually. Finally, we show that depth-minimized circuits,
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even under size trade-offs, significantly reduce the online runtime of
multi-round MPC protocols for different network configurations. We
begin by describing the parameters of the benchmarked functionali-
ties.
6.3.1 Benchmarked Functionalities and their Parameters
For comparison, we use functionalities that are described in Section 2.5.
The applications used to evaluate ShallowCC are:
• Integer arithmetics. Due to their importance in almost every com-
putational problem, we benchmark arithmetic building blocks
individually. For multiplication we distinguish results for out-
put bit strings of length n and of length 2n (overflow free) for
n-bit input strings.
• Floating point arithmetics. We abstain from implementing hand-
optimizing floating point circuits, but instead rely on CBMC-
GC’s capabilities to compile a IEEE-754 compliment software
floating point implementation of addition (FloatAdd) and multi-
plication (FloatMul) written in C.
• Distances. We study the Hamming distance over 160 bit and over
1600 bit. Moreover, we study the Manhattan distance for two in-
tegers of bit-width 16 and 32 bit, and we also study the squared
two dimensional Euclidean distance for the same bit-widths.
• Matrix multiplication (MMul). MMul is a purely arithmetic task,
and therefore a good showcase to illustrate the automatic trans-
lation of arithmetic operations into CSNs to achieve very low
depth. Here we use a matrix of size 5× 5 and 32 bit integers.
• Oblivious arrays. Oblivious data structures are a major building
block for the implementation of privacy preserving algorithms.
The most general data structure is the oblivious array that hides
the accessed index. We benchmark the read access to an array
consisting of 32 integers of size 8 bit and 1024 integers of size
32 bit.
• Biometric matching (BioMatch). As in previous chapters, we use
the squared Euclidean distance as distance function between
two samples. Moreover, we use a database of size of n = 32
and n = 1024, and d = 4 features per sample with an integer
bit-width of 16 bit and an overflow free multiplication.
All applications are implemented using textbook algorithms and
are described in detail in Section 2.5. A code example illustrating
the simplicty of the implementations is given in Listing 14, which
computes the Manhatten distance.
6.3 experimental evaluation 108
1 void manhattan () {
2 int INPUT_A_x , INPUT_A_y , INPUT_B_x , INPUT_B_y;
3 int diff_x = INPUT_A_x - INPUT_B_x;
4 int diff_y = INPUT_A_y - INPUT_B_y;
5
6 if( diff_x < 0)
7 diff_x = -diff_x;
8 if( diff_y < 0)
9 diff_y = -diff_y;
10 int OUTPUT_res = diff_x + diff_y;
11 }
Listing 14: Manhattan Distance in ANSI C with variable naming for
ShallowCC.
6.3.2 Compiler Comparison
We compiled all applications with ShallowCC on an Intel Xeon E5-
2620-v2 CPU with a minimization time limit of 10 minutes. The re-
sulting circuit dimensions for different parameters and bit-widths
are shown in Table 15 and Table 16. Furthermore, the circuit size
is given when compiled with the best size-minimizing compilers,
i.e., Frigate [Moo+16] and CBMC-GC v0.9. To evaluate the circuit
depths, a comparison with the depth-minimized circuit constructions
of [Dem+15] and [SZ13] is shown. The results for [Dem+15], [Moo+16]
and [SZ13] are taken from the respective publications.
Comparing the depth of the circuits compiled by ShallowCC with
the hand and tool minimized circuits of [Dem+15; SZ13] we observe a
depth reduction at least 30% for most functionalities. The only excep-
tion are the floating point operations, which do not reach the same
depth as given in [Dem+15]. This is because floating point operations
mostly consist of bit operations, which can significantly be hand opti-
mized on a gate level, but are hard to optimize when complied from
a high-level implementation in C. When comparing circuit sizes, we
observe that ShallowCC is compiling circuits that are competitive in
size to the circuits compiled by size minimizing compilers. A nega-
tive exception is the addition, which shows a significant trade off be-
tween depth and size. However, the instantiation of CSNs allows Shal-
lowCC to compensate these trade-offs in applications with multiple
connected additions, e.g., the matrix multiplication. In Section 6.3.4
we analyze these trade-offs in more detail. Summarizing the results,
ShallowCC is compiling ANSI C code to Boolean circuits that out-
perform hand crafted circuits and tool optimized circuits in depth,
with moderate increases in size. This also illustrates that the here
proposed combination of minimization techniques outperforms the
classic hardware synthesis tool chain used in [Dem+15].
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6.3.3 Evaluation of the Optimizations Techniques
To evaluate the effectiveness of the different optimization techniques,
we compiled various example functionalities twice, once with the re-
spective optimization technique enabled and once without. The dif-
ference between the two versions for each of the three proposed op-
timization techniques are shown in Figure 27. We observe improve-
ments in the circuit depth between a factor of 2 and 80 for all func-
tionalities. We also remark that not all optimizations apply to all func-
tionalities, therefore, the improvements (obviously) should be studied
with care when transferring the results to other applications. The CSN
detection and instantiation shows its strengths for arithmetic func-
tionalities. For example, the 5x5 matrix multiplication shows a depth
reduction of 60%, when the optimization is enabled. This is because
the computation of a single vector element can be grouped into one
CSN. The detection of reductions is a very specific optimization, yet,
when applicable, the depth saving can be significant. For example,
when computing the minima of 100 integers, a depth reduction of
92% is visible. Similarly, the BioMatch application improves by 92%,
which is a factor of 80. Note that in both cases the circuit size itself is
unchanged, as only the order of the computation is optimized. Gate
level minimization is the most important optimization technique for
all functionalities that do not use all bits of every program variable.
In these cases constant propagation can be applied, which leads to
significant reductions in size and depth, as exemplary shown for the
floating point addition and computation of the Hamming distance. In
summary, when applicable, the optimization methods significantly
improve the circuit depth when compiling with ShallowCC. More-
over, although not shown here, we remark that the the instantiation
of a CSNs and the gate level minimization are beneficial for the circuit
size.
6.3.4 Protocol Runtime
To show that depth-minimization improves the online time of MPC
protocols, we evaluate a selection of circuits in the ABY [DSZ15]. The
ABY framework provides a state-of-the-art two-party implementation
of the GMW protocol [GMW87] secure in the semi-honest model (a
detailed protocol description is given in Section 2.2.3). We extended
the ABY framework by an adapter to parse CBMC-GC’s circuit for-
mat. For our experiments, we connected two machines, which are
equipped with an AMD FX 8350 CPU and 16GB of RAM, running
Ubuntu 15.10 over a 1Gbit ethernet connection in a LAN. To simulate
different network environments we made used of the Linux network
emulator netem.
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Figure 27: Effectiveness of optimization techniques. Comparison of circuit
dimensions when compiled by ShallowCC with different opti-
mization techniques, i.e., CSNs instantiation, rewriting of reduc-
tion, or gate level minimization, enabled or disabled.
In this experiment the online protocol runtimes of size- and depth-
minimized circuits for different RTTs are compared. Netem simulates
different RTTs by locally stalling the TCP protocol and thus, the
transmission of packets. We ran this experiment for different RTTs,
starting with zero delay up to a simulated RTT of 80ms. In our re-
sults, we omit timings for the pre-processing setup phase, as this pre-
computation can take place independently of the evaluated circuits
and with any degree of parallelism.
biomatch . The first functionality that we investigate is the Bio-
Match application with a database of n = 1024 entries. Here, we com-
pare the size and depth-minimized circuits generated by CBMC-GC
with and without ShallowCC enabled. The resulting circuit dimen-
sions are given in Table 16, and the protocol runtimes averaged over
10 runs are given in Figure 28. We observe speed-ups of the depth-
minimized circuit over the size-minimized circuit of a factor between
2 and 400, when increasing the RTT from ∼1ms to 80ms.
multiplexer . The second functionality that we evaluate is the ar-
ray read (MUX). We compiled the read access to an array with 1024
integers of size 32 bit. We compare the tree based MUX, which is
the previous best known solution [SZ13], which has depth dnX = 10
and size snX = 32, 736, with our depth optimized MUXDNFd, which
has a depth of dnX = 4 and size snX = 65, 844, after gate level mini-
mization. Each circuit is evaluated with ABY individually, as well as
6.3 experimental evaluation 113
0 20 40 60 80
101
102
103
round trip time [ms]
on
lin
e
ti
m
e
[s
]
Biomatch - CBMC-GC
Biomatch - ShallowCC
Figure 28: GMW protocol runtime when evaluating a depth- (ShallowCC)
and size- (CBMC-GC) minimized biometric matching application.
We observe that the depth optimized circuit significantly outper-
forms the size optimized circuit for any noticeable RTT.
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Figure 29: GMW protocol runtime when evaluating the depth-minimized
DNF and size-minimized tree 1024:1 MUX for a single and paral-
lel array read access. The DNF based MUX significantly outper-
forms the tree based MUX for any noticeable RTT.
100 times in parallel. This also allows to investigate whether SIMD
parallelism, which is favored in GMW [DSZ15], has a significant in-
fluence on the runtime. The resulting online runtimes for both cir-
cuits are illustrated in Figure 29. All data points are averaged over
100 runs. We observe that for almost every network configuration
beyond 1ms RTT, the depth optimized circuits outperform their size-
optimized counterparts by a factor of 2. The reason for the factor of 2
is, that the GMW protocol requires one communication round for in-
put sharing as well as one round for output sharing, which leads to 6
communication rounds in total for the MUXDNFd and 12 rounds for
the MUXtree. Moreover, we observe that the here applied data par-
allelism shows no significant effect on the speed-up gained through
depth reduction.
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Figure 30: Size-depth trade-off analysis: Shown is the amortized runtime,
i.e., the runtime to perform one operation, of 4 functionalities in
a network setting with 20ms RTT for different degrees of par-
allelism (1, 100, 10000). Each functionality is compiled twice, i.e.,
size-optimized (s-opt) and depth-optimized (d-opt).
size-depth trade-off . To further study the trade-off between
size- and depth-minimized circuits in multi-round MPC protocols,
we evaluate four exemplary functionalities that have been compiled
with CBMC-GC and ShallowCC with different degrees of parallelism.
The functionalities are a 32 bit integer addition, a floating point multi-
plication, Euclidean and Manhattan distance computation. The result-
ing circuit dimensions are shown in Figure 30. Each circuit is evalu-
ated with GMW using ABY in an exemplary network setting with a
fixed RTT of 20ms. Measured is the amortized runtime in ms of a
single circuit, when evaluating the circuit individually, 100 or 10, 000
times in parallel. The results are averaged over 100 runs each. We ob-
serve that an increasing degree of parallelism significantly decreases
the amortized runtime for all functionalities. This is because compu-
tation and bandwidth limits have not been reached and thus more
gates can be computed and transmitted per communication round.
We also observe that for all parallel batch sizes the depth minimized
circuits outperform the size optimized circuits, even under signifi-
cant size-depth trade-offs, e.g., the depth-optimized addition circuit
is ≈ 5 times larger than the size-optimized circuit. Hence, even for
a coarse grained parallelization degree of 10, 000 functionalities and
only a moderate RTT of 20ms, the trade-off between circuit depth
and size is in favor of depth when aiming an optimal runtime. The
performance gap increases with an increasing RTT.
In conclusion, the experiments support our introductory statement
that depth minimization is of uttermost importance to gain further
speed-ups in multi-round MPC protocols. With the ShallowCC exten-
sion to CBMC-GC we are capable to achieve these speed-ups by com-
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piling depth-minimized circuits for the aforementioned benchmark
applications that are up to 2.5 times shallower than hand optimized
circuits and up to 400 times shallower than circuits compiled from
size optimizing compilers.
6.4 related work
The relevance of low non-linear depth for various cryptographic tasks
led to a multitude on works that proposed or optimized circuits for
cryptographic primitives. For example, Doröz et al. [Dor+14] iden-
tified the need for depth-minimized cryptographic primitives, Bo-
yar et al. [BP12] developed a depth-minimized AES S-Box and very
recently, Dobrauning et al. [Dob+18] proposed a symmetric cipher
name RASTA that aims a minimal non-linear depth.
Schneider and Zohner [SZ13] presented the first depth-minimized
building blocks for MPC to achieve a fair comparison between GMW
und Yao’s Garbled Circuits. Demmler et al. [Dem+15] extended this
work and presented a library of depth-minimized circuits exported
from a commercial hardware synthesis tool.
General optimization heuristics to minimize the non-linear depth
based on rewriting techniques have recently been described by Car-
pov et al. [CAS18; CAS17]. To the best of our knowledge, beside the
low-level synthesis tool chain described in [Dem+15], no compiler or
high-level synthesis tool chain has been proposed to compile Boolean
circuits with minimal depth for MPC.
Part III
C O M P I L AT I O N A N D O P T I M I Z AT I O N F O R
H Y B R I D M P C P R O T O C O L S
7
C O M P I L AT I O N O F H Y B R I D P R O T O C O L S F O R
P R A C T I C A L S E C U R E C O M P U TAT I O N
Summary: In previous chapters, we presented compilation approaches for
different MPC protocols, yet always studied them separately. Yet, it is known
that multiple protocols using different cryptographic techniques can be com-
bined to more efficient hybrid protocols.
In this chapter we present HyCC, a tool chain for automated compila-
tion of ANSI C programs into hybrid protocols, supporting size and depth
minimized Boolean circuits and size minimized Arithmetic circuits. With
HyCC we present a scalable compilation approach, that automatically de-
composes an input source code, compiles the decomposed parts, performs
local and global optimizations, and finally partitions the compiled applica-
tion by selecting the most efficient MPC protocols for each part. As a result,
our compiled protocols are able to achieve performance numbers that are
comparable to hand-built solutions. For the MiniONN neural network (Liu
et al., CCS 2017), our compiler improves performance of the resulting pro-
tocol by more than a factor of three. Thus, for the first time, highly efficient
hybrid MPC becomes accessible for developers without cryptographic back-
ground.
Remarks: This chapter is based in parts on our paper – “HyCC: Compilation
of Hybrid Protocols for Practical Secure Computation”, Niklas Büscher, Daniel
Demmler, Stefan Katzenbeisser, David Kretzmer, Thomas Schneider, which
appeared in the Proceedings of the 25st ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), Toronto, Canada, 2018 and our paper –
“Scalable Secure Computation from ANSI-C”, Niklas Büscher, David Kretzmer,
Arnav Jindal, Stefan Katzenbeisser, appeared in the Proceedings of the IEEE
International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS), Abu
Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 2016.
The first paper has been written in the CROSSING collaborative research
center and is not solely used in this dissertation. The evaluation section is a
joint effort by Daniel Demmler and myself (and thus shared in both theses),
the compiler and the protocol selection is my major contribution. The other
authors contributed to the implementation and the overall writing of the
paper.
7.1 motivation
In the previous chapters, we studied the compilation for standalone
MPC protocols. Albeit their advancements, further optimization is of
interest to lower computational and communication requirements of
MPC. One solution is to use hybrid protocols. Hybrid protocols com-
bine multiple different MPC protocols with the potential to outper-
form a standalone protocol [DSZ15; Hen+10; KSS14; Liu+17; Nik+13b;
PS15]. For example, for an application that consists of numerical com-
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putation and a combinatorial problem, it is beneficial to evaluate the
former part with an Arithmetic circuit-based MPC protocol, and the
latter part with a Boolean circuit-based protocol.
Identifying a (near) optimal choice of MPC protocols for a desired
application requires experience with different MPC protocols, their
optimizations, their programming models, and conversion costs to
securely switch between protocols when performing a hybrid compu-
tation. Unfortunately, existing compilers, such as the ones presented
in the previous chapters, mostly target only a single class of proto-
cols, e.g., Yao’s Garbled Circuits [Mal+04; Son+15] (cf. Chapter 4), the
GMW protocol [Dem+15] (cf. Chapter 6), or additive linear secret-
sharing-based MPC [BLW08]. Although removing the need of experi-
ence in hardware design, all these compilers follow a holistic compila-
tion of an input program rather than supporting automatized decom-
position, which is a prerequisite for hybrid MPC. An exception is the
TASTY compiler [Hen+10], which compiles to a hybrid protocol con-
sisting of Yao’s protocol and additive homomorphic encryption. Yet,
TASTY requires specific annotations to mark which protocol is used
for each statement. The only other compiler that addresses the com-
pilation of a program using two MPC protocols (Yao’s gabled circuits
and arithmetic sharing) is EzPC [Cha+17]. However, EzPC only pro-
vides semi-automation for a domain specific language (DSL), as the
input code has to be manually decomposed, array accesses have to be
manually resolved into multiplexer structures, and the compiled cir-
cuits are left unoptimized. Moreover, EzPC supports only two MPC
protocols, which are selected statically and independently of the exe-
cution environment, by following a strict set of rules for each expres-
sion in the program.
compilation for hybrid mpc . In this chapter, we propose a
novel hybrid circuit compiler, named HyCC, that is capable of com-
piling applications written in standard ANSI C code into an opti-
mized combination of MPC protocols. In contrast to previous work
on hybrid compilation, we present a fully automated approach that
decomposes the source code, translates the decomposed code into
Boolean and Arithmetic circuits, optimizes these circuits, and finally
selects suitable MPC protocols for a given deployment scenario, op-
timizing the selection for a given criterion, such as latency (minimal
total runtime), throughput (minimal per-operation runtime), or com-
munication.
Figure 31 illustrates the two major components of this approach.
The first component is the (one-time) compilation of the input source
code into a decomposed program description in form of circuits. We
refer to the different parts of a decomposed program, i.e., the compact
logical building blocks a larger application consists of, as modules.
Each module is compiled into multiple circuit representations. Our
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Figure 31: High-level overview of HyCC’s compilation architecture. The cir-
cuit compiler decomposes an input program and compiles each
part into multiple circuit representations. The protocol selection
recombines the different parts.
implementation compiles Arithmetic circuits (A), depth-optimized
circuits for GMW (B), and size-optimized circuits for Yao’s proto-
col (Y). The second component in HyCC is the protocol selection step
in which the most suitable combination of MPC protocols is selected
for a decomposed program depending on the computational environ-
ment. We note that this protocol selection can be part of an MPC
framework and does not necessarily need to be performed during
compilation.
optimizing circuit compiler . MPC is still significantly slower
and more expensive than generic plaintext computation in terms of
both computation and communication. Thus, a tool chain is required
that optimizes the compilation of a program description into an effi-
cient MPC protocol and its corresponding circuits. Even though the
optimization of an input program has limits, i.e., an inefficient algo-
rithmic representation cannot automatically be translated into a fast
algorithm, a programmer expects the compiler to not only translate
every statement of a high-level description of an application or algo-
rithm for a selected target architecture, but also to optimize the given
representation, e.g., by removing unnecessary computations. This is
of special interest for MPC compilers because code optimization tech-
niques that are too expensive to be applied in traditional compilers
become affordable when considering the trade-off between compile
time and evaluation costs of the program on the circuit level. For
example, in Yao’s protocol a 32×32 bit signed integer multiplication
requires the evaluation of ∼1000 non-linear Boolean gates (cf. Sec-
tion 4.3), which results in ∼5000 symmetric encryptions during the
protocol run. Consequently, the removal of any unnecessary opera-
tion in MPC is more vital than in traditional compilation, where at
most a single CPU cycle is lost per multiplication during program
execution. We also observe that optimization techniques performed
on the source code level, e.g., constant propagation, are cheaper in
computational resources than minimization techniques applied on
the gate level after the compilation to circuits.
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These observations are reflected in our compiler architecture: Be-
fore decomposing the input source code into different parts, a rig-
orous static analysis is performed to realize constant propagation,
detect parallelism, and determine the granularity of decomposition.
The optimization then continues on the circuit level, where logic opti-
mization techniques are gradually applied. To achieve a scalable and
optimizing compilation, we guide the logic optimization efforts based
on the results of static analysis of the source code. For example, loop
bodies with a large number of iterations will be optimized with more
effort than a piece of code that is only rarely used. Thus, in contrast
to classic logic optimization or arithmetic expression rewriting, we
make use of structural information given by the programmer in the
high-level code.
Summarizing the compiler’s functionality, HyCC is capable of com-
piling optimized Boolean and Arithmetic circuits suiting the require-
ments of most constant- and multi-round MPC protocols. Our tool
chain is highly flexible and independent of the underlying MPC pro-
tocols, as only the respective cost models for primitive operations,
e.g., addition or Boolean AND, have to be adapted to reflect future
protocol developments in MPC.
protocol selection. Protocol selection is the task of mapping
each part of a decomposed program to an MPC protocol represen-
tation. The circuits created by our compiler for each module and
the mapping of modules into MPC protocols is sufficient to eval-
uate an application in a hybrid MPC framework. Optimal protocol
selection is an optimization problem, where the best mapping is iden-
tified in regard to the cost model that considers the cost to evaluate
each circuit in the respective MPC protocol as well as the conver-
sion costs between the different representations. The concept of pro-
tocol selection has previously been studied independently from com-
pilation in [KSS14; Pat+16]. Kerschbaum et al. [KSS14] investigated
protocol selection for a combination of Yao’s garbled circuits and
additive homomorphic encryption. They conjectured that the opti-
mization problem is NP-hard and proposed two heuristic approaches.
First, they presented a transformation of the combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem into an integer linear programming task by lineariza-
tion of the cost model. Second, they presented a greedy optimization
algorithm, which is capable of optimizing larger functionalities. Pat-
tku et al. [Pat+16] used similar heuristics to optimize the protocol
selection for minimal cloud computing costs, i.e., the price to pay a
cloud provider to perform a computation.
We follow an approach that is different in multiple aspects. First,
we show that the synthesis of an efficient hybrid MPC protocol is
not only a protocol selection problem, but also a scheduling problem.
Second, in contrast to the work mentioned above, we make use of
7.2 the hycc mpc compiler 121
structural information in the source code before its translation into cir-
cuits. By grouping expressions that perform similar operations, e.g.,
loops, it becomes possible to perform an exhaustive search over the
problem state for many practically relevant applications. Applications
that cannot be optimized to the full extent with the available optimiza-
tion time are approached by a combination of exhaustive search with
heuristics.
contributions . We present the first complete tool-chain that au-
tomatically creates partitioned circuits and optimizes their selection
for hybrid MPC protocols from standard ANSI C code, which makes
hybrid MPC accessible to non-domain experts. Moreover, we con-
tribute techniques and heuristics for the efficient decomposition of
the code, scalable compilation, and protocol selection. As part of these
techniques, we propose source code guided optimization, which al-
low a more scalable optimization of circuits. Finally, we report speed-
ups for our automatically compiled hybrid protocols of more than
one order of magnitude over stand-alone protocol compilers, and fac-
tor three over previous handmade protocols for an exemplary ma-
chine learning application [Liu+17].
chapter outline . This chapter is organized as follows: Our com-
pilation architecture is presented in Section 7.2, followed by a discus-
sion of protocol selection and partitioning in Section 7.3. We evaluate
HyCC in Section 7.4 and discuss related work in Section 7.5.
7.2 the hycc mpc compiler
Here we describe our hybrid compiler. After introducing the chal-
lenges, we provide details on every step of the compilation chain.
7.2.1 Hybrid Compilation and its Challenges
We begin with a description of a straight-forward (unoptimized) ap-
proach to compile hybrid MPC applications from standard source
code in order to illustrate the challenges of achieving efficient hybrid
compilation. We will then refine this approach throughout this sec-
tion and describe a more advanced compilation approach.
An exemplary illustration of the necessary steps for a straight-
forward compilation is given in Figure 32. First, the input source code
is decomposed into multiple parts, henceforth referred to as modules.
Modules are the finest level of granularity used in the later protocol
selection. Thus, all code within a module is guaranteed to be evalu-
ated with the same MPC protocol. We remark that during protocol
evaluation this level of granularity is only forming a lower bound. In
principle, a program can also be evaluated with only a single MPC
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Figure 32: Naïve compilation of hybrid protocols from input source code to
a decomposed circuit description. First, the code is decomposed
into multiple modules. Then, each module is translated into three
different circuit formats.
protocol. The decomposition can be made directly on the source code
level or on an intermediate representation of the code, e.g., SSA form.
Given a decomposed application description, each module is com-
piled into the circuit representations for the different MPC protocols
forming the hybrid protocol, and then optimized. In HyCC, we con-
sider size-optimized Boolean circuits, required for Yao’s protocol (Y),
depth-optimized Boolean circuits, required for GMW style protocols
(B), and Arithmetic circuits (A). Finally, the hybrid application is syn-
thesized during protocol selection and scheduling, described in detail
in Section 7.3.
Multiple challenges (besides the complexity of compiling efficient
Boolean or Arithmetic circuits itself) arise when following this straight-
forward approach. All challenges relate to a trade-off between com-
pilation resources, i.e., time and storage, and compilation result, i.e.,
circuit size and depth. We describe identified challenges and propose
solutions, which motivate our actual compilation architecture:
• Granularity of decomposition. Automatically decomposing input
code into multiple modules is a non-trivial task, as a fine-grained
decomposition limits the possibility of circuit level optimiza-
tions and increases the complexity of the computationally ex-
pensive protocol selection problem, whereas a coarse-grained
decomposition risks to miss the most efficient selection. We
tackle this challenge by the use of heuristics based on static
analysis of the source code.
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1 long pow(unsigned b, unsigned exp) {
2 /* Computationally expensive code */
3 }
4
5 void main(){ /* Some code */
6 t1 = pow(x, y);
7 t2 = pow(2, y);
8 /* Some code */
9 unsigned c = 1;
10 if (condition)
11 c += 1;
12 res = pow(x, c);
13 /* Some code */
14 }
Listing 15: Example source code to illustrate the conflict between local
and inter-procedural optimization.
• Local versus inter-procedural optimization. Optimizing an applica-
tion as a whole or optimizing its modules independently can
lead to circuits of different sizes. The former allows more op-
timizations, whereas the latter is typically more efficient w.r.t
compilation because each module will only be compiled and
optimized once.
We illustrate this conflict with the example in Listing 15. This
example consists of a function main() that performs multiple
calls to a function pow(), which computes the power of two
integers. A function-wise decomposition approach would sepa-
rate the two functions to compile them independently. However,
a careful study of the source code reveals that the pow() func-
tion is called with a constant argument in Line 7, and with the
second argument being either one or two in Line 12, which sim-
plifies the computation of the exponentiation function on the
circuit level significantly. An optimizer with an inter-procedural
(context-sensitive) approach could detect this fact and optimize
the created circuit accordingly. To find a trade-off between mod-
ular and holistic optimization, i.e., compile time and circuit size,
we rely on static analysis and source code optimization tech-
niques in our compilation framework.
• Loop handling. Loops are an essential part of many programs.
To create circuits with low complexity, it is best to first unroll
(inline) all loop iterations, before translating them into a circuit,
as this allows to apply optimizations, such as constant propaga-
tion, over all iterations. However, for compilation efficiency, for
the exploitation of parallelism, and for a more compact circuit
representation, it can be useful to avoid loop unrolling. There-
fore, instead of choosing either technique we propose an adap-
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Figure 33: The compilation chain of HyCC. Marked in gray are all new or
adapted compilation phases.
tive approach that distinguishes different loop types and then
decides for or against loop unrolling.
• Efficient logic minimization. Even though we consider the compi-
lation to be a one-time task, which in theory allows to use arbi-
trary resources, in practice compilation efficiency is of relevance.
Optimizing circuits on the gate-level is a resource-consuming
task that can become practically infeasible when considering cir-
cuits with billions of gates. Therefore, we propose a technique
named source-guided optimization to optimize circuits under con-
figurable time constraints, by distributing an optimization bud-
get in a controlled manner.
The sketched solutions can be realized using static source code
analysis techniques only. This is sufficient because MPC applications
have to be bound (finite and deterministic runtime), as they are eval-
uated independently of the input of the program to avoid any form
of information leakage. Using the side-channel free circuit computa-
tion model, all possible program paths are visited during protocol
runtime and thus can already be studied at compile time.
7.2.2 Architecture
We describe our compilation architecture for a resource-constrained
environment that expects a source code with a pointer to an entry
function f as input, and a compilation and optimization time limit T .
The compiler outputs a program description consisting of multiple
modules, compiled to different circuit representations, and a direct
acyclic dependency graph that describes the dependencies between
the different modules. The combination of dependency graph and
modules can be used to evaluate the program in a hybrid MPC frame-
work.
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The compilation architecture, illustrated in Figure 33 consists of
multiple compilation phases shown in the next paragraph, which them-
selves can consist of multiple compilation passes. The phases are:
1. Automated Parallelization: Automated identification of code blocks
that can be evaluated in parallel using external tools.
2. Preprocessing, Lexing and Parsing: Construction of an AST from
the input code.
3. Source Code Optimization and Loop Unrolling: Source-to-source
compilation using static analysis.
4. Code Decomposition: Decomposition of the input program into
multiple modules.
5. Circuit Compilation: Compilation of each module into the differ-
ent circuit representations.
6. Inter-Procedural Circuit Optimization: Optimization of Boolean and
Arithmetic circuits across multiple modules.
7. Circuit Export: Writing the decomposed circuit to a file, ready
for reconstruction in protocol selection.
Note that steps 2, 3, and 5 are also part of CBMC-GC’s tool chain,
whereas the others have been added for the compilation of hybrid
protocols. We describe the steps in detail in the following subsections.
Automated Parallelization
Parallel code segments allow efficient compilation and protocol selec-
tion. Moreover, most MPC protocols profit from parallelized function-
alities. Therefore, their detection is of relevance in compilation for hy-
brid MPC. As in Chapter 5, we rely on existing automated paralleliza-
tion tools, e.g., [IJT91; Wil+94], for the detection of parallel loops, i.e.,
loops that have independent loop iterations. These tools are able to
detect parallelism and to annotate parallelism using source-to-source
compilation techniques, independent of the HyCC compilation chain.
In HyCC we follow the same approach as in ParCC, which is de-
scribed in Section 5.3.2: For annotations, HyCC relies on the OpenMP
notation, which is the de-facto application programming interface for
shared memory multiprocessing programming in C and supported
by most parallelization tools. Specific preprocessing notations, e.g.,
#omp parallel for, are added in the code line before each parallel
loop. The annotations are parsed in the next compilation phase.
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Preprocessing, Lexing and Parsing
The preprocessing, lexing, and parsing of source code is realized as
described in Chapter 3. We remark that, as in CBMC-GC and typical
for MPC, the given program has to be bound to avoid leaking infor-
mation through the program runtime. Furthermore, global variables
are not supported, which, however, is an implementation limitation
and not a limitation of our approach.
Source Code Optimization and Loop Unrolling
In this compilation step the intermediate code is analyzed and opti-
mized using static analysis. The results are subsequently used as a
preparation step for the later code decomposition and parallelization.
In detail, to overcome the optimization limits of a (context insensitive)
modular compilation, rigorous source code optimization in form of
a partial evaluation is performed. Thus, all variables known to be
constant are propagated, such that every remaining expression (indi-
rectly) depends on at least one input variable (dynamic variable).
To achieve an efficient compilation result, partial evaluation re-
quires symbolic execution of the complete source code, which limits
compilation scalability. A faster compile time can be achieved, un-
der a (often significant) circuit-size trade-off, when not optimizing
across function or loop boundaries. For example, the circuit compiler
Frigate [Moo+16] follows this approach. To achieve the best of both
worlds, we propose a time-constrained multi-pass optimization rou-
tine, which can be interrupted at any point in time. Given sufficient
compile time, the iterative approach converges to the same result as
a complete context sensitive optimization.
In the first pass, partial evaluation is performed with a local scope,
yet not across function or loop boundaries. In the second pass, con-
stants are propagated within every function body and between mul-
tiple functions (inter-procedural constant propagation), yet not between
multiple loop iterations or in recursive function calls to avoid loop un-
rolling. This form of program specialization can lead to an increase in
the code size, as the same function may now appear multiple times
with different signatures. For example, in Listing 15, we observe that
the pow() function is called with none, either of the two, and both
arguments being constant. Hence, in this example, two, namely one
with the first argument and one with the second argument being con-
stant, additional copies of the function will be introduced (function
cloning), partially evaluated, and compiled individually.
In the third optimization pass, all (possibly nested) loops are vis-
ited. We distinguish three types of loops: Parallel, simple, and com-
plex loops. Parallel loops have already been identified in the first com-
pilation phase. We refer to a for loop as simple if the loop guard is
constant and the iterator variable is incremented (or decremented)
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in a constant interval and not written inside the loop body. Further-
more, simple loops cannot have return or break statements. Hence,
the loop range of simple loops can be derived without a complete
symbolic execution of the loop itself. Complex loops are all remain-
ing loops, which require a complete unrolling of all iterations using
symbolic execution to determine their termination.
Simple and parallel loops do not need to be unrolled during com-
pilation, as it is sufficient to compile a single circuit for all iterations
that is instantiated multiple times within an MPC protocol with the
loop iterator variable as input. Nevertheless, similar to function spe-
cialization, loop specialization is desirable for an efficient compila-
tion result. Therefore, in HyCC, loops are optimized in an iterative
approach. First, all constants that are independent of the loop iterator
variable are propagated in the loop body. This allows an effective opti-
mization of multiple loop iterations at the same time. Afterwards, the
first iteration of every loop is partially evaluated. In contrast to the
previous symbolic execution, the loop iterator variable is now initial-
ized with a constant and can lead to further program specialization.
If symbolic execution of the first iteration leads to improvements, i.e.,
an expression can be evaluated or removed, then the loop becomes a
candidate for unrolling. By unrolling the first loop iteration, an esti-
mate on the computational resources required to unroll all iterations
can be made. Given sufficient remaining compile-time (and memory),
the loop will be unrolled and optimized.
Function and loop specialization may reveal constants relevant for
other parts of the code. Therefore, given sufficient remaining compile-
time, a further round of partial evaluation is initiated until no fur-
ther improvements are observed. Finally, a call-graph is exported for
usage in the following decomposition. Statements within loops that
have been unrolled are enriched with information about their original
position in the loop, to re-identify loops and their iterations during
decomposition.
Code Decomposition
Identifying a suitable decomposition is the major challenge for effi-
cient protocol partitioning. The task of automated decomposition is
to identify which parts of a code should jointly be compiled as one
module, which forms the finest level of granularity of protocol se-
lection. Each module has an input and an output interface, where a
module can receive input from one or more modules and provide
output to one or more modules. We refer to the separation points
between two modules as interface. Hence, a decomposed code forms
a DAG consisting of modules with interfaces in-between (similar to
a call-graph or dependency-graph). The first input and last output
interface of the graph are the program input and output variables,
respectively.
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The overall goal of a useful decomposition is to identify modules
of a program that can be evaluated efficiently in a specific circuit rep-
resentation. A first example of such a heuristic are expressions con-
sisting only of arithmetic statements. Naturally, these should profit
from processing in MPC protocols based on Arithmetic circuits. In
contrast, control flow operations or comparisons are evaluated more
efficiently with Boolean circuit-based protocols. Consequently, arith-
metic and combinatorial statements should be in different modules.
We follow a multi-pass decomposition approach that starts with the
complete source code as a module that is split into more fine-granular
modules in every pass.
function decomposition. Functions already give programs a
form of modularization and hence they can be used as natural bound-
aries for decomposition. Therefore, in the first compilation pass, each
function becomes a module, while considering the previously de-
scribed function specialization. The input interface to a function mod-
ule consists of the arguments that are read in the function body and
assigned to other variables. The output interface are all pointers and
variables passed by reference that are written to in the function body,
as well as the return statement. This form of recursive decomposi-
tion leads to three modules per (possibly nested) function call, one
module for the callee itself, one for the code before and one after the
function call.
Technically, this decomposition becomes challenging when point-
ers or references are passed to a function. Using the results of the
previous (exhaustive) symbolic execution, which involves a pointer
analysis, input and output variables can be differentiated, and array
sizes can be determined during compile time. We note that dynamic
memory management, i.e., memory that is allocated based on (pri-
vate) input variables, is impossible to be realized in the circuit com-
putation model and is thus outside the scope of circuit compilers.
loop decomposition. Loops also give code a structure and are
therefore a good heuristic for decomposition. Consequently, in the
second compilation pass, every module is further decomposed ac-
cording to its loops, such that every loop iteration becomes its own
module, where all variables that are read from an outer scope and
the iterator variable form the input interface and all variables that are
written to, but defined in an outer scope, form the output interface.
Loops might have been unrolled during code optimization, as de-
scribed previously. For their re-identification during decomposition,
loop iterations are marked as such during loop unrolling. Loops that
have not been unrolled during code optimization require a dedicated
handling of array accesses before decomposition. Otherwise, an ar-
ray access that depends on the iterator variable, which is an input
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1 unsigned scalar = x1 * y1 + x2 * y2;
2 if(scalar > min) {
3 count = count + 1;
4 }
Listing 16: Code excerpt to illustrate code decomposition. The scalar
product of two two-dimensional vectors is computed and
compared to a reference value.
variable after decomposition, would compile into a private array ac-
cess, which is represented by large multiplexers, cf. Section 4.3. For
better efficiency, in HyCC these array accesses are extracted from the
loop iteration and placed in the module that encapsulates the iter-
ation. Consequently, these array accesses are evaluated as accesses
with publicly known index, and as such without any gates.
Decomposition by loops is especially beneficial for parallel loops,
as it allows to derive the placement costs of MPC protocols during
protocol selection from the analysis of only one loop iteration.
arithmetic decomposition. In the last decomposition pass,
connected arithmetic expressions are extracted, as they are candidates
for Arithmetic circuits. Therefore, all expressions in each module are
visited to extract expressions that purely consists of arithmetic oper-
ations (supported by the used MPC protocol). This decomposition is
realized as follows: For each module, a data flow dependency graph
is constructed from the output to the input interface. Each node in
the dependency graph is an elementary expression and an edge rep-
resents the data that is computed on. By iterating over all nodes, two
sets of sub-graphs are formed. The first contains sub-graphs consist-
ing of connected arithmetic expressions, whereas the second contains
sub-graphs consisting of connected remaining expressions. Each sub-
graph forms its own module, where edges between the sub-graphs
define the respective I/O interfaces. This form of decomposition is
illustrated in Figure 34 for the code excerpt given in Listing 16 that
computes a scalar multiplication.
We remark that during protocol selection, multiple (or even all)
modules can be merged to larger modules, to be jointly evaluated
with the same MPC protocol. Finally, the created DAG that repre-
sents the modules and their I/O dependencies is exported for the
next compilation steps.
Circuit Compilation
The different modules identified in the previous step are compiled
separately into two or three circuit representations. Namely, every
module is compiled into size-optimized Boolean circuits using the cir-
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Figure 34: Code dependency graph and decomposition for the code excerpt
in Listing 16. Connected statements that can efficiently be ex-
pressed as Arithmetic circuits, i.e., addition (ADD) and multi-
plication (MUL), marked with a red dashed circle, form sub-
graphs. Statements that profit from a Boolean representation,
marked with a blue dotted circle, i.e., greater-than (GT) and mul-
tiplexer (MUX), are grouped.
cuit compiler of CBMC-GC (see Chapter 4) and into depth-optimized
Boolean circuits using its ShallowCC extension (see Chapter 6). More-
over, every module that can be represented with the supported arith-
metic operations, i.e., addition and multiplication (cf. Section 2.2),
is also compiled into an Arithmetic circuit using a straight-forward
mapping of arithmetic expressions to arithmetic gates. Note that mod-
ules representing functions or loops that have not been unrolled are
only compiled once.
Inter-Procedural Circuit Optimization
So far, the compiled circuits have only been optimized on the source
code level. Yet, it is desirable to also optimize the Boolean circuits
on the gate-level, e.g., by removing unused bits (gates) and by prop-
agating constants between modules and circuit types, as applied in
CBMC-GC, cf. Section 4.4, and also to subsequently propagate con-
stants in Arithmetic circuits.
The scalability of logic minimization techniques for Boolean cir-
cuits is limited, because these techniques are applied in a gate-by-gate
manner and some techniques involve computationally expensive op-
erations, such as SAT sweeping. Thus, to distribute the available com-
putational resources, i.e., the optimization time limit Topt, which is
the total user specified time T subtracted by the compile time Tcomp,
onto all modules efficiently, we propose a technique named source
code guided optimization. Over multiple time-constrained optimization
passes, the available computing time is distributed using the struc-
tural information present on the source code level and the informa-
tion available from previous optimization passes.
Initially, every module is optimized at least once. For the initial
optimization, a fraction λinit (0 6 λinit 6 1) of the total budget
Topt is distributed onto all modules weighted by the number of their
non-linear gates. Furthermore, modules originating loops or function
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bodies are optimized with an effort that is weighted by the number
of their iterations or calls. After the initial optimization pass, the min-
imized modules are queued by the number of constant inputs, which
have been revealed in the previous pass, as well as the absolute im-
provement in the number of non-linear gates in the previous pass.
Based on this order, the most promising module is selected for min-
imization. After minimizing a module, it is returned to the queue
according to the aforementioned criteria and modules with newly re-
vealed constant inputs are reordered. The optimization stops once
Topt has be reached or no further improvements are observed. An
algorithmic description of the optimization heuristic is given in Algo-
rithm 1.
We selected this heuristic because of two reasons. First, constant
propagation is the most cost efficient optimization strategy and should
therefore be applied with preference. Second, in the fixed point logic
minimization routine (cf. Section 4.4), circuits that have seen signifi-
cant optimization are more promising for further optimization than
circuits with little or none improvement in the previous pass. There-
fore, these are given preference.
The described optimization strategy enables the scalable optimiza-
tion of circuits for standalone protocols and is evaluated in more
detail in our paper [Büs+16]. For hybrid compilation we optimize
all types of circuits independently with a shared optimization bud-
get. Thus, the different optimizations are performed separately. Yet,
the information about identified constant output variables or module
outputs is propagated between optimization routines and will also
be used to improve the Arithmetic circuits, if all bits of an output
variable are identified as constant. We remark that this form of cross
propagation maintains functional correctness because all circuits for
one module are logically equivalent.
Circuit Export
Once a user-defined compile time has been reached, the optimiza-
tion routine is stopped and the DAG, consisting of modules with
optimized circuit representations and I/O interfaces as well as infor-
mation about identified parallel loops, is exported. Given the circuits,
an MPC framework can choose a protocol selection to perform the
computation as described next.
7.3 protocol selection and scheduling
In this section, we describe how to determine an optimized schedul-
ing and mapping of the modules that were created during compila-
tion to MPC protocols.
7.3 protocol selection and scheduling 132
7.3.1 Problem Definition
We optimize evaluation costs of a hybrid MPC application by choos-
ing an efficient protocol representation and evaluation order of all
modules for a given program description. For this, we present heuris-
tics considering a user-specified cost model. A very interesting use
case is the optimization of the protocol’s online runtime, yet, various
other cost models are also of interest. For example, optimizing the
cloud computing costs has been discussed in [Pat+16]. Further exam-
ples are the total protocol runtime including or excluding the time
spent on preprocessing, depending on the use case of the application,
the pure communication costs when considering a constrained net-
work connection, or the power consumption, when considering mo-
bile devices. All these minimization problems can also be formulated
as constrained problems, e.g., minimizing the communication costs
while keeping the protocol runtime below a user-defined threshold.
The computation and communication costs of a hybrid MPC appli-
cation depend on the combined costs to evaluate each module in the
selected protocol plus the time to convert between modules, when
evaluating them with different protocols. However, in contrast to pre-
vious works, i.e., [KSS14] and [Pat+16], we observe that the optimiza-
tion problem, i.e., achieving minimal costs for a given decomposition,
is not only a protocol selection problem, but also a scheduling prob-
lem. Namely, the evaluation order of parallel modules, i.e., modules
without sequential dependencies, can significantly influence the effec-
tiveness of protocol selection, and thus the overall protocol runtime.
This is because of the non-linearity of computation and communica-
tion costs of MPC protocols (e.g., parallel computations in the pro-
gram can be performed in the same communication round or packed
in the same cryptographic operation), as well as the trade-off that has
to be taken into account when converting between different MPC pro-
tocols. Figure 35 illustrates this scheduling problem for an example
program description and naïve cost model. Namely, Figure 35a shows
an exemplary program DAG resembling a computation from inputs
(top) to outputs (bottom) with different modules (nodes) in between.
For simplicity, we assume that modules illustrated as squares profit
from an evaluation in protocol type A (e.g., arithmetic), whereas mod-
ules represented by circles profit from a different protocol type B (e.g.,
Boolean). Furthermore, for illustration purposes, we assume that a
conversion between two different protocols is reducing the total eval-
uation costs if at least three modules are evaluated in the same proto-
col. The result of an exemplary As-soon-as-possible (ASAP) schedul-
ing followed by a protocol selection is shown in Figure 35b. Two
groups of nodes (marked with dashed lines) become a candidate for
being evaluated in protocol type B. However, when considering the
assumption above, an optimal protocol selection algorithm will pro-
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(a) Example DAG
with protocol
preferences
(b) ASAP scheduling
and subsequent
protocol selection
(c) Optimal scheduling
and subsequent pro-
tocol selection
Figure 35: Exemplary DAG with different evaluation schedules and proto-
col selections described Section 7.3.1.
pose to evaluate all modules with type A, as the conversion is too
expensive for only two modules. An optimal scheduling is shown
in Figure 35c. In this case, three modules that can jointly be evaluated
in protocol type B can be identified during protocol selection and are
consequently evaluated in protocol type B.
Thus, we remark that optimal runtime can only be achieved when
optimizing both protocol selection and scheduling of modules. Next,
we present a formalization of the optimization problem, before pre-
senting optimization routines in the following subsections.
formalization. We formalize the cost model and optimization
problem as follows. Given is a program description in the form of a
DAG G from inputs i ∈ In to outputs o ∈ Out with modules m ∈M
in between. Cost minimization for hybrid MPC consists of two in-
terleaving tasks, namely protocol selection and scheduling. Protocol
selection is an assignment that maps every module to an MPC proto-
col, also referred to as protocol type t :M→ {A,B, Y}. We denote the
set of protocols that represents each module in the respective protocol
type with ΠtM. Moreover, we denote the set of conversion protocols re-
quired to convert between adjacent modules evaluated with different
MPC protocols with ΠtC.
Scheduling is the task of assigning an evaluation order to all mod-
ules for a given protocol selection. Modules and their conversions
form the set of elementary protocols Πt = ΠtM ∪ ΠtC that are the
atomic units of scheduling. As it is common in scheduling, we use
the notion of instructions I, which is the set of protocols that are per-
formed in parallel in hybrid MPC. Furthermore, note that most mod-
ules and their conversions have data dependencies to other modules,
i.e., module m2 is dependent on m1, if the result of m1 is needed to
compute m2. Therefore, scheduling is the task of creating a sequence
of k instructions (I1, I2, . . . , Ik) and assigning protocols to instruc-
tions s : Πt → I1, . . . , Ik. This assignment must guarantee that every
protocol only appears in one instruction, protocols in each instruc-
tion are pairwise mutually independent, and the order of protocols
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induced through the order of instructions conforms to the dependen-
cies between modules and conversions.
Given a schedule, i.e., an ordered list of instructions IL, the total
evaluation cost is the sum of the evaluation costs of all protocols
representing a module pitm ∈ ΠtM and their respective conversions
pitc ∈ ΠtC according to IL plus the cost to input values into the pro-
tocol, plus the costs to reveal all outputs. In our paper [Büs+18], we
study the protocol evaluation costs in more detail and also present a
runtime prediction for a given evaluation schedule.
In summary, the goal of optimized protocol selection and schedul-
ing is to minimize the total evaluation cost by choosing a schedule s
and protocol selection t. Next, we present approaches to achieve effi-
cient protocol selection and scheduling.
7.3.2 Protocol Selection in HyCC
Scheduling and protocol selection are tightly coupled problems, where
the latter alone is conjectured to be NP-hard [KSS14; Pat+16]. There-
fore, in HyCC we first select an evaluation schedule using an heuristic
for a given program decomposition. The schedule is then used in a
second step to optimally solve the protocol selection problem.
scheduling . In HyCC, protocol scheduling is performed with
respect to the parallelism present on the source code level. Conse-
quently, the identified parallelism, which has been annotated in the
program’s DAG during compilation, is used to schedule modules in
parallel. This explicit scheduling of parallel code structures is nec-
essary, as the straight forward application of an ASAP or similar
scheduling algorithm cannot guarantee that parallel code statements
will be evaluated in parallel, as shown in Figure 35. Moreover, this
approach is beneficial for hybrid MPC, as the MPC protocols, conver-
sion protocols, and their implementations benefit from parallel exe-
cution. For example, n sequentially scheduled multiplications in an
Arithmetic circuit require n communication rounds, whereas a paral-
lel alignment allows to perform all multiplications in a single commu-
nication round, which leads to very different runtimes in any high-
latency deployment scenario. Furthermore, parallelization is bene-
ficial for the later protocol selection, as multiple modules can be
grouped together and thus, optimized more efficiently.
Besides parallelization, modules are scheduled in an ASAP man-
ner. To combine both strategies in a single algorithm, parallel mod-
ules are merged in a single module when creating an ASAP sched-
ule. Afterwards, the merged modules are restored and placed in the
same instruction of the evaluation schedule. We leave more advanced
scheduling algorithms for future work.
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protocol selection. Even though in the general case protocol
selection is conjectured to be NP-hard, given a coarse-grained decom-
position, such as the one created by HyCC, an optimal protocol se-
lection can be computed under reasonable computational effort for
many practical applications, as we show in Section 7.4.1. This is be-
cause the complexity of the protocol selection routine is dominated
by the width of the program’s DAG rather than its size. Consequently,
all applications that only moderately divert in their data and control
flow are candidate problems for optimal protocol selection.
To identify the optimal protocol selection for a given DAGG, we ap-
ply a straight-forward combinatorial optimization approach by enu-
merating all possible protocol combinations using dynamic program-
ming. The core concept of the optimization routine is to iteratively op-
timize the selection of protocols up to a certain module, following the
order of modules generated by the instruction list IL. In every step,
one module is added and modules that do not have any open outputs,
i.e., outputs that are required for subsequent modules, are removed.
We refer to the set of modules with open outputs as the working
set WS. For every WS, the best selection for every possible protocol
combination is computed and stored. When going from WS to the
next WS ′, the best protocol selection to represent the new WS ′ in
every protocol combination is computed by identifying the least cost
to compute WS ′ from any configuration of WS. Thus, the complexity
of this optimization approach for a given DAG G with n modules, a
maximum width of w, and s different protocol types is in O(nsw),
and thus exponential in the size of the largest working set, i.e., the
width of G. Consequently, for a small number of protocol types and
for DAGs with moderate widths, the protocol selection problem can
be solved optimally in seconds, as evaluated in Section 7.4.1.
algorithm . An implementation of the algorithm is given in Al-
gorithm 2 and described in the following paragraph. The initial WS
consists of all inputs of the DAG G. Consequently, the cost to repre-
sent a WS in a specific protocol combination is the cost to share each
input with the specified protocol (Line 2). Next, the iterative opti-
mization routine is initiated. A module from the ordered G is added
to the WS, and completed modules are removed to create the next
working set WS ′ (Line 6). Then, all possible protocol combinations
of the next WS ′ are enumerated. For each of these combinations, the
best selection based on all protocol configurations of the previousWS
is computed (Line 8). This task is realized in the function eval_costs(),
outlined in Algorithm 3, which takes as input the two working sets,
as well as the desired protocol configuration c ′ of WS ′ and a cost
table that stores the costs to compute all possible configurations of
WS. The costs to evaluate the newly added module, reflecting the
protocols in WS and WS ′ is computed in function cost_step(), which
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models the evaluation costs of MPC protocols. Once all combinations
of WS ′ are computed, WS is replaced by WS ′ to add a further mod-
ule. The algorithm ends, once all modules have been visited, and thus
an optimal output sharing has been identified.
scalable protocol selection. In cases where the DAG ex-
ceeds the computationally manageable width, the optimization algo-
rithm can compute the optimal protocol selection for all sub-graphs,
which have a width that is solvable. For the remaining sub-graphs, or
the combination of multiple sub-graphs, heuristics, such as the hill-
climbing heuristic proposed in [KSS14] can be used to search for an
optimized selection in the combination of different optimally solved
sub-graphs.
7.4 experimental evaluation
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of HyCC. We
study the efficiency of protocol selection, the circuits created by HyCC
and their performance in hybrid MPC protocols for various use cases
in two different deployment scenarios. The goal of this evaluation is
to illustrate that the circuits that were automatically created by HyCC
from ANSI C code are comparable to hand-crafted hybrid circuits
and significantly more efficient than previous single-protocol com-
pilers. As such, we are able to show that HyCC is simplifying the
ease-of-use of hybrid MPC, and thus is a powerful tool to prototype
PETs. We remark that the goal of this work is not to outperform ded-
icated secure computation protocols, which are optimized to achieve
maximum efficiency for a specific use case. We begin with an evalu-
ation of the runtime of the protocol selection algorithm presented in
Section 7.3.2.
7.4.1 Protocol Selection
To illustrate that an exhaustive search is a sufficient solution for the
protocol selection problem in most practical cases, we measure the
runtime of the protocol selection algorithm in Figure 36. Shown are
the runtimes averaged over k = 10 executions of a straight forward
(unoptimized) implementation running on a commodity laptop for
randomly generated graphs with n = 20 modules with increasing
graph width w. We observe the expected exponential growth in run-
time when increasing w. Albeit being a limiting factor of our ap-
proach, we remark that to the best of our knowledge all applications
considered so far in privacy research have a very small branching fac-
tor in their functionalities, which leads to very small w. For example,
all use cases in this chapter have a width of at most w = 3, which is
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Figure 36: Averaged runtime of the protocol selection algorithm for different
graph widths w.
solved in 0.1 seconds and we remark that even larger graphs with a
width of w = 10 are solved in seconds.
7.4.2 Use Cases
Next, we evaluate the generated circuits and protocol selections made
by HyCC for different use cases in the ABY framework [DSZ15]. The
ABY framework provides state-of-the-art implementations for Yao’s
protocol, GMW, OT-based additive secret sharing protocols, and the
corresponding conversion protocols, which makes it an ideal back-
end to evaluate the created circuits. For the evaluation, we use appli-
cations that illustrate the versatility of HyCC or that have previously
been used to benchmark MPC protocols and compilers. A more de-
tailed description of the applications is given in Section 2.5.
experimental setup. All applications are implemented based
on textbook algorithms and compiled with HyCC using a total opti-
mization time of T = 10minutes. We used the ABY framework to eval-
uate the generated circuits on two identical machines with an Intel
Core i7-4790 CPU and 32GB RAM, connected via a 1Gbps local net-
work, denoted as LAN. To simulate an Internet connection between
the MPC parties, denoted as WAN, we use the Linux tool tc to set a
latency of 50ms (100ms RTT) and limit the throughput to 100Mbps.
We set the symmetric security parameter to 128 bit. Running times
are median numbers from 10measurements. The symbol“—” denotes
that no values were given or benchmarked.
For all applications the number of non-linear (multiplicative) gates,
communication rounds, transferred bytes, and the protocol runtime
of the setup phase and of the online phase are measured. For compari-
son purposes we provide these numbers not only for the best protocol
selection, but also for different instantiations of the same functional-
ity, e.g., all modules evaluated in a Boolean circuit-based protocol,
or a hybrid of a Boolean circuit and Arithmetic circuit. As before,
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we use A to denote an Arithmetic secret sharing based protocol, B
for the GMW protocol, and Y for Yao’s garbled circuits. We omitted
A-only measurements for use cases that include bit-operations (e.g.,
minimum, comparison), since these are extremely costly in A proto-
col and therefore not implemented in ABY [DSZ15].
Biometric Matching (BioMatch)
As in previous chapters, we evaluate the BioMatch application, which
computes the minimum Euclidean distance as the minimum of the
distances from a single coordinate to a list of coordinates. We use
databases consisting of n ∈ {1,000; 4,096; 16,384} samples with di-
mension d = 4, where each coordinate has bit length b = 32 bit and
show performance results in Table 17.
We compare a hand-built hybrid ABY circuit [DSZ15] with a cir-
cuit that is compiled with HyCC. The results show that the circuits
that we automatically compiled from a standard ANSI C description
achieve the same complexity as the circuits that were hand-built and
manually optimized in ABY. Here, a combination of Arithmetic proto-
cols and Yao’s protocol (A+Y) achieves the best runtime in all settings.
The runtimes in both implementations show a slight variation that is
due to variance of the network connection. We remark that the setup
phase of the ABY circuit is more efficient, because ABY allows SIMD
preprocessing, which is currently not implemented in HyCC.
To show the efficiency gain of hybrid protocols over standalone
protocols, we give experiments using B or Y protocols only. These
protocols are significantly less efficient and for larger input sizes even
exceed the memory resources of our benchmark hardware.
Machine Learning (ML)
Machine learning (ML) has many applications and therefore also
many privacy-preserving implementations have been proposed.
supervised machine learning – neural networks . We
implement CryptoNets [Gil+16] and the MiniONN CNN [Liu+17],
which both have recently been proposed to detect characters from the
MNIST handwriting data set. Previously these use cases needed to
be carefully built by hand, while we achieve even better performance
when conveniently compiling easily understandable C source code to
a hybrid MPC protocol.
Table 18 shows machine learning performance results. For Cryp-
tonets, HyCC automatically determined A as the best protocol in the
LAN setting. When changing the activation function (from the square
function to f(x) = max(0, x), known as RELU function), or when
changing the number representation (fixed point instead of integer),
a hybrid A+Y protocol becomes the fastest option.
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For the MiniONN CNN, HyCC proposes to use A+Y, where Y is
mainly used to compute the RELU activation function, which results
in a hybrid protocol that requires only a third of the online runtime,
total runtime, and total communication compared to the original Min-
iONN protocol [Liu+17]. When expressing the entire MiniONN func-
tionality solely as a Boolean, the circuit created by HyCC consists of
more than 250 million non-linear gates. Using Yao’s protocol in the
LAN setting, sending the corresponding garbled circuit would take
more than one minute, assuming perfect bandwidth utilization. Thus,
in comparison to all existing Boolean circuit compilers for MPC, i.e.,
single protocol compilers, HyCC achieves a runtime that is more than
one order of magnitude faster.
unsupervised machine learning – k-means . Clustering is
another data mining task, frequently used to identify centroids in
unstructured data. We evaluate a textbook k-means algorithm that
detects c = 4 clusters in 2-dimensional data sets of size n = 500 using
i = 8 iterations and show our results in Table 18. Also in this use case,
a hybrid A+Y protocol achieves the best runtime.
Gaussian Elimination
We implement a textbook Gauss solver with partial pivoting for n ∈
{10, 16} equations using a fixed point number representation and pre-
sent results in Table 19. In all scenarios, HyCC identifies A+Y as the
most efficient protocol, where Y is mainly used to compute the row
permutations and divisions. Note that due to the significant circuit
depth, we did not measure the runtime for Boolean circuits evaluated
with the GMW protocol in the WAN setting.
Database Analytics
Performing data analytics on sensitive data has numerous applica-
tions and therefore many privacy-preserving protocols and use cases
have been studied, e.g., [Bog+15; DHC04]. We study exemplary use
cases, where each party provides a database (array) of size nA and nB
that has two columns each, which are concatenated (merged), lead-
ing to a database of size n = nA + nB, or joined (inner join on one
attribute), yielding a database of maximum size n = nA · nB, and
then the mean and variance of one column of the combined database
are computed. The performance evaluation is shown in Table 21. We
observe that in both use cases, a combination of A+Y achieves min-
imal runtime in the LAN setting, with the division (and join) being
performed in Y. In the WAN setting, Y achieves optimal runtime and
minimal online communication.
7.5 related work 140
summary of experiments . Summarizing the results obtained
in all use cases, we observe that hybrid protocols consisting of A+Y,
achieve a very efficient runtime in the LAN deployment, whereas Y
is often the fastest protocol in the WAN deployment. We observe that
the GMW protocol (B) has barely been identified to achieve optimal
runtime for any of the benchmark applications. This is because we
performed all benchmarks in the function dependent preprocessing
model, which is the default setting in ABY, and which allows to gar-
ble the circuit in the setup phase. When using a function independent
cost model for preprocessing, HyCC identifies A+B as the fastest pro-
tocol combination in the LAN setting for many applications.
conclusions and future work . In our evaluation we observed
that hybrid protocols can significantly outperform standalone proto-
cols. HyCC is capable of automatically synthesizing the required hy-
brid circuits from a high-level description and selecting them for a
given deployment scenario. As such, HyCC is even capable of outper-
forming certain hand-optimized protocols. Thus, we conclude that
HyCC makes hybrid MPC more practical and also accessible to de-
velopers without expert-knowledge in MPC.
In future work, we will extend HyCC with floating point operations
and integrate more MPC protocols with different cost models. A nat-
ural candidate for extension is homomorphic encryption, similar to
TASTY [Hen+10]. Another possibility would be integrating trusted
hardware environments such as Intel’s SGX.
7.5 related work
To the best of our knowledge, only a few MPC frameworks and
compilers have been presented that support hybrid MPC protocols.
TASTY [Hen+10] and L1 [SKM11] combine Yao’s garbled circuits
with additively homomorphic encryption. Both have compiler sup-
port, where the programmer has to manually select the respective
protocol per operation. The Sharemind framework [BLR14; BLW08]
has been extended to support multiple MPC protocols and provides
a compiler for these with a focus on linear secret sharing. Moreover,
the user has to manually select the protocol type for operations in
Sharemind. The ABY framework [DSZ15] provides state-of-the-art
implementations of Yao’s Garbled Circuits, the GMW protocol, and
additive linear sharing for Arithmetic circuits, as well as efficient
conversions between these three protocols (see Section 2.2) in the 2-
party setting. ABY3 [MR18] is a novel framework for hybrid secure
3-party computation with a honest majority. The circuits generated
from HyCC can directly be used by ABY and ABY3. Very recently,
Chandran et al. [Cha+17] proposed a solution for hybrid compilation
of MPC protocols called EzPC. However, while the main motivation
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is similar, our results differ in several key points. In EzPC, a devel-
oper needs to invest much more work to manually split the input
program into suitable modules and needs to manually resolve private
array accesses into multiplexer-like structures, which hardly goes be-
yond what’s already possible using the underlying ABY framework.
Furthermore, EzPC does not apply circuit optimization methods and
cannot cope with depth-minimized Boolean circuits, as required for
the GMW protocol, which is beneficial for Boolean operations in low-
latency networks.
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optimize(Modules M, Topt, Tmin, λinit, λm)
1 : foreach m inM do
2 : t← Topt · λinit · size(m) · occurrences(m)size(M)
3 : m ′ ← locally_optimize(m, t)
4 : M← update_modules(M, m ′)
5 : Topt ← Topt − duration()
6 : endfor
7 : Q← init_queue(M)
8 : while Topt > 0 do
9 : m← Q.pop()
10 : t← min(Topt · λm, Tmin)
11 : if has_constant_inputs(m) then
12 : m ′ ← propagate_constants(m, t)
13 : else
14 : m ′ ← locally_optimize(m, t)
15 : endif
16 : M← update_modules(M, m ′)
17 : Q← update_queue(Q,m ′)
18 : Topt ← Topt − duration()
19 : endwhile
20 : returnM
Algorithm 1: Optimization heuristic. The functions receives all modules M,
an optimization time limit Topt, a minimum constant time
Tmin, which is necessary to perform a complete run of a lo-
cal optimization, and two factors λinit and λm describing the
fraction of time to be used for the initial and all later optimiza-
tion runs. Function locally_optimize() performs the fixed point
optimization routine described in Section 4.4, whereas func-
tion propagate_contants() only propagates constants Boolean
or arithmetic values. Function update_queue(m) adds m to the
queue and updates all other elements about possible constant
inputs and than reorders the elements accordingly.
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protocol_selection(DAG G, instruction list IL)
1 : WS← G.inputs
2 : foreach c in share_combinations(WS) do
3 : cost_table[c]← cost_input_sharing(c)
4 : endfor
5 : foreach m inG.modules ordered by IL do
6 : WS ′ ← remove_completed(WS∪m)
7 : foreach c ′ ∈ share_combination(WS ′) do
8 : cost_table ′[c ′]← eval_costs(WS,WS ′, c ′, cost_table)
9 : endfor
10 : WS←WS ′
11 : cost_table← cost_table ′
12 : endfor
13 : return min(cost_table)
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for optimal protocol selection. The algorithm takes
as input the DAG of the program with the circuit descriptions
of all modules. It returns the protocol cost for the optimal pro-
tocol selection.
eval_costs(WS,WS ′, c ′, cost_table)
1 : min←∞
2 : foreach c ∈ share_combinations(WS)
3 : cost← cost_step(WS,WS ′, c, c ′)
4 : if cost+ cost_table[c] < min then
5 : min← cost+ cost_table[c]
6 : endif
7 : return min
8 : endfor
Algorithm 3: Algorithm to compute the cheapest evaluation cost to compute
the next WS ′ in a specific protocol configuration. The algo-
rithm takes as input the two working sets WS,WS ′, the desig-
nated protocol configuration for WS ′, denoted as c ′, as well as
a table with the cheapest cost to compute all possible protocol
configurations c of WS.
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8
C O M P I L AT I O N F O R R A M - B A S E D S E C U R E
C O M P U TAT I O N
Summary: MPC protocols are powerful privacy enhancing technologies.
Yet, their scalability is limited for data intensive applications due to the cir-
cuit computation model. Therefore, RAM based secure computation (RAM-
SC) has been proposed, which combines MPC with Oblivious RAM (ORAM).
Unfortunately, realizing efficient RAM-SC applications by hand is a tedious
and error-prone task, which requires expert knowledge in ORAM protocols
and circuit design. To make things worse, a multitude of ORAMs with differ-
ent trade-offs has been proposed. To overcome this entry barrier to RAM-SC,
we present a two-fold approach. First, we explore all cost dimensions of rel-
evant ORAMs in various deployment scenarios. Second, we present a fully
automatized compilation approach from ANSI C to RAM-SC by extending
CBMC-GC. The presented approach analyzes the input source code and ex-
tracts relevant information about the usage patterns of all arrays in the code.
The results of the analysis are then used to predict the runtime of suitable
ORAMs and to identify the ORAM that achieves minimal runtime. Thus, for
the first time, RAM-SC also becomes accessible to non-domain experts.
Remarks: This chapter is based on our paper – “Towards Practical RAM-based
Secure Computation”, Niklas Büscher, Alina Weber, and Stefan Katzenbeisser,
which appeared in the Proceedings of the 23rd European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), Barcelona, Spain, 2018.
8.1 motivation and overview
In previous chapters, we observed that almost all MPC protocols have
in common that they compute functionalities in the circuit computa-
tion model. Thus, to compute a function f, the function has to be
represented as Boolean or Arithmetic circuit Cf. Unfortunately, every
random memory access, i.e., an access to an array with private index,
in this model requires a scan of the complete memory, which renders
MPC protocols impractical for any data intensive application. To over-
come this performance barrier, Gordon et al. [Gor+12] proposed the
idea of RAM-SC (introduced in detail in Section 2.3.2), later refined by
Liu et al. [Liu+14], which combines MPC with ORAM [GO96]. Thus,
RAM-SC partially performs the same MPC computations, yet every
RAM access is evaluated (more efficiently) using an ORAM proto-
col. ORAMs obfuscate each RAM access by producing a sequence of
physical accesses that is indistinguishable to a random access pattern.
Many ORAMs using a wide range of constructions have been pro-
posed, e.g., [KLO12; LO13; Shi+11; Ste+13], and recently also new
ORAMs optimized for RAM-SC have been presented, e.g, optimized
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Figure 37: ORAM access time in RAM-SC. Runtime in seconds for differ-
ent ORAMs to perform a b = 32 bit write access in RAM-SC for
arrays with different numbers of elements log2(m). Figure 37a
illustrates the results for a high connectivity network, e.g., data-
center setting with 1.03 Gbit bandwidth and 0.5ms latency. In
Figure 37b the results for a WAN setting with 200 Mbit band-
width and 50ms latency is shown.
Tree ORAM [Gen+13], SCORAM [Wan+14], Circuit ORAM (C-ORAM)
[WCS15], optimized Square-Root ORAM (SQ-ORAM) [Zah+16], and
Function-secret-sharing Linear ORAM (FLORAM) [Ds17a]. Though
RAM-SC is asymptotically more efficient than MPC, it is almost im-
possible to identify a suitable ORAM that achieves optimal runtime
by hand due to their complex cost models. Yet, the runtimes can differ
by multiple orders of magnitude depending on the ORAM choice.
For instance, the array size influences the ORAM choice. Namely,
all ORAMs have different ranges of use, as illustrated in Figure 37a,
where the (simulated) time to access a block of size 32 bit for ORAMs
of different sizes is shown. An access using circuit only techniques,
i.e., Linear Scan (LS), is very efficient for arrays of at most m = 29
elements, then from m = 211 to m = 215 elements, SQ-ORAM is
more efficient, yet being outperformed for m > 215 elements by both
FLORAM variants.
Hence, for an optimal decision it is necessary to consider the num-
ber of elements, the number of accesses, and the size of the accessed
elements. Yet, also the distinction between read or write accesses and
the distinction between accesses with private index or public index
is relevant. In the latter case, the array is accessed under encryption
yet the accessed position is leaked. For example, array accesses with
publicly known index can be performed at little cost in FLORAM, but
have to be performed with costs similar to an access with private in-
dex in C-ORAM. Additionally, the RAM initialization pattern within
the program influences the RAM-SC runtime. Moreover, each ORAM
has its own set of parameters that can be selected during instantia-
tion. While most parameters depend on the security parameter, some
8.1 motivation and overview 150
parameters, e.g., the recursion depth and the packing factor, have an
impact on the overall performance of the ORAM construction. Also,
the environment in which the protocol is executed has to be taken
into account, as all ORAMs have different communication and com-
putation patterns. This includes the properties of the network con-
nection (bandwidth and latency), but also the computational power
of the executing hardware. The impact of the network environment
is illustrated in Figure 37a and Figure 37b, where the difference be-
tween a high-connectivity setup and a typical Internet like (WAN)
setup is illustrated. We observe noticeable differences in the range of
use of all schemes, when changing from the DC to the WAN setting.
Concluding, for an optimal ORAM choice it is necessary to consider
all aforementioned parameters. Up to know it is a tedious task for a
developer to create an efficient RAM-SC program, as this requires an
array usage statistic of the input program and in depth knowledge
about ORAMs and their deployment costs.
compiler for ram-sc . To make RAM-SC accessible for non-
domain experts, we present an automatized framework that analyzes
which ORAMs (if at all) should be used to achieve optimal runtime
for a RAM-SC program with a given number of array accesses and a
deployment scenario. Moreover, by implementing the framework in
CBMC-GC, we provide a compile-chain from generic ANSI C code
into a RAM-SC program.
In contrast to previous work, such as SCVM [Liu+14] and its succes-
sor ObliVM [Liu+15b], which statically decide for or against a single
ORAM, our approach is aware of all aforementioned cost dimensions
of RAM-SC. Namely, we automatically identify all array accesses (in-
dividually for each array in the input code), determine an optimal
ORAM choice depending on the access pattern, which includes the
optimal selection of ORAM parameters, and automatically partition
the code into circuit based computations and ORAM accesses.
For this purpose, we revisit C-ORAM, which is the most efficient
tree-based ORAM optimized for MPC, SQ-ORAM, and FLORAM,
which both have been developed to outperform C-ORAM for mid-
sized arrays, to develop a library with gate-precise costs models. This
library allows runtime estimations for arbitrary ORAM sizes, access
patterns, and deployment scenarios within seconds, which is mul-
tiple orders of magnitude faster than benchmarking all ORAMs in
an actual deployment scenario. Using a modular composition, the
library can be adapted to future ORAMs with ease and circuit build-
ing blocks, e.g., oblivious shuffle, can be replaced once faster con-
structions are known. Moreover, the library can compute multiple
different cost metrics, e.g., to determine which ORAM has minimal
communication complexity in a given scenario. As a side-product of
our studies, we present practical optimizations for all ORAMs that
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reduce the runtime for each access of up to a factor of two. Further-
more, we present the first extensive study of RAM-SC runtimes for
different real world deployment scenarios and show that the use of
ORAMs over purely circuit based computations is often only useful
for arrays larger than one could assume.
chapter outline . We study the different ORAMs and propose
optimizations in Section 8.2, before describing the compiler in Sec-
tion 8.3. Afterwards, an evaluation of our approach is given in Sec-
tion 8.4. Finally, we briefly discuss related work in Section 8.5.
8.2 analysis and optimization of orams for secure com-
putation
In order to precisely determine the best suiting ORAM for a RAM-
SC application, in this section we revisit the most efficient ORAMs
for RAM-SC to establish gate-precise cost models. These models al-
low the approximation of runtime costs in any RAM-SC deployment,
which forms the basis for the optimizing compiler in Section 8.3. Since
RAM accesses are basic primitives for any algorithm, we also pro-
pose gate-level optimizations for all ORAMs. We begin with a de-
scription of implementation pitfalls observed in previous implemen-
tations, which can lead to inefficient RAM-SC.
8.2.1 Pitfalls of ORAM implementations for MPC
ORAMs are complex cryptographic primitives, and thus substantial
engineering effort is necessary to translate them in efficient circuit
representations as required for RAM-SC. Consequently, the major-
ity of ORAM implementations in MPC is written in high-level lan-
guages for MPC and translated using compilers for MPC. Unfortu-
nately, due to the lacking maturity of tools, compilers, and program-
ming paradigms, a straight-forward high-level implementation does
not automatically translate into an efficient circuit description. Thus,
while revising the ORAMs and their implementations we identified
the following inefficiencies and provide hints for future implementa-
tions.
overallocation of internal variables . Some MPC com-
pilers use fixed bit-widths for all program variables. For example,
leaf identifiers for any tree based ORAM scheme can be represented
as bit strings of log (m) bits. Consequently, for small to medium
numbers of elements m, e.g., m < 232, a fixed integer bit-width of
32 bit, introduces a noticeable overhead in the number of used gates,
which also propagates to subsequent (possibly recursive) computa-
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tions. Therefore, it is preferable to either use optimizing compilers,
such as CBMC-GC [Hol+12] or to adjust the bit-width accordingly.
insufficient constant propagation. Constants are not al-
ways properly identified and propagated by some compilers, espe-
cially between multiple functions, which can result in cascading ef-
fects of significant circuit size. This especially concerns temporary
variables in conditional blocks, which can be expressed by wires with-
out any gate costs, but are often multiplexed with all other variables
in the conditional.
duplicated multiplexer blocks . Conditional blocks are rep-
resented by multiplexers on the circuit level. When using if/else
statements that write the same variable (with different values), some
compilers introduce duplicated multiplexer blocks, one for each write.
However, both can be merged into a single conditional write, which
results in a smaller circuit. We are not aware of compilers explicitly
optimizing this use case, yet compilers with logic minimizers that
support structural hashing and circuit rewriting partly achieve this
goal (cf. Chapter 4).
bound checking . The most recent ORAM implementations for
MPC [Ds17a; Zah+16] perform an inefficient out-of-bounds check for
each array access. To limit the accessible range, indexes are masked
using a modulo computation, which requires a significant number of
gates. While there is no perfect solution to this problem, as there is
no unified error handling approach in MPC, several other and more
efficient approaches exist. For example, an MPC compiler that is able
to identify that all accesses are within their bounds can be used (if
possible), a faster masking scheme can be used, or for some schemes
the ORAM’s size can be increased to the next power of two without
a noticeable loss in runtime.
fixed parameters for recursive oram structures . Most
of the existing ORAM schemes use recursive techniques to store the
position map. Hence, these ORAM schemes are parameterized to con-
figure the maximum recursion depth or the packing factor, i.e., num-
ber of addresses per bucket. These parameters are often hard-coded
into the ORAM’s algorithm and cannot be changed dynamically to
achieve optimal costs. However, it is preferable to select them opti-
mally during compilation. For example, the access to an array with
m = 29 elements using a bit-width of b = 32 bit can reduce the
access time in C-ORAM by 44%, when using an optimal choice of
parameters in a DC environment.
8.2 analysis and optimization of orams for secure computation 153
8.2.2 Circuit Models and Optimized ORAM Construction for MPC
To determine an optimal ORAM choice for RAM-SC, we develop cir-
cuit, computation and communication models for all schemes, which
are composed of hand-crafted circuit building blocks, e.g., conditional
swap, adder, or shuffle. Using a modular construction of all ORAM
schemes allows to adapt to future improved building blocks, to re-
combine different ORAM schemes (e.g., for the recursive position
map), and to evaluate different implementation options.
The developed models are based on the papers and their imple-
mentations [Ds17a; WCS15; Zah+16] and precisely consider the num-
ber of non-linear gates, the communication complexity (rounds and
bandwidth), and auxiliary computation costs, i.e., computations per-
formed outside of secure computation. We use optimal bit-widths for
variables and avoid the earlier described pitfalls. As this is purely
an engineering task, we do not elaborate on the created models, but
rather focus on their optimization. We begin with a study of the triv-
ial circuit solution.
trivial circuit solution. Traditionally, MPC compilers trans-
late a dynamic array access into a linear scan (LS) of the complete
memory to hide which position was actually accessed. The most effi-
cient MPC circuit construction for LS read is based on a multiplexer
tree that bit-wise encodes the accessed index over the stages of the
tree. For write accesses a decoder of m− 1 non-linear gates is used
to convert the index to a so called One-Hot Code, where each bit
of the decoders’ output is connected to a multiplexer, which selects
either the element to write or the previous data. These circuit con-
structions are described in detail in Section 4.3. In contrast to ORAM
schemes, the elements are not shared between the parties but reside
inside the garbled circuit. Hence, while LS has a significant circuit
size for a growing numbers of elements, it is very efficient in case of
networks with high latencies and smaller array sizes, as accesses can
be performed in zero rounds and without any initialization.
We note that LS is also used in other ORAM schemes, e.g., to read
the stash, buckets, or one of the recursive layers. In this cases it might
be necessary to perform a LS using an equivalence comparator on
additional metadata, as the data might be unordered.
c-oram . C-ORAM [WCS15] was presented to reduce the costs of
the most practical ORAM, i.e., Path ORAM, in RAM-SC. This goal
has been realized by optimizing the eviction algorithm for minimal
circuit size. C-ORAM is known to achieve almost optimal asymptotic
cost, and is thus the best suiting ORAM scheme for larger arrays. Un-
fortunately, C-ORAM suffers from high initialization costs, as each
element has to be initially written in an ordinary ORAM access. Fur-
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thermore, C-ORAM is a multi-round protocol, where the number of
communication rounds is dominated by the recursive structure of the
scheme. Nevertheless, accesses to physical blocks can be performed
using the soldering approach, which only requires to transmit the
computed public indices. Explained in more detail in Section 2.3.2,
soldering functions by continuing the circuit garbling and evaluation
by using wire the labels stored at a position that is revealed to parties.
The most recent implementation of C-ORAM [Ds17a] that we are
aware of has been implemented with OblivC, which neither opti-
mizes the bit-width of internal variables nor thoroughly eliminates
unnecessary multiplexer blocks. This has a significant impact on the
number of gates required for the eviction algorithm, where for ex-
ample variables with bit-width log (log (m) + 1) are sufficient to rep-
resent the tree height. Additionally, an inefficient implementation of
LS is used. Furthermore, the ReadAndRemove() operation used in all
tree ORAMs to read and move a path into the stash, can be opti-
mized such that only necessary metadata and isDummy flag is ac-
cessed, rather than all metadata. The existing implementation uses a
large multiplexer construction over the whole data block, which can
thus be partly omitted. This is because the leaf identifier and virtual
index are known beforehand and will be overwritten with a new ran-
dom value anyways when the block is written back to the stash.
sq-oram . Optimized SQ-ORAM [Zah+16] has been proposed to
outperform C-ORAM for moderate array sizes, albeit being asymp-
totically less efficient. For small numbers of elements the circuit com-
plexity is (surprisingly) small, as the major costs stem from the scan
of the stash, i.e., the temporary cache, whose publicly known size is
of at most
√
m. SQ-ORAM has a substantially more efficient initializa-
tion phase in comparison to C-ORAM. Physical blocks are efficiently
accessed using the soldering approach. However, similar to C-ORAM,
the number of communication rounds depends on the number of re-
cursive position maps, which is in logc (m) with c being the packing
factor.
The implementation of Square-Root ORAM in Obliv-C was done
by the original authors of the paper, is highly optimized, and is, to
the best of our knowledge, the most efficient implementation of this
scheme. For their construction the same low-level optimizations as
described for C-ORAM can be applied, while the LS is already using
the most efficient version.
floram . FLORAM is the most recent ORAM scheme for RAM-SC.
Based on PIR techniques, O(m) server computations are required per
access, however, these are performed outside secure computation and
lead to very low communication complexity. For the generation of the
FSS, the FLORAM algorithm requires 2 · log2 (m) AES encryptions
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that have to be computed inside a circuit, which consists of ≈ 5000
non-linear gates each. Being a constant round protocol, FLORAM has
a huge advantage over the other ORAMs in high latency settings.
Furthermore, in contrast to other ORAMs, it is possible to efficiently
perform semi-private accesses with little costs, as the physical ad-
dresses of the elements correspond to the virtual addresses used. The
implementation of FLORAM uses inefficient modulo operations to
compute the element position inside its 128 bit data blocks, which re-
quires additional 6000 non-linear gates upon each access. This checks
can be omitted, when using a packing factor c that is a power of two,
which is the case when using standard data types.
fcprg . The CPRG optimization for FLORAM was proposed to re-
move the expensive computation of the many AES encryptions within
MPC, so that both parties are able to compute the encryptions lo-
cally and only input their results into the secure computation for each
stage of the FSS tree. Hence, it introduces a trade-off by reducing the
computational effort within the MPC protocol, yet turns the constant
round protocol into a multi-round protocol with O(log2 (m)) rounds.
The implementation of the FCPRG scheme can be optimized in the
same manner as the original FLORAM.
optimal parameter selection for recursive orams .
Most ORAM schemes come with a set of parameters that can be se-
lected for every instantiation. For example, while maintaining the
same level of security, larger buckets in tree based ORAMs allow
to use a smaller stash [Wan+14], which influences the resulting cir-
cuit complexity and thus RAM-SC runtime. Therefore, for an optimal
ORAM instantiation in RAM-SC it is desirable to identify optimal pa-
rameters. These parameters, i.e., bucket size, stash size, number of
levels in ORAMs with recursive position maps, and the eviction strat-
egy are (often) constrained by the desired security level, as well as
the failure probability (overflow of the stash). Fortunately, for most
ORAM schemes, safe parameter ranges for different security configu-
rations have been proposed [Ste+13; WCS15; Wan+14]. Within these
ranges, we solve the combinatorial optimization problem by exhaus-
tive search over the parameter space, which can be performed in sec-
onds for all schemes.
Although we only described optimizations that lead to constant
improvements, in Section 8.4.2 we observe gate reductions of practi-
cal relevance, namely up to 70.7% for C-ORAM, 17.9% for SQ-ORAM,
and up to 35.6% for FCPRG, when implementing the above-mentioned
optimizations.
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Figure 38: The compilation chain of CBMC-GC with modifications marked
in gray to compile RAM-SC programs.
8.3 automatized ram-sc
In order to facilitate the broad usage of RAM-SC, we present an au-
tomatized compilation approach from ANSI C to RAM-SC that is able
to detect dynamic memory accesses in a high-level input language
and that places the corresponding arrays into ORAMs without the
need of any interaction, e.g., by annotations, from the programmer.
To achieve this goal, we follow a two-step approach. First, an in-
put code analysis and transformation is performed that identifies ar-
rays and enumerates array usage statistics. Second, an optimizer is
invoked that identifies a suitable scheme for each array in the input
code for a selected runtime environment, using the analysis result of
the first step, as well as the cost models developed in Section 8.2.
8.3.1 Input Code Analysis and Transformation
To transform an input source code into a RAM-SC program, a naïve
compilation can be performed by iterating over the abstract syntax
tree of the input source code and by translating each array and ac-
cess into an equivalent RAM access. However, this approach leads to
very inefficient RAM-SC programs, as not every access requires full
memory trace-obliviousness. For example, arrays can also be accessed
purely with public indexes or with a mix of public and private indices.
Moreover, the number of accesses, as well as the initialization of the
array, play an important role for the performance of RAM-SC (cf. Sec-
tion 8.4.1). Also the order of accesses is of relevance, e.g., in the case
of semi-private accesses, the stash size in FLORAM only depends on
the number of writes. Therefore, for an optimized compilation it is
important to create precise array usage statistics.
We implemented such a more advanced compilation approach for
CBMC-GC, which provides the most powerful Symbolic Execution
(SE), required for the analysis, of all currently available compilers for
MPC. Its powerful constant propagation performed on the source-
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code level allows to separate private and semi-private array accesses.
Recapping Chapter 3, CBMC-GC unrolls the input program and trans-
lates it into a SSA form. This form is then used for a SE, also referred
to as Expression Simplication, of the source code. During SE, every
expression of the unrolled code is visited and partial evaluation is per-
formed. In this chapter, we extend the SE interface for array accesses
to i.) maintain a list of all allocated arrays, ii.) track each access, and
iii.) distinguish semi-private and private accesses.
This approach allows to create a detailed usage statistic for each
array, which consists of array size m, element bit-width b, an enu-
meration of all (semi-)private reads and writes, and an initialization
pattern. Namely, we distinguish the case that an array is initialized i.)
by only one party, ii.) by using only public indices, e.g., by iterating
over the array, or iii.) in a random manner purely based on private
writes.
To compile a RAM-SC program the existing LS interface, which is
CBMC-GC’s traditional approach to handle array accesses, is over-
written, such that each array read or write is replaced by input and
output wires of the circuit. Using this approach the compiler does
not need to be aware of the concept of RAM-SC, as it is only con-
cerned about the computations performed in the circuit model. Con-
sequently, the remaining code is compiled into a circuit using the
existing compilation chain of CBMC-GC, which is illustrated in Fig-
ure 38. This ensures to profit from all implemented gate-level opti-
mizations. To execute a compiled RAM-SC program, the inputs and
outputs have to be connected to ORAM client circuits, which are se-
lected in the second compilation step.
8.3.2 Optimal ORAM Selection
Given a detailed array access description, an optimizing compiler
should select the ORAM that achieves minimal costs, e.g., provides
optimal runtime. For this purpose, our compiler computes a model
of all ORAM schemes for a given array description with the help of
the ORAM library developed in Section 8.2. Afterwards, the secure
ORAM parameter space is identified for a desired security level. Fi-
nally, this combinatorial optimization problem is solved by enumerat-
ing the complete search space, consisting of all ORAMs and their pos-
sible configurations, which is manageable in seconds on commodity
hardware. The optimal choice depends on the applied evaluation met-
ric, which currently is either the runtime or the number of transferred
bits. Next, we describe how to predict the runtime in RAM-SC, which
requires additional input to the compiler, and remark that these ideas
can also be transferred to other metrics, e.g., cloud computing costs
(cf. [Pat+16]) with little engineering effort.
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runtime estimation. Using the library developed in the pre-
vious section, the runtime of all RAM accesses within a RAM-SC
program can be estimated efficiently for a computing environment
specified by the developer. Namely, taking the type of array usage
description and the security parameter κ into account, the library re-
turns a gate count, the number of communication rounds, the number
of OTs, and additional local costs, e.g., such as the FSS evaluation for
FLORAM. The environment is described by three parameters, i.e., the
computational power (as the non-linear gate throughput, the number
of OTs that can be performed per second, and the time to evaluate a
FSS scheme), the available bandwidth, and the round trip time.
For runtime approximation we assume that the computing time
is linear in the number of non-linear gates and the number of OTs,
which is a reasonable assumption as in practice both depend on the
throughput of the AES-NI hardware extension. Thus, assuming per-
fect resource allocation and parallel generation of garbled tables and
their transmission (known as streaming), the runtime is estimated as
the sum of the time until the last gate has been evaluated (assuming a
constant garbling throughput) by the circuit evaluator, the time to per-
form OTs with OT Extension (assuming a constant OT throughput),
and number of communication rounds times the latency. The runtime
for the circuit initialization can be estimated in a similar manner.
Although simplifying the RAM-SC computation, we only observed
moderate deviations in a lab setting (a detailed experimental study is
given in [Web17, 49 ff.]) that are decreasing with increasing RAM size,
when comparing to experimentally measured runtimes. These devia-
tions are especially acceptable as only the relation between different
ORAM schemes is of major relevance.
optimizing multidimensional arrays . Multidimensional
arrays can be represented in a single or in multiple (hierarchical struc-
tured) ORAMs, where one ORAM scheme is used per dimension.
The latter can be more efficient, if one dimension is predominately
accessed using static indexes. Therefore, our compiler studies both
cases, i.e., using multiple or a singular ORAM separately to identify
the optimal choice.
8.4 experimental evaluation
We give a threefold evaluation of our approach for automatized RAM-
SC. First, we evaluate the parameter space that influences the choice
for a suitable ORAM when implementing a RAM-SC application. Sec-
ond, we study the circuit optimizations presented in Section 8.2.2. Fi-
nally, we illustrate the compilation approach introduced in Section 8.3
for an exemplary use case.
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experimental setup. Our evaluation is based on the runtime
estimation, described in the previous section. Assuming a state of the
art implementation of Yao’s protocol, cf. Section 2.2.2, and a com-
modity CPU, at least 10 million (M) non-linear gates can be gar-
bled per second per core (fixed-key garbling [Bel+13]), where two
wire labels per non-linear gate have to be transmitted (cf. two halve
gates [ZRE15]). We use a security level of κ = 80 bit. Thus, each label
has length κgc = 80 bit. The computation of XOR is assumed to be
for free (free-XOR [KS08]). Similarly, we assume an efficient OT Ex-
tension implementation with a throughput of 10 millions (correlated)
OTs per seconds [Ash+13]. Two values with length κot = 80 bit have
to be transmitted per OT. We remark that in practice, the computa-
tion throughput could be experimentally determined in the executing
environment for better accuracy, yet also observe that these (conser-
vative) estimates, easily exceed the capacity of a 1 Gbit link. The time
to compute Base OTs is left of out scope, as these only need to be
computed once and have practically negligible costs for any larger
RAM-SC application. The computational effort for the local computa-
tions in FLORAM are taken from the evaluation and implementation
described in [Ds17a], assuming a parallelization onto four cores.
We investigate three exemplary network settings. First, for compar-
ison purposes with [Zah+16] we use a data center (DC) setting, a
scenario with 1.03 Gbit connectivity a low latency 0.5ms. Second, a
local area network (LAN) scenario, typical for the internal network
of a larger company, with a 1 Gbit bandwidth and 5ms latency is
studied. Finally, we study a wide area network (WAN) setting as it
can be found in nowadays Internet, i.e., servers located on different
continents with 200 Mbit bandwidth and 50ms latency.
8.4.1 RAM-SC Parameter Dimensions
We give a quantitative evaluation of the different parameter dimen-
sions of ORAM schemes. The results of this analysis are given in
Figure 39 and Figure 40, where the average ORAM access runtime or
the initialization costs is shown for different network settings, block
sizes b, and number of accesses n.
network settings . In the first column of Figure 39, the run-
time to perform a typical integer access with b = 32 bit for differ-
ent ORAM sizes m is shown in the three different network settings
without considering initialization costs. We observe that for latencies
above or equal to 5ms (LAN), LS is superior to all other schemes for
ORAM sizes of up to m ≈ 212 elements, afterwards, FLORAM be-
comes more efficient. The efficiency of LS and FLORAM stems from
the fact that they are constant (or zero) round protocols, whereas the
other recursive schemes are multi-round protocols. SQ-ORAM out-
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performs the other schemes for mid-sized RAM sizes, yet its advan-
tages decreases with increasing latency.
block size . The runtime of a single ORAM access without con-
sidering initialization costs for three different block sizes, namely
b = 64, 128, 1024 bit, in the DC and WAN setting is shown in the first
and second column of Figure 40. In general we observe that the op-
timal range of all ORAM schemes shifts towards smaller RAM sizes
with only marginal changes in their relation to each other. Moreover,
with increasing block sizes LS becomes more inefficient, because all
blocks are scanned to the full extent for every access.
number of accesses and initialization amortization.
The ORAM schemes have different initialization costs, which have not
been considered in the previous analyses. Shown in the second col-
umn of Figure 39 is the total time to initialize a RAM with m values
and to perform n accesses afterwards in the DC setting. We note that
the total runtime is given in seconds for Figure 39i and Figure 39ii and
days for Figure 39iii. We observe that LS and FLORAM have none or
negligible initialization costs, whereas SQ-ORAM and C-ORAM re-
quire a certain number of accesses to amortize their asymptotic costs.
In Figure 39i and Figure 39ii, the amortization of SQ-ORAM’s ini-
tialization costs is shown, which is achieved with n  m accesses.
Whereas C-ORAM requires almost n ≈ m accesses to amortize its
initialization as shown in Figure 39iii, albeit being around 10 times
faster per access than the second best ORAM, i.e., FCPRG, with a
total amortization time of 2900 days.
summary. For small block sizes and elements, LS is the recom-
mendation of choice in any network setting, SQ-ORAM is effective in
fast networks and for larger block sizes, yet has a very short range
of use that must be carefully studied before deployment. In all other
settings, FLORAM is the most promising ORAM. With its constant
rounds and the ability to parallelize the server workload, it is sig-
nificantly less constrained by network resources, which is the most
limiting factor for the other ORAMs. In fast networks FCPRG slightly
outperforms FLORAM, but also has a comparably high round com-
plexity (logarithmic to the power of two, and not logarithmic to the
packing factor c, as SQ-ORAM and C-ORAM). We were unable to
identify a scenario where C-ORAM amortizes its high initialization
costs with less than one month total runtime to outperform FLORAM
or FCPRG.
8.4 experimental evaluation 161
5 10 15 20 25
10−4
10−2
100
log2(m)
a.) DC, b = 32 bit
ru
nt
im
e
[s
]
20 40 60
10−1
100
101
number of accesses
i.) DC, m = 212,
b = 32 bit
to
ta
lr
un
ti
m
e
[d
]
5 10 15 20 25
10−4
10−2
100
log2(m)
b.) LAN, b = 32 bit
ru
nt
im
e
[s
]
20 40 60
10−1
100
101
number of accesses
ii.) DC, m = 210,
b = 1024 bit
to
ta
lr
un
ti
m
e
[s
]
5 10 15 20 25
10−3
10−1
101
log2(m)
c.) WAN, b = 32 bit
ru
nt
im
e
[s
]
10 15 20 25 30
100
102
104
log2(number of accesses)
iii.) DC, m = 230,
b = 32 bit
to
ta
lr
un
ti
m
e
[d
]
LS C-ORAM SQ-ORAM FCPRG FLORAM
Figure 39: Network settings and initialization costs in RAM-SC. In the first
column the average runtime for one RAM-SC access is shown in
different network settings and for different sizes m. In the second
column the time to perform the first number n of accesses to an
ORAM is shown.
8.4.2 ORAM Optimizations
We evaluate the ORAM optimizations presented in Section 8.2.2 by
comparing the optimized ORAMs with the latest implementation
given in [Ds17a] in the number of non-linear gates. The resulting
circuit sizes are shown for an exemplary single write access for el-
ements of size b = 32 bit and different ORAM sizes m in Figure 41.
We observe that the break-even points between different schemes shift
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Figure 40: RAM-SC access runtimes for different block sizes. Illustrated is
the runtime of a one averaged RAM-SC access in seconds for
ORAMs of different size m and different block size b in two net-
work settings.
when comparing both figures. For example, both FLORAM variants
outperform LS for a lager number of elements than previously as-
sumed. The improvements of the individual schemes are discussed
in the following paragraph.
We observe a difference in form of a factor of two in the number
of (non-linear) gates between the optimized LS and the LS based on
equality comparators, as it has often been used in the past. This has
a noticeable impact on the break-even points with the other ORAM
schemes, as LS is more efficient than previously assumed. The dif-
ference between the two LS implementations becomes smaller with
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Figure 41: Circuit Optimization. Comparison of the circuit size (in the num-
ber of non-linear gates) between the ORAM schemes for RAM-
SC in [Ds17a], illustrated with dotted lines, and the optimized cir-
cuits described in 8.2.2, illustrated with solid lines, for one write
access of bit-width b = 32 bit and different array sizes m.
an increasing block size. The circuit size of C-ORAM is reduced by
40%− 70%. Yet, we remark that the difference between the two imple-
mentations slightly decreases when increasing m, as all overly allo-
cated resources are decreasingly used. The existing SQ-ORAM imple-
mentation is already highly optimized and therefore, only marginal
improvements are observed, i.e., for up to m = 211 elements, on aver-
age 12.5% non-linear gates are saved. We only observe marginal im-
provements for FLORAM with savings of up to 20.8% in non-linear
gates. This is because the majority of FLORAMs circuit consists of
already highly optimized AES circuits. This is not the case in FCPRG,
where only two AES circuits are used per access and therefore, an
improvement of up to 35.7% of non-linear gates is observed.
8.4.3 Use Case – Dijkstra Shortest Path Algorithm
We illustrate our compilation approach for an exemplary use case
that has previously been studied in RAM-SC research, namely Dijk-
stra’s single-source shortest path algorithm [Liu+14; Liu+15b]. One
party inputs a set of weighted edges between the nodes in the graph,
representing the distances, as a two-dimensional array (INPUT_A_e)
and the other party inputs the source and destination node, repre-
sented by the indices of the respective nodes. The algorithm, given in
Listing 17, consists of multiple arrays that are accessed in a semi- and
private manner.
In the first step of the compilation, constants are propagated, such
that unnecessary array access are removed, e.g., Line 9. Afterwards,
the array usage statistic is generated, which is illustrate for m = 8
nodes in Table 22. The code uses two one dimensional arrays, namely
an array to store visited nodes (vis) and an array to store the shortest
path to the source node (dis), as well as the two dimensional input
array that stores the distances between nodes (INPUT_A_e). Shown
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private semi-private
array b init read write read write
visited (vis) 8 false 0 8 64 8
distance (dis) 32 false 106 0 105 72
inner edges(INPUT_A_l1) 16 true 0 0 64 0
outer edges (INPUT_A_l0) 128 true 8 0 0 0
Table 22: Exemplary array usage statistics for m = 8. Statistics gathered by
the compiler extension after symbolic execution.
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Figure 42: Total runtime for all accesses to the arrays dis and INPUT_A_l0 in
Dijkstra’s algorithm.
is the analysis result when separating the two dimensions. The in-
ner dimension of the array is always accessed using a public index,
whereas the outer dimension is accessed with private indeces only.
Moreover, the arrays vis and dis are first written during the algorithm,
whereas, the weighted graph is already pre-initialized with values
from Party A. In the next compilation step, the statistics are handed
to the ORAM library. The runtime estimated by the ORAM library
in the DC setting for the two most compute intensive arrays is illus-
trated in Figure 42 for different graph sizes m. We note that the com-
piler is only able to compute absolute array usage statistics, yet not
parametrized formulas. Therefore, the results are based on multiple
compiler runs, one for each size m. Shown is the total runtime in sec-
onds to perform all semi- and private array accesses for the two most
efficient ORAM choices for each array. The array dis is best stored as
a LS for up to m = 28 nodes, then SQ-ORAM becomes most efficient.
For the INPUT_A_e array, a decomposition in two dimensions l0 and
l1 is more efficient than placing it in a single ORAM. Form 6 29 a SQ-
ORAM representation of the outer array dimension INPUT_A_e_l0
is most efficient. Albeit being a small array, the significant block size
to store the second layer of the array makes LS inefficient. For m > 29
nodes, FCPRG becomes most efficient.
We observe, that even for simple algorithms, an automatized ap-
proach is highly beneficial, as many factors need to be considered
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1 # def ine M 128
2
3 typedef s t r u c t { shor t m[M] [M] ; } Graph ;
4
5 i n t main ( Graph INPUT_A_e , i n t INPUT_B_s , i n t INPUT_B_d ) {
6 char v i s [M] ; // inidicates if node has been visitied
7 i n t d is [M] ; // current smallest distance from src to dst
8 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < M; i ++) {
9 v i s [ i ] = 0 ; d i s [ i ] = 0 ;
10 }
11 v i s [ INPUT_B_s ] = 1 ;
12 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < M; i ++) {
13 dis [ i ] = INPUT_A_e .m[ INPUT_B_s ] [ i ] ;
14 }
15
16 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < M; i ++) {
17 i n t minj = −1;
18 f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j < M; j ++) {
19 i f ( ! v i s [ j ] && ( minj < 0 || dis [ j ] < dis [ minj ] ) )
20 minj = j
21 }
22 v i s [ minj ] = 1 ;
23 f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j < M; j ++) {
24 i f ( ! v i s [ j ] &&
25 ( d is [ minj ]+INPUT_A_e .m[ minj ] [ j ] < dis [ j ] ) ) {
26 dis [ j ] = dis [ minj ] + INPUT_A_e .m[ minj ] [ j ] ;
27 }
28 }
29 }
30 re turn dis [ INPUT_B_d ] ;
31 }
Listing 17: Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm. Source code is based on
[Liu+14] using CBMC-GC’s input annotations.
when manually selecting ORAMs. In total we observe runtime of
more than an hour for a moderately sized array, e.g., 210.
8.5 related work
The first compiler that combines ORAMs and MPC, named SCVM,
has been proposed by Liu et al. [Liu+14]. In follow-up works, Liu et al.
presented the ObliVM [Liu+15b] compiler targeting practical RAM-
SC, and adapted this compiler for the needs ORAM supported hard-
ware synthesis [Liu+15a]. These compilers translate a domain-specific
or annotated language that compiles specially marked arrays into
RAM-SC programs using a single ORAM type. Although simplify-
ing the development effort for RAM-SC, the developer is still re-
quired to have expert knowledge in ORAMs. The OblivC compiler
by Zahur and Evans [ZE15] allows to jointly compile public and pri-
vate computations, and has therefore been used to implement many
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ORAM protocols, e.g., SQ-ORAM and FLORAM. However, it does
not primarily target RAM-SC and therefore does not provide any
form of automatization for RAM-SC.
Related to the work on RAM-SC, is the work on structured memory
accesses in MPC. For example, Zahur and Evans [ZE13] as well as
Keller and Scholl [KS14] have studied dedicated data structures, such
as oblivious stacks or queues that can outperform the generic ORAM
solution for applications with the according access pattern.
9
C O N C L U S I O N A N D F U T U R E W O R K
The growing complexity in information technology has a sincere im-
pact on the security of our systems and hence also on our privacy.
We further observe that the complexity of newly proposed protec-
tion mechanisms is also continuously increasing. An example are the
RAM-SC protocols studied in the previous chapter, which combine
MPC protocols with ORAMs. Their description individually fills re-
search papers. Thus, implementing secure applications and privacy-
preserving protocols becomes a challenging task, which limits their
widespread use.
In principle there are two solutions that allow to handle this level
of complexity, namely abstraction and automatization. We contribute
to both in this thesis, while mostly concentrating on the latter. We
make use of abstraction in the sense that we follow a strict separa-
tion between compilation and protocol framework. This allows to use
compilation goals that are based on abstract cost models rather than
concrete protocols implementations. On the automatization side, we
present a variety of compilation approaches and tools that automatize
the task to create PETs based on MPC protocols. By compiling for four
different protocol types, i.e., constant- and multi-round MPC proto-
cols over Boolean circuits, hybrid protocols and RAM-SC protocols
from the same input language, we introduce a degree of automatiza-
tion that not only allows to develop applications for different classes
of MPC protocols but also enables their rapid prototyping. This pro-
totyping also allows to evaluate whether generic MPC protocols are
a sufficient for a desired application or whether dedicated protocols
need to be designed. In many cases we are able to outperform pre-
vious (hand-made) applications and thus improve the efficiency of
applied MPC.
future work
Although we present compilation approaches for a multitude of di-
rections, there are many open ends that require future work and that
are outlined in the next paragraphs.
boolean circuit optimization. The limits of Boolean circuit
minimization in the number of non-linear circuit size or circuit depth
in both theory and practice are either unknown or have only re-
cently been studied. For example, it is known that every Boolean
function (one output bit) with l 6 5 inputs can be computed with
167
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at most snX = l− 1 non-linear gates [TP14]. Although the non-linear
complexity of a random Boolean function with l inputs is at least
snX = 2l/2 −O(l) with high probability [BPP00], the first concrete
function with non-linear complexity larger than l− 1 has only been
found in 2018 [CTP18]. Upper bounds for the side-depth trade-offs
of Boolean circuits have been studied in [BB94], where it has been
shown that every circuit with complexity n has an equivalent circuit
of depth O(log(n)). Yet to the best of our knowledge, there is little
known about the practical implications of this result, i.e., whether
efficient conversion algorithms with minimal or moderate size trade-
off exist. Moreover, there is mostly preliminary work on dedicated
heuristics for minimizing the non-linear complexity [BP10; CAS18].
Extending these theoretic results for practical relevant functions and
mapping these into a synthesis framework is a promising task to ex-
plore the limits of practical circuit minimization for MPC.
further compilation targets . We identify four further pos-
sible compilation targets, in which our work could be extend:
First, we only focused on the compilation of the private functional-
ity. Yet, an extension towards mixed-mode frameworks that support
both public and private computations, e.g., [ZE15; Liu+15b], is of in-
terest to create a wider range of applications. Fur this purpose, safe
type systems have already been proposed, e.g., [RHH14], and also
optimization techniques for mixed-mode applications have been pre-
sented, e.g., [Ker11]. Yet, the combination of mixed-mode computa-
tion and advanced circuit optimization has not been investigated so
far.
Second, during this thesis a different class of protocols became
of relevance, namely protocols operating on look-up tables [DK10;
Ish+13; Des+17]. Thus, instead of using gates with two inputs, gates
with more inputs, e.g., 8 bit input for the AES S-Box, are used. Com-
pilation for look-up tables is known in hardware synthesis and a first
compilation approach using these techniques is given in [Des+17].
Third, another compilation target are protocols with richer set of
operations. So far, we focused on the compilation towards elemen-
tary circuit operations. Nevertheless, a richer standard library with
more advanced protocols, e.g., sorting protocols, could be interesting
for the research on automatized algorithmic transformations. For ex-
ample, the Sharemind [BLW08] MPC framework provides dedicated
protocols for a very broad range of functionalities. The automatized
use of these dedicated protocols can lead to faster protocol execution.
Finally, in Chapter 8, we observed that RAM-SC is only at the verge
of being practical. Even in fast networks, RAM accesses create notice-
able costs. As it is impossible to perform a RAM access faster than the
latency, the round complexity becomes a sincere bottleneck in any in-
tercontinental deployment scenario. Consequently, parallelization for
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RAM-SC [BCP16; Lau15; Nay+15] with compiler support becomes
necessary to overcome the performance barrier of multi-round RAM-
SC protocols.
information leakage and developer support. To the best
of our knowledge, no compiler for MPC exists that provides automa-
tized feedback or implementation recommendations for performance
or security. For example, unintended information leakage in MPC
cannot be identified by traditional compilation methods, yet can be a
sincere security problem. Thus, an open research questions is whether
possible information leaks could automatically be detected by compil-
ers and reported to the developer. Similarly, it would be interesting to
see, if MPC specific inefficiencies could be detected and automatically
replaced by more efficient implementations. This would not only al-
low algorithmic optimizations, but also MPC specific optimizations,
e.g., the use of slow floating point operations could be investigated
during compile time to evaluate whether fixed-point computations
would be a correct and more efficient alternative.
verification. With the increasing number of protocols and their
complexity, also the compilers for MPC became more complex, cf.
Chapter 7. Therefore, verification techniques become of importance.
A first step has been made in [Alm+17], where a part of the compi-
lation chain is formally verified. However, the verification of an opti-
mizing circuit compilation chain is still an open problem.
In conclusion and albeit the many open topics, I sincerely hope
that this thesis could contribute a tiny piece to the enormous task
of making the powerful world of modern cryptography accessible to
non-domain experts.
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